Iran: Highlights: Friday Prayer Sermons, 30 March 2007
Originally published on 3/30/2007 by OSC Report in Persian
Highlights: Friday Prayer Sermons, 30 March 2007
The following are summaries of items posted on the 30 March 2007 IRNA website (http://www.irna.ir/) concerning Tehran, Qom, and provincial Friday prayer sermons.
The temporary Friday prayer leader of Tehran, Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Ahmad Khatami, said that the reform of the society can take place by reforming the family. He said that the spirit of the moral principles of Islam is to train people who have control over their passions. He regarded the disintegration of families a crisis for the West and said that some Westernized individuals are trying to bring the same crisis to Iran.
Regarding the captured British seamen, he said that no third party such as the Security Council or any other country has the right to interfere and should know that interference will complicate the situation and make it more difficult.
He said that British should know that it is no longer the 19th century, when they assumed the posture of an empire; today Britain is a defeated and isolated power and acts as a political middleman for the United States.
He said that Iran is a powerful Islamic country that stands against the United States, which is the master of Britain.
The temporary Friday prayer leader of Qom, Ayatollah Ebrahim Amini, said that the people of Islamic Iran with national unity and Islamic solidarity will stand against the bullying of the enemies and the great powers. He said that world imperialism not only opposes Iran’s scientific and economic progress but fights against any important movement that happens in Islamic countries.
The Friday prayer leader of Khorramabad, Hojjat ol-Eslam ‘Abbas ‘Ali Sadeqi, referred to 12 Farvardin [ 1 April], Islamic Republic Day, as the day of national unity and solidarity and said that on that day the 2,500 year monarchy was overthrown and Islamic religious government was established in Iran.
The Friday prayer leader of Birjand, Hojjat ol-Eslam Hoseyn Sadeqi, said that from the beginning of the Revolution, many ups and downs have occurred but never has Iran had a more successful year than 1385 [ 21 March 2006-20 March 2007].
The Friday prayer leader of Tabriz, Ayatollah Mohsen Mojtahed-Shabestari, said that considering that satellite information indicates that the British sailors intentionally violated the waters of Iran, their trial is the just demand of the worshippers and the Muslim people of Iran.
The temporary Friday prayer leader of Dezful, Hojjat ol-Eslam ‘Azizollah Salehi-Ansari, condemned the violation of Iranian waters by the British sailors and said that any aggression against Islamic Iran is doomed to fail.
The temporary Friday prayer leader of Shahr-e Kord, Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Mohammad Fatemi, said that those who have violated Iranian waters should apologize.
The Friday prayer leader of Ardabil, Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Hasan ‘Ameli, said that the U.S. and British attack on Iraq has thus far brought bitter experiences for the Muslim people of Iraq and their forces should leave the region as soon as possible.
The Friday prayer leader of Ahvaz, Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohsen Heydari, said that the British proved their foolishness with their violation of the territory of Iran.
The Sunni Friday prayer leader of Zahedan, ‘Abdolhamid Esma’ilzehi, asked for the Islamic laws and moral virtues to be strengthened in Muslim society and said that unfortunately the religious instructions are often neglected.
The Friday prayer leader of Abadan, Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed ‘Ali Dehdashti, said that the greatest and most important blight of the Islamic world and the Islamic Revolution is disunity, which the enemy is trying to create in any way possible.
The temporary Friday prayer leader of Urmia, Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Mohammad Fakhri, said that the enemies of Islamic Iran have issued many resolutions against the Islamic regime that have had no effect on the will of the Iranian people to continue their path.
The temporary Friday prayer leader of Borujerd, Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Ahmad Musavi, referred to Unity Week and said that it is a good opportunity for as much solidarity as possible and to prepare the grounds for overall development.
The temporary Friday prayer leader of Rasht, Hojjat ol-Eslam Yusef Saddiq-Oryani, said that the recent anti-Iranian resolution of the Security Council was shameful and shocking and that the people of Iran are not afraid of resolutions and sanctions and will never give up their nuclear rights.
The Friday prayer leader of Poldokhtar, Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad Taqi Sarafipur, said that the only way for the release of the 15 British marines is for the government of Britain to apologize and to request negotiations with Iran.
The Friday prayer leader of Shiraz, Ayatollah Mohyeddin Ha’eri-Shirazi, referred to the support for the recent plan for dealing with hooligans in the city and said that if a judge is unable to implement religious punishment regarding hooligans he must step aside for a courageous judge to take his place.
The Friday prayer leader of Semnan, Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Mohammad Shahcheraghi, said that the Islamic Republic of Iran does not need to have relations with the British government and it should respond decisively to the threat of the British government regarding the severance of relations with Iran.
The temporary Friday prayer leader of Gorgan, Hojjat ol-Eslam Sheykh Rasul Reza’i, said that the Persian New Year has both national and religious roots and people should not forget to take care of the poor and visit those who are ill in hospitals or at home.
The Friday prayer leader of Arvandkenar, Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Majid Sharafi, said that the unity and solidarity of the people of Iran will neutralize the conspiracies of the enemies of Islam and Iran.
The Friday prayer leader of Ilam, Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad Naqi Lotfi, said that among the conspiracies of the enemies that can be seen at the present time in Iraq and Afghanistan is the fact that in certain countries some of the followers of Islamic sects accuse people of heathenism and dualism and issue decrees to shed their blood.
The Friday prayer leader of Arak, Ayatollah Ahmad Mohseni-Gorgani, said that the recent illegal resolution of the Security Council should be condemned and cannot be an obstacle to the scientific and peaceful nuclear activities of Iran.
The Friday prayer leader of Mahneshan, Hojjat ol-Eslam Amir Rashtbari, said that instead of apologizing to the people and country of Iran, the British government is engaged in creating a commotion.
The Friday prayer leader of Kashan, Ayatollah ‘Abolnabi Namazi, condemned the aggression of the British boats on Iranian waters and asked the officials not to retreat by any means regarding this issue.
The temporary Friday prayer leader of Chabahar, Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad Hasan Heydarabadi, said that the creation of joint educational and research centers between the Shiites and Sunnis will have a great effect on familiarizing them with each other’s views and preserving unity.
The Friday prayer leader of Kerman, Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Yahya Ja’fari, said that while the United States with the support of France, Britain, and Germany announces that Iran does not have the right to have peaceful nuclear energy, the warehouses of the opponents of Iran are full of weapons of mass destruction, which they have used in certain countries.
The Friday prayer leader of Zanjan, Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Ya’qub Musavi, said that the Islamic Republic of Iran was established with the vote of over 98% of the people and the result of the bloodshed of the martyrs and the leadership of Imam Khomeyni.
The Friday prayer leader of Isfahan, Ayatollah Seyyed Yusef Tabataba’inezhad, said that the ideology of the prophet’s family is that of justice and love and those who engage in insulting language will impede the path of God and the progress of this ideology.
The Sunni Friday prayer leader of Kish, Haj Ya’qub Shams, said that Unity Week is the week for the solidarity and brotherhood of all Islamic sects and Muslims in the world.
The temporary Friday prayer leader of Saveh, Hojjat ol-Eslam Hasan Qorbani, emphasized the observance of Islamic veiling by young girls and said that unfortunately sometimes improper scenes in the society can be witnessed and improper veiling has spread.
The Friday prayer leader of Gachsaran, Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Farajollah Musavi, said that on 12 Farvardin 1358 [ 1 April 1979] more than 98% of the people in a referendum voted for the regime of the Islamic Republic, which disappointed the Revolution’s enemies.
The Friday prayer leader of Karaj, Hojjat ol-Eslam Gholamreza Karimi, said the solidarity of the people and the officials of the Islamic regime is necessary to neutralize the threats of the enemies.
The temporary Friday prayer leader of Shahr-e Rey, Ayatollah ‘Abbas ‘Ali Akhtari, asked the officials of the country to deal decisively with the seamen who have violated Iranian waters.
The Friday prayer leader of Hamadan, Ayatollah Ghiyasoddin Tahamohammadi, said that Islamic Iran is decisive and determined to gain access to peaceful nuclear energy.
The Friday prayer leader of Qasr-e Shirin, Hojjat ol-Eslam Hoseyn Ebrahimi, said that 12 Farvardin 1358 was the day the Iranian people decisively rejected the United States and world imperialism and chose the regime of the Islamic Republic.
The temporary Friday prayer leader of Yasuj, Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed ‘Ali Saleh Musavi-A’zam, referred to the anniversary of the start of the guardianship of the Imam of the Age and said that many of the signs of the advent of the Imam of the Age ("end of times") can be seen in the society today, including men and women wearing each other’s clothing, the spread of prostitution and lack of restraint, not paying attention to religious obligations, and the increase in the slaughter of innocent people.
The Friday prayer leader of Bandar ‘Abbas, Ayatollah Gholam’ali Na’imabadi, referred to the violation of Iranian waters by the British forces and said: The capable hands of the children of this nation punished imperialism.
The Friday prayer leader of Khomeyn, Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed ‘Ali Hoseyni, said that not only will the resolutions fail to create an obstacle but they will increase the unity and resistance of the people.
The Friday prayer leader of Shahrud, Hojjat ol-Eslam Mahmud Torabi, said: Access to peaceful nuclear energy is more important for our country than the nationalization of the oil industry, especially for the Islamic world not to need Western countries in the future in regard to energy.
The Friday prayer leader of Kermanshah, Ayatollah Mohammad Hoseyn Zarandi, said that there is excessive waste in Iran and if the people stop this waste and are frugal, the roots of poverty will be eradicated.
The Friday prayer leader of Bojnord, Ayatollah Mehmannavaz, said that the plans of the United States in the Middle East have failed and that country is concentrating on creating disunity among Muslims; therefore, the followers of Islam should be alert and united.
The Friday prayer leader of Sari, Ayatollah Nurollah Tabarsi, referred to the statements of the leader regarding the anti-Iranian resolution of the Security Council and said that today unity is the only secret to overcoming such mischievous acts.
The Friday prayer leader of Bushehr, Hojjat ol-Eslam Asadollah Imani, said that Security Council Resolution 1747 against Iran will have no effect on the progress of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Sunday, April 29, 2007
Saturday, April 28, 2007
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE WEBSITES
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This is current as of Wednesday, March 22, 2006
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Brazil
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Czech Republic
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Security Information Service(Bezpecnostní informacní sluzba, BIS)
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Denmark
Security Intelligence Service(Politiets Efterretningstjeneste, PET)http://www.pet.dk/English.aspx
Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS)http://forsvaret.dk/FE/eng/
Estonia
Security Police Board(Kaitsepolitseiamet)http://www.kapo.ee/
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Hungary
Information Agency(Információs Hivatal, IH)http://www.mkih.hu/index.php
National Security Office(Nemzetbiztonsági Hivatal, NBH)http://www.nbh.hu/index.htm
Israel
Mossad -Israeli Secret Intelligence Service
http://www.mossad.gov.il/Mohr
Shin- Bet (Shabak)- Israeli Security Agency
http://www.shabak.gov.il/mod/
Aman - Israeli Military Intelligence
http://www1.idf.il/aman/site/default.asp
Italy
Intelligence and Democratic Security Service(Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Democratica, SISDE)http://www.sisde.it/
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Mexico
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Netherlands
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New Zealand
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Joint Geospatial Support Facility (JGSF)http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/corporate/jgsf/default.htm
JGSF’s Role
http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/corporate/jgsf/role.htm
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http://www.security.govt.nz/
Securing our Nation’s Security - How New Zealand manages its security and intelligence agencies
http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/dpmc/publications/securingoursafety/index.html
This is still probably the best piece of Odfficial literature on the New Zealand Intelligence Community
Norway
Police Security Service(Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste, PST)http://www.pst.politiet.no/
Norwegian Intelligence Service(NIS) Foreign Intelligence Service
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Poland
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Portugal
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Romania
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Russia
Federal Security Service(Federal’naya sluzhba bezopasnosti, FSB)
Foreign Intelligence Service(Sluzhba vneshney razvedki, SVR)
Sometimes it is rather useful to use Webtranslation to get an idea ofthe website, like the Russian ones (Free)
My Favourite one is by PROMThttp://www.online-translator.com/srvurl.asp?lang=en
Babel Fish Language Web Online translation
http://babelfish.altavista.com/
Though Google Language tools can be helpful
http://www.google.co.nz/language_tools?hl=en
I have yet to find a useful one to translate from Hebrew to English
Serbia
Security Information Agency(Bezbednosno-informativna agencija, BIA)
http://www.bia.sr.gov.yu/
Slovakia
Slovak Information ServiceSlovenská informacná sluzba (SIS)
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Slovenia
Slovene Intelligence and Security Agency(Slovenska obvescevalno-varnostna agencija, SOVA)http://www.sigov.si/sova/
South Africa, Republic of
Ministry for Intelligence Services
http://www.intelligence.gov.za/
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National Intelligence Agency
http://www.nia.gov.za/
Government Communication and Information Service
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South Korea
National Intelligence Service (NIS)http://www.nis.go.kr/app/eng/index
Spain
National Intelligence Centre(Centro Nacional de Inteligencia, CNI)
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Sweden
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English Page of SAPO
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Switzerland
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt fürVerfassungsschutz/BfV).
http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/index.html
English page
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Turkey
National Intelligence Organization(Milli Istihbarat Teskilati, MIT)
http://www.mit.gov.tr/
English Page
http://www.mit.gov.tr/english/main.html
Taiwan (Republic of China)
National Security Bureau, Republic of China
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Ukraine
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USA
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Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)http://www.fbi.gov/
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA)http://www.nga.mil/portal/site/nga01/
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)http://www.nro.gov/
National Security Agency (NSA)
http://www.nsa.gov/
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
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Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
http://intelligence.senate.gov
Venezuela
REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANADE VENEZUELA
Military IntelligenceDirección General de Inteligencia MilitarUn portal informativo y de interacción con el Pueblo Venezolano...
http://www.dgim.mil.ve/
http://www.sis.gov.sk/index_sis_en.html
This is current as of Wednesday, March 22, 2006
ArgentinaGendarmería Nacional Argentina
http://www.gendarmeria.gov.ar/
ARGENTINE NATIONAL GENDARMERIE (english)http://www.gendarmeria.gov.ar/ingles/ingles1.htm
Australia
Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS)http://www.asis.gov.au/
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)http://www.asio.gov.au/
Australian Defense Intelligence Organisation (DIO)http://www.defence.gov.au/dio/
Defence Signals Directorate (DSD)http://www.dsd.gov.au/
Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO)http://www.defence.gov.au/digo/
Office of National Assessments (ONA)http://www.ona.gov.au/
The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS)http://www.igis.gov.au/
Australian National Security
http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/
This web site provides a single access point for counter-terrorism information from the Australian Government.
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/pjcaad/index.htm
Belgium
Federal intelligence and security agency
http://www.belgium.be/eportal/application?languageRedirected=yes&navId=37794&pageid=charterPodPage
Belgian Military Intelligence and Security Service
http://www.mil.be/is/index.asp?LAN=E
Permanent Committee for the Control of Intelligence Services
http://www.comiteri.be/
Brazil
Brazilian National Intelligence Agency (ABIN) Agência Brasileira de Inteligência
http://www.abin.gov.br/abin/index.jsp
British
Defense Intelligence Service ( DIA)http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/Organisation/AgenciesOrganisations/DefenceIntelligence.htm
Defense Geospatial Intelligence (DGA)http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/Organisation/AgenciesOrganisations/DGI/DefenceGeospatialIntelligence.htm
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)http://www.gchq.gov.uk/
Security Service or (MI5)http://www.mi5.gov.uk/
Secret Intelligence Service or (MI6)http://www.sis.gov.uk/output/Page79.html
Intelligence and Security Committee
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/intelligence/
Intelligence Services Commissionerhttp://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page3325.asp
Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page6862.asp
Office of Surveillance Commissioners
http://www.surveillancecommissioners.gov.uk/
Bulgaria
National Intelligence Service(Nacionalna Razuznavatelna Sluzhba, NRS)
http://www.nrs.bg/eng/index_eng.htm
Canada Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/index.asp
Communications Security Establishment (CSE)http://www.cse.dnd.ca/
Canada’s National Cryptologic Agency
Office of the Commissioner, Communications Security Establishment
http://csec-ccst.gc.ca
Inspector General, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
http://www.sgc.gc.ca/abt/wwa/igcsis/igcsis-en.asp
Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC)http://www.sirc.gc.ca/index_e.html
El Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS) is the country’sprimary intelligence service.
http://www.das.gov.co/
School of Intelligence and CounterintelligenceEscuela de Inteligencia y Contrainteligencia
http://www.esici.edu.co/
Czech Republic
Military Intelligence(Vojenské zpravodajství, VZ)http://www.vzcr.cz/html/en/index.html
Czech foreign intelligence serviceOffice for Foreign Relations and Information(Úrad pro zahranicní styky a informace, ÚZSI)http://www.uzsi.cz/index.php@lang=2.html
Security Information Service(Bezpecnostní informacní sluzba, BIS)
http://www.bis.cz/_english/index.html
Denmark
Security Intelligence Service(Politiets Efterretningstjeneste, PET)http://www.pet.dk/English.aspx
Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS)http://forsvaret.dk/FE/eng/
Estonia
Security Police Board(Kaitsepolitseiamet)http://www.kapo.ee/
Finland
Security Police(Suojelupoliisi, SUPO)http://www.poliisi.fi/poliisi/supo/home.nsf/pages/indexeng
Germany
Federal Intelligence Service(Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND)http://www.bnd.bund.de/DE/Home__Vorschaltseite/home__node__mit__javaSkript.html
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution(Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, BfV)http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/index_en.html
Greece
National Inteligence Service (NIS)http://www.nis.gr/
Hungary
Information Agency(Információs Hivatal, IH)http://www.mkih.hu/index.php
National Security Office(Nemzetbiztonsági Hivatal, NBH)http://www.nbh.hu/index.htm
Israel
Mossad -Israeli Secret Intelligence Service
http://www.mossad.gov.il/Mohr
Shin- Bet (Shabak)- Israeli Security Agency
http://www.shabak.gov.il/mod/
Aman - Israeli Military Intelligence
http://www1.idf.il/aman/site/default.asp
Italy
Intelligence and Democratic Security Service(Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Democratica, SISDE)http://www.sisde.it/
Italian Intelligence and Security Services
http://www.serviziinformazionesicurezza.gov.it/pdcweb.nsf/pagine/ee_Homepage
Jordan
General Intelligence Department(Da’irat al-Mukhabarat al-’Amma)
http://www.gid.gov.jo/
Lithuania
State Security Department(Valstybes Sauguro Departamentas, VSD)
http://www.vsd.lt/
Mexico
Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional (CISEN)http://www.cisen.gob.mx/
Netherlands
General Intelligence and Security Service(Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, AIVD)https://www.aivd.nl/
Military Intelligence and Security Service (MVID)Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (MIVD)http://www.mindef.nl/mivd/
Thailand
National Intelligence Agency
http://www.nia.go.th/nia/default.asp
New Zealand
Security Intelligence Service (SIS)http://www.nzsis.govt.nz/
Government Communications Security (GCSB)http://www.gcsb.govt.nz/
External Assessments Bureau (EAB)http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/eab/index.htm
The Directorate of Defence Intelligence and Security (DDIS)http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/corporate/hqnzdf.htm#ddishttp://www.dpmc.govt.nz/dpmc/publications/securingoursafety/ddis.html
Joint Geospatial Support Facility (JGSF)http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/corporate/jgsf/default.htm
JGSF’s Role
http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/corporate/jgsf/role.htm
Domestic and External Security Group (ODESC)http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/dess/index.htm
Security in the Government Sector
http://www.security.govt.nz/
Securing our Nation’s Security - How New Zealand manages its security and intelligence agencies
http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/dpmc/publications/securingoursafety/index.html
This is still probably the best piece of Odfficial literature on the New Zealand Intelligence Community
Norway
Police Security Service(Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste, PST)http://www.pst.politiet.no/
Norwegian Intelligence Service(NIS) Foreign Intelligence Service
http://www.mil.no/etjenesten/english/start
Poland
Foreign Intelligence Agency(Agencja Wywiadu, AW)http://www.aw.gov.pl/
Internal Security Agency(Agencja Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetrznego, ABW)
http://www.abw.gov.pl/
Portugal
Security Intelligence Service(Serviço de Informaçoes de Segurança, SIS)
http://www.sis.pt/
Romania
Foreign Intelligence Service(Serviciul de Informatii Externe, SIE)
http://www.sie.ro/
Romanian Intelligence Service(Serviciului Român de Informatii, SRI)
http://www.sri.ro/
Russia
Federal Security Service(Federal’naya sluzhba bezopasnosti, FSB)
Foreign Intelligence Service(Sluzhba vneshney razvedki, SVR)
Sometimes it is rather useful to use Webtranslation to get an idea ofthe website, like the Russian ones (Free)
My Favourite one is by PROMThttp://www.online-translator.com/srvurl.asp?lang=en
Babel Fish Language Web Online translation
http://babelfish.altavista.com/
Though Google Language tools can be helpful
http://www.google.co.nz/language_tools?hl=en
I have yet to find a useful one to translate from Hebrew to English
Serbia
Security Information Agency(Bezbednosno-informativna agencija, BIA)
http://www.bia.sr.gov.yu/
Slovakia
Slovak Information ServiceSlovenská informacná sluzba (SIS)
http://www.sis.gov.sk/index_sis_en.html
Slovenia
Slovene Intelligence and Security Agency(Slovenska obvescevalno-varnostna agencija, SOVA)http://www.sigov.si/sova/
South Africa, Republic of
Ministry for Intelligence Services
http://www.intelligence.gov.za/
South African Secret Service (SASS)http://www.sass.gov.za/
National Intelligence Agency
http://www.nia.gov.za/
Government Communication and Information Service
http://www.gcis.gov.za/index.html
South Korea
National Intelligence Service (NIS)http://www.nis.go.kr/app/eng/index
Spain
National Intelligence Centre(Centro Nacional de Inteligencia, CNI)
http://www.cni.es/castellano/index.html
Sweden
Security Service(Säkerhetspolisen, SÄPO)http://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/
English Page of SAPO
http://www.securityservice.se/
Switzerland
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt fürVerfassungsschutz/BfV).
http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/index.html
English page
http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/index_en.html
Turkey
National Intelligence Organization(Milli Istihbarat Teskilati, MIT)
http://www.mit.gov.tr/
English Page
http://www.mit.gov.tr/english/main.html
Taiwan (Republic of China)
National Security Bureau, Republic of China
http://www.nsb.gov.tw/eindex.htm
Ukraine
Security Service of Ukraine(Sluzhba bezpeky Ukrayiny, SBU)
http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/control/uk/index
USA
US Intelligence Community Webpage
http://www.intelligence.gov/
Director of the National Intelligence (DNI)http://www.dni.gov/
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)http://www.cia.gov/
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)http://www.dia.mil/
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)http://www.fbi.gov/
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA)http://www.nga.mil/portal/site/nga01/
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)http://www.nro.gov/
National Security Agency (NSA)
http://www.nsa.gov/
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
http://intelligence.house.gov
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
http://intelligence.senate.gov
Venezuela
REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANADE VENEZUELA
Military IntelligenceDirección General de Inteligencia MilitarUn portal informativo y de interacción con el Pueblo Venezolano...
http://www.dgim.mil.ve/
Friday, April 27, 2007
JIHADIST INSTRUCTIONS TO TERRORISTS HEADING FOR IRAQ
Jihadist Website Publishes Instructions to Jihadists Before They Go to Iraq
On April 19, a jihadist website posted an article entitled Instructions to Jihadists Before They Go to Iraq.
This article includes questions and answers providing what jihadists need to know before heading out for combat in Iraq, including what type of equipment to take and how to use it and the details of what strategies should be used according to the terrain.
Responses were taken from Shaykh Yusuf al-Ayiri from his series entitled The New Crusader War Against Iraq which was published on the website of the Islamic Research and Studies Center.
A translation of the article follows:
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.
1. What is the most important equipment a fighter must have to be prepared?
A fighter’s military equipment is closely associated with the type of missions entrusted to him and with the nature of the field in which he will operate.
We can say that a fighter’s equipment in the cities is much less than what a fighter needs mountains and jungle fields. The reason is that activity in the cities depends on secret activity, and therefore, a fighter does not need to appear in public with the equipment and clothing he is carrying.
He prepares for each operation the appropriate equipment which he estimates he will need before carrying out the activity.
A guerrilla fighter, whether in cities, mountains, or jungles, still needs to ensure that all the equipment he needs in all the military missions remains within reach during the fighting. If he is unable to carry it on his back, he needs to ensure it is kept in a secure place that he can access quickly when he needs it.
We will not provide a long explanation of the equipment that a guerrilla fighter needs, but we will draw attention to certain equipment, and a guerrilla fighter must estimate his needs, consider his tasks, and understand what he precisely needs for each task.
It would be a good idea for every mujahid to obtain the equipment mentioned below because the guerrilla fighter is considered an army moving on the ground. He needs all the equipment to carry out all the tasks without depending on other individuals or units.
A guerrilla fighter might have to go alone to a target, withdraw alone from an operation, or carry out an operation alone. He must not be like a soldier in a regular army who operates in conjunction with others in terms of equipment and combat.
He must view himself as the commander, the navigator, the shooter, and the communications or reconnaissance man. He must view himself as the man entrusted with carrying out all the fighting tasks.
Therefore, he must equip himself with everything that he needs and train on all combat tasks and appropriate weapons.
A guerrilla fighter is primarily a multi-type combat businessman, and therefore, he must equip himself with everything that he needs for combat, as follows:
Combat Equipment
* a small Koran that will be his companion to strengthen his heart to fight
* a light automatic rifle (Kalashnikov)
* a high quality bag to carry ammunition and bombs, which would not hamper combat activity
* four magazines for the light automatic rifle
* ammunition for four 120-round magazines; he may carry reserve ammunition if the combat mission requires the use of a larger amount of ammunition.
* a night-vision scope for the Kalashnikov
* a handgun with two magazines to be used for self-defense in case the light automatic rifle is abandoned or stops working or he runs out of ammunition
* two military uniforms for camouflage whose colors should suit the nature of the area; if this is impossible, any type of clothing used in the area that will not hamper his movement and fighting.
* military shoes or high-quality athletic shoes with two pairs of socks
* a helmet to protect against bullets and shrapnel
* a dagger for close combat or assassinations
* any type of shackles that would be easy to use to carry out abductions
* at least four hand grenades to comb rooms or for close ambush operations
* a rope for climbing up and climbing down from buildings or mountain heights. This rope is made especially for such operations and known by the name of a harness. It has rings to help a person climb down securely.
Navigation and Communication Equipment
* an up-to-date military map of the area and the surrounding areas. If it is impossible to obtain a military map, one can use an up-to-date civilian map with a scale of 250,000 centimeters.
* a ruler to measure distances on a map
* a protractor to determine directions on a map
* a compass equipped for night use
One can compensate for all this by using any global positioning systems (GPS) set, such as Magellan, Garmen, and others. Obtaining this equipment does not mean stopping to use the map and the compass. The equipment is susceptible to failure, and there must be a substitute to it if it fails or its location is spotted.
* a hand-held radio communication set of any kind to communicate with other groups or individuals. Small batteries for the communication set and the GPS set are necessary.
* a flashlight for use at night. There are types of flashlights that operate by solar energy and do not need batteries.
* Other equipment may be needed according to the nature of the mission and the area, but we will mention the most important ones and leave out that which changes with the change of the situation:
* a water flask of no less than one liter capacity
* a sufficient quantity of food determined by the nature of the military mission
* a small, easy to carry military bed
* a plastic raincoat to protect the fighter, equipment, and weapons from water
* a small pickax for digging
* a small wood saw
* a small iron saw
* a medium-size knife with a sharpener
* matches or friction igniter or any substitute not affected by water and exhausted within a short time
* a rope of a medium-size and length
* a screwdriver
* a different caliber bolt wrench
* a barbed wire cutter
* personal medical supplies, such as cotton, gauze, scissors, antiseptic solutions, medical bandages, and ointments that repel mosquitoes, which carry most illnesses
* tooth picks or anything similar
* small binoculars
* a strong quality backpack to carry supplies
Certain equipment is not particular to every individual. It is enough for one group to have a sufficient amount of such equipment for their combat missions as it deems appropriate.
* suitable night vision goggles
* a video camera to film and study reconnoitered sites and operations
* a first-aid box equipped with the necessary supplies, including tranquilizers and all types of antibiotics to treat all cases that occur in the field, such as bleeding, fractures, burns, sunstroke, colds, electricity shocks, pest bites, diarrhea, malaria, and other sicknesses caused by pollution
* The group commanders should provide non-personal weapons such as medium-caliber machineguns, sniper guns, M/D rocket launchers, and M/T rockets (as received).
* suitable quantities of explosives, land mines, military detonators, fuses, and slow-burning fuses and explosive belts for martyrdom operations; poisons that cause death by touching, smelling, or eating; invisible ink; electronic circuits for the detonation of explosives by remote control, timers, light, movement, or sound; electrical shock equipment or anesthesia gases for abduction operations; and appropriate silencers for some pistols available to the group for assassinations
* sources of electric power by solar means and any ammunition, weapons, and stores a guerrilla group might need
The type of equipment depends on the mission entrusted to a group, the terrain, and the type of enemy.
The commander of the group must provide everything that the group might need for the various combat tasks, for movement, or for holding a position and defending it.
The unavailability of some of this equipment and supplies does not mean that action should not take place. However, a mujahid must do his best to obtain this equipment prior to meeting the enemy.
If he can obtain this equipment and other things that he might need and failed to do so, he violates God’s commandment to do what is within his ability and if he cannot, he should not recoil from the jihad, as God only asks a person to do what he can.
These are the most important pieces of equipment that we think a fighter needs to get ready for combat. A fighter does not necessarily have to carry all of this equipment and supplies on his back wherever he goes. However, this equipment and these supplies should be close to the fighter and within his reach and he should carry only what he needs for his mission.
Combat missions demand combat equipment and supplies. Reconnaissance missions demand a camera and navigation tools. Assassination tasks only require carrying poison. Therefore, each task has its own equipment and supplies that a fighter needs.
A fighter must not neglect this equipment and these supplies and should try to obtain them before combat so they will not become an obstacle to him in taking the initiative in the field and moving from one combat mission to another immediately.
(This question was answered by the mujahid Shaykh Yusuf al-Ayiri, may God bless his soul and accept him among the martyrs, in his series on The New Crusader War Against Iraq, which he published on the website of the Islamic Research and Studies Center.)
2. What are the most important field, combat, and physical skills that a fighter must command?
It is difficult to list the field and physical skills that a fighter must command. Field and fighting skills are the crux of combat operations.
Many books have been written about these numerous and varied skills. However, we will try to mention a few examples of fighting skills to clarify the task. We will mention some of the fighting skills that a mujahid needs in the cities. They are more important to us than others are. We will also only mention the physical standard that a mujahid should have without detailing the athletic programs.
There are two types of skills: field skills and fighting skills.
Field Skills
It is the ability to adapt to the field, move efficiently in it, and take up positions by using all forms of camouflage methods. It is the ability to activate all the firing power of the group in offensive or defensive postures.
Each field has its own basic arts and skills that cut losses in our ranks, surprise the enemy, and achieve victory.
Desert areas, for example, have their own climates and character which require a special kind of adjustment and camouflage. They also require a special method in offensive and defensive postures. They are completely different from mountain, jungle, and urban fields. Some methods of adaptation are acquired from the residents of the area.
A mujahid must receive training on these types of skills in the area in which he needs to operate so he will not be surprised by difficulties in obtaining water, food, or shelter that would prevent him from carrying out his combat mission, affect his performance, and perhaps lead to his defeat. Training on field skills in any area does not take much time. A mujahid does not need more than 10 days for this.
Combat Skills
Combat in mountainous terrain requires different tactical skills than combat in forests or cities. Attacks, encirclement, frontal assault, defense of a position, and ambushes are different in mountains than in other fields. All these tasks have a common name and strategy, but they involve different tactics according to the field.
We will not spend much time identifying each task or relating its strategy. This is not the place for this. However, we will mention some examples of individual combat skills in the cities.
The success of combat tasks in any field depends primarily on good performance by the group. It should reflect the excellent execution of all the individual combat skills and the performance of weapons and equipment in the fighting. For example, a fighter in urban areas needs to know:
* how to fight in developed areas;
* how to move in developed areas;
* how to clear buildings and rooms;
* how to use hand grenades in developed areas and rooms;
* how to choose a firing position for any weapon he uses; and
* how to move, camouflage, conceal, and hide behind barriers.
These are some of the combat tasks in cities. Many exercises branch from them, which a mujahid needs to be trained on before he engages in a battle. These exercises are not a big problem that a person can only overcome through an intensive course. It is possible to reach a reasonable level of skills appropriate for a battle, God willing, without the need for an intensive course.
We will try to give examples of exercises for each task we mentioned earlier to clarify what we mean. We will not elaborate on every exercise but will try to give the example to clarify what we mean without details.
How To Fight in Developed Areas
Combat activity in cities develops from one stage to another according to the guerrilla warfare theory. In its first stage, it depends on agility and speed. The target should be easy and simple, and the security around it should be weak. The combat action against this target should be quick and not be based on a complex plan.
Operations at this stage differ, ranging from assassinations, raids, quick ambushes, infiltration, planting mines, poisoning food and water, sending booby-trapped parcels and toxic letters, and blowing up installations with booby-trapped equipment.
In this stage, fighters should not take up positions, barricade themselves in any place inside a city, or even plan an operation with a view to seizing control of a neighborhood. Such an idea is totally rejected at this stage in which the enemy has military superiority that enables him to destroy any visible body.
The idea is for the mujahidin to be like gas or air; that is, present but not seen. If the mujahidin lose this characteristic, they would suffer because their efforts would be jeopardized.
Combat action in the second stage of guerrilla warfare will be a development of the first stage in the sense that the mujahidin had already familiarized themselves with their enemy and absorbed his tactics and reactions.
They also had gained combat and security experience that made them skillful. These qualifications enable them to select bigger targets in size and importance.
Therefore, the plans for their operations at this stage would be characterized by complexity and effectiveness because the operations would be larger and the results would be greater.
The new characteristic of this stage is that the day is for the ruling regime and the night is for the mujahidin forces.
It is possible at this stage for the mujahidin to have some control over some neighborhoods that have certain characteristics, such as rough terrain and population composition.
The third stage in the war is when guerrilla fighters begin coming down from rough terrain areas and start occupying the cities.
In this stage, combat in urban areas, in the case of an attack from outside, passes through three stages.
The first stage is isolation. This is the stage in which the fighters besiege and isolate the targeted village or city by taking control of the roads leading to it. They approach the village or town and try to isolate it to block the way to any support force or factors that could make it withstand an attack.
After a sufficient time of isolation to exhaust the defenders, the next stage begins, which is the stage of attack. The objective in this stage is to destroy the defenses of the defenders and establish positions on the outskirts of the village or city.
It is possible to carry out an attack on the enemy to destroy him in two ways: the converging axes way or the parallel axes way. After destroying the defenders and making sure that no regular defenses exist, the third stage begins, which is the mopping up stage.
This stage involves combing the streets and buildings in ways that we will mention later. A mujahid must know that movement by a group during combat in cities takes place in stages.
A group or an individual takes up position to cover the advance of a group or an individual. The advancing group or individual then takes cover and provides cover for the advance of the previous covering group or individual, and so forth. A mujahid must have experience in shooting and aiming from the right or left shoulder, because the corner of a building dictates from which side of his body he should shoot. He or his shadow must not appear while firing.
How To Move in Developed Areas
To minimize exposure to enemy fire while advancing in built-up areas, a mujahid must not become a target. He must do everything to conceal or disguise himself and hide behind barriers.
He must avoid movement in open areas, such as streets, gardens, and lanes that lack exits. If he has to move in such areas, he must do it under the cover of fire or smoke in a zigzag way, or crawling. He must choose with his own eyes the next position that could provide him with appropriate cover before he moves out of his position.
He must conceal his movement by all methods. He must move quickly and cautiously. If he expects to be shot at while moving from one position to another, he must cover his movement by firing his personal weapon against the positions where he expects someone would be waiting for him. If he needs to climb walls, he must explore the other side to which he is moving.
Before that, he must specify the easiest area for climbing the wall. He also must move quickly toward the wall, and if he climbs, he must lower his body, jump close to the wall, and move quickly to the other side.
If a mujahid wants to observe the movement on a street, he must not expose his entire body or head from the corner of the street or door. He must lie down, wear a helmet, and show only a small part of his head to enable him to explore movement on the street.
He can also use a periscope without having to show any part of his head. One of the biggest dangers that face a mujahid in cities is passing in front of windows behind which enemy soldiers usually take up positions.
There are two kinds of windows: ground floor windows and cellar windows. A mujahid must be weary of these windows. He must know how to pass in front of these windows.
To pass in front of ground floor windows, a mujahid must bow down below the level of the window, keep close to the wall, and pass quickly and quietly. For a mujahid to pass over cellar windows, he must jump over the window without exposing his legs to danger. If the window is wide and a mujahid cannot jump over it and pass, he must use a barrier between him and the window to pass.
A mujahid must be careful and avoid using doors to enter and leave. Often, the enemy places these doors within his firing range, or he uses deceptive traps and mines to kill anyone who tries to enter buildings by climbing up or down. He must not pass through open areas without firing or smoke cover. If a mujahid has to do that, he must pass quickly in a zigzag way. During movement inside a building, he must avoid getting close to doors and windows to avoid enemy fire from inside or outside the building.
A plan must be prepared carefully for secure movement during the evacuation of the wounded from each building to secure locations. Members of a group must leave a distance of three to five meters between them during movement inside cities.
How To Clear Buildings and Rooms
A mujahid must choose his point of entry before moving toward a building. He must avoid entering through windows and doors. He must use a smoke screen or firepower to cover up his advance toward the building. He must open gaps to enter the building by using explosives, rockets, or tank shells to avoid using the windows and doors. He must also use hand grenades before entering any open space in the building.
He must enter immediately after the hand grenade explodes in order not to give the enemy any chance to recover. He also must have protection by one of his colleagues while entering a room to clear it of enemy elements.
The best method to clear buildings is to start from top to bottom. A mujahid must climb to the top floor of a building by any method, whether by climbing with ropes, over water pipes, on ladders and trees, or through the roofs of neighboring buildings or by any other method.
A fighter must be experienced in climbing buildings with ropes equipped with anchors, throwing the anchor at the roof of the building and climbing up. It is preferable to make knots in the rope approximately one meter apart to help in climbing up. A fighter must also be experienced in climbing down with a special rope, a harness.
These ropes enable a fighter to climb down from the top of the building and easily comb rooms facing the outside.
How To Use Hand Grenades in Developed Areas and Rooms
A mujahid must master the use of hand grenades because they are used extensively in fighting in urban areas. A mujahid will need to use grenades to clear each room, opening, or staircase. He must know how to throw a grenade in various circumstances. He must learn through training how to aim and throw a grenade accurately at the desired target.
He must also receive training to time the grenade trigger so he can throw it and prevent the enemy from throwing it back before it explodes. He must know how to pull the security pin of the grenade if he is carrying his personal weapon in the other hand, if he is lying down, and in all other situations as well.
He must also know how to keep the security arm after throwing the grenade for fear the enemy will take the fingerprints, learn the type of grenade, or learn any other information beneficial to him.
A mujahid must know the effects of the grenade shrapnel and the destructive power of the grenade to take precautions and hide behind a barrier during the combing of a building.
How To Choose a Firing Position for Any Weapon
The success of operations inside buildings depends on an individual’s skill in combat. However, such skill will not serve its purpose in defense, offense, retreat, or advance by an individual or group until the fighter becomes experienced in directing his fire at the enemy and silencing his fire.
The firepower of a fighter in cities is his capital, and it is wrong to use this firepower uselessly.
He must know how, when, where, and why he is shooting.
He also must know with what he is shooting and from where he is shooting. These are urgent requirements, and a mujahid must have enough intelligence, intuition, firmness, and courage to enable him to interact with these requirements quickly during combat. One of these demands is knowing from where to shoot.
A mujahid must always look for a suitable position from which to fire and not to expose himself to enemy fire, taking advantage of his firepower and avoiding dead corners that the enemy exploits in his movements.
He should fire from building corners, from behind walls, window corners, rooftops, small openings prepared by the shooter, from behind sand barriers, from water service halls on the streets, or from flowerbeds on sidewalks. If he is using anti-armor weapons, a mujahid must keep a distance from a wall behind him so the flames will not spread to him.
He must choose positions overlooking the main streets. He must know that if a tank comes close to a building, it cannot elevate its gun at an angle of 45 degrees to aim at the roof of the building. This allows the mujahid to use rooftops overlooking the main streets to hit tanks.
We must draw the attention of the mujahid that window glass poses a danger to him. Therefore, before using windows to open fire, he must remove all the glass to prevent being hurt if an explosion takes place near him.
He must also install an iron mesh on the window to prevent hand grenades thrown by enemy soldiers from outside the building from entering.
How To Move, Camouflage, Conceal, and Hide Behind Barriers
To exhaust the enemy and achieve security, the mujahidin must use camouflage, concealment, and disguises skillfully. The first thing to do is to study the area carefully to camouflage the equipment, weapons, personnel, and armored vehicles with the same colors of the surrounding area.
Do not try to open holes in buildings for shooting if there is no destruction and cracks in the buildings because of war.
Do not try to exaggerate the camouflage because it often reveals the location. Do not use luminous and shining materials in your position because this will expose you and subject you to random shelling.
Darkness is an excellent natural cover for concealment and movement.
The shadow of walls and buildings is appropriate for concealing armored vehicles and equipment because a person from a distance cannot distinguish anything under a shadow unless he comes close. Try to disguise the glow of your skin, equipment, or weapons by using charcoal, mud, or burned cork.
Place a wet fabric material under the muzzle of any kind of weapon during firing to prevent stirring up dust. Try to shoot from inside rooms at night. If the neighboring buildings or the other rooms in the building are lit, try to fire while the lights are on to conceal the rifle flashes.
You must conceal the muzzle of the rifle during firing to prevent its flash from showing and exposing your location.
The mujahidin should conceal all their traces, including any location they settled in or passed through, such as garbage, paper, campfires, footsteps, and any trace that could lead to information about the number of elements in the group, their types of weapons, or anything about them.
It is appropriate to create fictitious targets for the enemy to exhaust him, distract his attention, and make him lose confidence in the results of his reconnaissance.
This is a brief explanation of some of the combat tasks inside cities. It is enough to explain what we mean by combat skills that a fighter should master. This is not an exclusive list. We drew attention to the most important skills. Still, there are many more things we did not draw attention to, and giving details of these skills is inappropriate here.
Such combat skills require a special volume. We already mentioned that the combat skills needed in cities are different from the combat skills in mountains and jungles.
However, the most difficult combat skills are the combat skills in cities. The dangers surrounding a mujahid in cities are much more than the dangers in mountains and jungles. In this answer, we think we drew attention to several combat skills in the cities, which explain hardships of combat in this field.
In response to the second part of the question regarding the fighter’s physical skills, we say that fighting requires a high level of physical fitness. This fitness is represented in muscle strength, endurance, speed, aerobic and non-aerobic fitness, agility, and flexibility.
It is easy for a mujahid to reach this suitable level within two months of training through a daily program involving all athletic exercises that the body of a mujahid needs to perform his combat tasks as best as possible.
In any case, the physical fitness of a mujahid and his ability to run for long distances and tolerate physical activity for long periods are the main factors in his good performance in the field.
A mujahid could be experienced with firearms, but because of a lack of physical fitness, he will not be able to select the appropriate place for shooting and will not be able to jump over walls or climb buildings to comb them.
All this is because he lacks physical fitness. A mujahid who enjoys good physical fitness can complete all his tasks very well even if his use of weapons has not reached the level of perfection because he is able to maneuver, assume the best positions for shooting, and fulfill his tasks quickly.
Physical exhaustion will not disturb his thinking, initiative, or speed. We learn from this that physical fitness is an important demand for a mujahid in the urban combat field.
However, training should be appropriate for an individual’s age and capability. Training should be limited to a number of days per week and no more than five days for most. For the advanced ones, it should be two or three times a day. Training should follow a gradual program.
The training period should begin with warming up, then training, and end with cooling down. This approach helps the muscle to fulfill its task and benefit from training without causing unpleasant repercussions.
We must know that a weak program will not lead to the desired result and intensive training that exceeds the capability of a person will produce undesirable counter results. No training, in such a case, could be better than exercising in this way.
We cannot give a longer response than this to the question before we mention the exercise program that allows a mujahid to reach a suitable level of fitness within one and a half or two months to help him fight as best as he can through a gradual daily program that does not exhaust the body and does not cause repercussions or tear up the muscles.
We say in this respect that the physical fitness level that a mujahid should have is measured by his ability to jog for 10 kilometers without stopping within a maximum of 70 minutes and to carry out an exercise of penetrating a neighborhood and running for three kilometers in no more than 13.5 minutes.
He should be able to run a 100-meter distance in 12 to 15 seconds. He should be able to walk without long stops for no less than 10 hours. He should be able to walk carrying a load of up to 20 kilograms for no less than 4 hours.
He should be able to do 70 push-ups at a time without a pause. He should be able to do the abdomen exercises (sit-ups) 100 times without stopping.
He should be able to do the crocodile crawl for 50 meters within a maximum of 70 seconds.
To test his endurance capability, he must carry out an exercise similar to the Fartlek method with slight variation. This exercise combines walking, fast walking, jogging, running, and racing. The mujahid begins by walking normally for two minutes and then walking fast for two minutes and then jogging for two minutes and then running for two minutes and ends with racing for 100 meters.
He then goes back to walking and repeating the same exercise without stopping 10 times. There is a difference between walking normally, walking fast, jogging, running, and racing. Everyone knows what is normal walking. A fast walk is to walk fast while not lifting one of the two feet from the ground for a long period close to the period of normal walk.
Jogging is covering a distance of a kilometer within no less than 5.5 minutes. Racing is covering a kilometer in no more than 4.5 minutes. Fast racing is calculated by the time a person needs to cover a distance of 100 meters, and it ranges between 12 and 15 seconds. It constitutes approximately 80 percent of the physical effort.
A mujahid who makes a serious effort could reach this level within one month, provided he observes progression in exercising and does not exhaust his muscles.
For example, if a mujahid begins at the beginning of the month with jogging for 15 minutes and increases the rate by two minutes every day, this means that within one month he could jog for one hour without stopping (a month consists of 20 days of exercise, if the program covers five days a week).
Likewise, if he began at the beginning of the month with 10 push-ups and increased that by three every day, he would be able to reach 70 push-ups within one month.
Progression and continuity has a big effect in gaining physical fitness. The exercise program must include Swedish exercises to help extend, relax, and strengthen the muscles. A mujahid must try to focus on all types of Swedish exercises and keep away from equipment to continue his exercise program anywhere because equipment has a negative effect on the body in the long-run.
The best exercises are Swedish exercises that are easy to apply, depend on the body and its strength, and have much less negative effect than others. The physical exercise program that includes all types of exercises needs a long explanation, which we cannot do here.
However, what we already mentioned is the level that a mujahid must reach before engaging in battle.The response to the previous two questions was somewhat long because of their importance. Still, we did not provide the details and explanation they deserve, but we can say that what was contained in the above response will enable a mujahid to exercise even if he does not have access to a training camp where he can do such exercises.
Sportsmanship is available to everyone. A mujahid can receive training in the combat skills we mentioned without engaging in shooting exercises. Most of these combat skills can be included in an athletic program.
3. What are the best combat methods a fighter would need in Iraq against the invaders?
We agreed in the previous responses that the best ways to confront the Crusader enemy in Iraq, based on the military, political, and economic realities and the difference between the two sides, is the guerrilla warfare method whether in cities or mountains.
Whether a fighter is in cities or mountains, he needs to have an idea about the combat methods he needs in Iraq before he goes there.
The names and strategies of the tactics and military offensive methods a defender of Iraq would use do not change, whether he is working with a small unit, a relatively large unit, or a combat cell.
Only the scope and type of weapons in each operation change according to need. A defender must take all the following methods into consideration: martyrdom operations and operations involving sniping; mine-planting; laying traps and carrying out detonations by remote control; blowing up and sabotage; cutting supply routes; operating behind the enemy; attacking units that cooperate with the enemy; raiding enemy bases, foremost airbases; focusing on all types of ambushes; poisoning food and drink; kidnappings or assassinations; and reconnaissance tasks. They are important methods to every defender. All of these types have firm strategies.
Only tactics change according to the demands of the terrain, the situation of the attacker and the defender, the timing, and other things learned through reconnaissance.
Whether these operations are large or small, they must be carried out accurately to advance from the first stage of guerrilla warfare and maintain the pressure on the occupier, which helps to advance from this stage.
Detailing the strategies of these methods would require more space, which is inconsistent with this article. They should be taught as special lessons, which we pray God will facilitate. However, for the sake of illustration and for making the intention understood, we will explain in brief and without elaboration some of these strategies in urban warfare, which we think are the most important in Iraq, in responding to future questions, God willing.
(This question was answered by the Mujahid Shaykh
Yusuf al-Ayiri, may God bless his soul and accept him among the martyrs, in his series on The New Crusader War against IraqStudies Center.) which he published on the website of the Islamic Research and
4. Would it be better for each group to be independent in supplies, equipment, fighting, and tactics or to be interrelated and coordinate their actions? If it is better to be interrelated, how should the interrelationship and coordination take place?
In the previous answer, we mentioned that interrelationship is unsuitable for guerrilla warfare in cities (secret activity). We also mentioned its inapplicability and danger, to some extent, to the method of guerrilla warfare in the mountains, jungles, or street fighting at the beginning of the first stage.
We repeat here that interrelationship is essential after the beginning of the first stage of guerrilla warfare.
Independence is necessary for fear groups would be attacked while in a weak state at the beginning of the first stage. After gaining strength and becoming experienced in warfare, they must move to cooperation.
Cooperation is not only a demand in military tactics, but also a shari’ah demand for achieving victory. Holding fast, all together, by the rope that God stretches out and the absence of division and disagreement are factors of victory.
The absence of cooperation would definitely cause disputes, disagreement, and failure because administrative division would gradually turn into division in the field.
Then, we would have commanders who issue separate decisions that violate the order of the day, causing catastrophe to all. Cooperation is essential as a shari’ah demand and a military demand. What we said earlier should not be understood to mean that we are against cooperation and centrality in command.
However, this interrelationship and centrality should be delayed for a while until the groups become stronger and able to enter the stage of interrelationship without causing a defect in the general structure.
Some groups might not need such delay in cooperation and centrality because they start in a strong position, as was the case at the beginning of the second Chechnya war. We mentioned these details because of their importance.
As for the question of whether it would be better for each group to be independent in supplies, equipment, fighting, and tactics or to be interrelated, we say that after the groups impose themselves on the ground and strengthen their roots, they have a duty under the shari’ah not to be independent.
They must also maintain an interrelationship militarily and not remain independent. Jihad is a collective worship.
From the military standpoint, it is a collective action aimed at defeating the enemy and deciding the battle in favor of the mujahidin. It is impossible to defeat the enemy and decide the battle except through unity and integration of supplies, equipment, fighting tactics, and other combat actions. A single central command should direct operations to produce the desired results.
The worst mistake is for separate groups to work in one sector without interrelationship. This would result in no group achieving any of its military goals because the actions of a group would negatively affect the other groups operating in the same sector if the other groups were not ready for the enemy’s reaction and initiatives.
For operations to succeed there must be interrelationship and no independence. Perhaps a group might think it would be better to maintain independence in supplies and equipment and in preparing stockpiles as a way of advancing the work and easing the burden and responsibility of the command to provide supplies and equipment and prepare stockpiles.
This is fine, provided the command is made aware of the details of such an initiative. If this initiative moves the group toward independence in carrying out certain military actions without coordination with the command, such independence in equipment, supplies, and stores would be prohibited militarily and primarily by the shari’ah.
This is because we have seen that rupture and division begin first with independence in supplies and equipment and then develop into finding independent commanders and carrying out independent operations that only add to the nation’s weakness. We must be weary and eliminate any reason for division and dispute.
As for the second part of the question about ways to establish cooperation and coordination, the answer to this question cannot be given before studying the situation.
Cooperation and coordination could take place through the establishment of a command council that includes a shura (consultative) council. If the situation is not conducive to this, cooperation and coordination could take place through messengers and verbal messages, or if the situation allows, through telephone and radio communication or the exchange of written messages, audio tapes, videos, or any other method of coordination and cooperation.
Each situation demands a particular method of communication and coordination.
There is no general strategy that we can point to. We can only say that communication and coordination can only take place if the groups operating in the field give up many of their ideas and agree on a unified command that all can listen to and obey; a command that can direct and coordinate the work so all can achieve God-supported victory, as the Almighty God has promised.
We repeat that the question of mastering these military skills does not only depend on battle experience. It is a shari’ah command from God, the Almighty, who said, ‘Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of Allah and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know.
Whatever ye shall spend in the cause of Allah, shall be repaid unto you, and ye shall not be treated unjustly’ (Al-Anfal 8:60). The question of doing whatever one can do is a shari’ah commandment that has nothing to do with embarking on a battle now or later. A servant must prepare himself to the best of his ability or else he would be committing a sin.
Whoever is able to prepare and enter the battle without preparation would not be doing what he has been commanded to do. This is if the decision to enter the battle is in his hands and not in the hands of the enemy that attacks him.
If the enemy invades a Muslim country, no one should say he did not make ready his strength to the utmost of his power and could not resist the enemy until he made the necessary preparations, even after years. Such words are unacceptable according to the shari’ah. What needs to be done immediately is to resist the invading enemy with whatever resources we have.
The demand to be prepared does not mean incurring expenses beyond our ability. It is legitimate to say we will not launch a jihad until we have fighter aircraft, interception missiles, or ballistic missiles to match the enemy.
However, this, in our case today, is beyond our ability. God asked us to do what we can. A person who can do something and fails to do it would be considered a failure.
However, a person who could only do a little would be doing what God had commanded him to do.
Many young Muslims today want to engage in the jihad and wish they could join the jihad but they did not do what they could to prepare for it.
If we go back to the ninth part of this series, we would find that many of those who want to join the jihad are able to prepare everything contained in it and more, but they have not done anything yet to justify themselves before the Almighty God, and there is no strength except in God.
If in explaining the previous Koranic verse we focused on military power, it is not because the verse specified power as military power only. The verse talked about the most important types of power.
5. What is the military importance of attacking the rear of the Crusader army on the borders of the agent states around Iraq?
Attacking the rear of the Crusader armies on the borders with Iraq or within the Iraqi borders is considered one of the best actions to disrupt all the Crusaders’ plans. As we said, the rear is the logistical support base, and logistical support constitutes three-quarters of an army’s operations.
A combat soldier needs three soldiers to support him, and this means that three-quarters of the army’s operations are concentrated in the rear. It is easy to threaten the rear because it is not manned by combat units but by support units.
Attacking the rear and cutting off the support would cause much disruption to the combat units, which might be forced to shift their efforts from fighting in the field to returning to the rear or to the supply routes to defend them.
Attacking the supply lines, which are normally in the rear, is very important. A threat to the flow of support opens a new front to them that requires a separate force to defend it.
The important thing in this war is to expand the scope of the battle with the American enemy as much as possible, scatter his efforts by all methods, and disperse his forces on the ground.
This would make it possible to exhaust the enemy and render him incapable of standing fast for long and causing him to collapse, God willing.
On April 19, a jihadist website posted an article entitled Instructions to Jihadists Before They Go to Iraq.
This article includes questions and answers providing what jihadists need to know before heading out for combat in Iraq, including what type of equipment to take and how to use it and the details of what strategies should be used according to the terrain.
Responses were taken from Shaykh Yusuf al-Ayiri from his series entitled The New Crusader War Against Iraq which was published on the website of the Islamic Research and Studies Center.
A translation of the article follows:
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.
1. What is the most important equipment a fighter must have to be prepared?
A fighter’s military equipment is closely associated with the type of missions entrusted to him and with the nature of the field in which he will operate.
We can say that a fighter’s equipment in the cities is much less than what a fighter needs mountains and jungle fields. The reason is that activity in the cities depends on secret activity, and therefore, a fighter does not need to appear in public with the equipment and clothing he is carrying.
He prepares for each operation the appropriate equipment which he estimates he will need before carrying out the activity.
A guerrilla fighter, whether in cities, mountains, or jungles, still needs to ensure that all the equipment he needs in all the military missions remains within reach during the fighting. If he is unable to carry it on his back, he needs to ensure it is kept in a secure place that he can access quickly when he needs it.
We will not provide a long explanation of the equipment that a guerrilla fighter needs, but we will draw attention to certain equipment, and a guerrilla fighter must estimate his needs, consider his tasks, and understand what he precisely needs for each task.
It would be a good idea for every mujahid to obtain the equipment mentioned below because the guerrilla fighter is considered an army moving on the ground. He needs all the equipment to carry out all the tasks without depending on other individuals or units.
A guerrilla fighter might have to go alone to a target, withdraw alone from an operation, or carry out an operation alone. He must not be like a soldier in a regular army who operates in conjunction with others in terms of equipment and combat.
He must view himself as the commander, the navigator, the shooter, and the communications or reconnaissance man. He must view himself as the man entrusted with carrying out all the fighting tasks.
Therefore, he must equip himself with everything that he needs and train on all combat tasks and appropriate weapons.
A guerrilla fighter is primarily a multi-type combat businessman, and therefore, he must equip himself with everything that he needs for combat, as follows:
Combat Equipment
* a small Koran that will be his companion to strengthen his heart to fight
* a light automatic rifle (Kalashnikov)
* a high quality bag to carry ammunition and bombs, which would not hamper combat activity
* four magazines for the light automatic rifle
* ammunition for four 120-round magazines; he may carry reserve ammunition if the combat mission requires the use of a larger amount of ammunition.
* a night-vision scope for the Kalashnikov
* a handgun with two magazines to be used for self-defense in case the light automatic rifle is abandoned or stops working or he runs out of ammunition
* two military uniforms for camouflage whose colors should suit the nature of the area; if this is impossible, any type of clothing used in the area that will not hamper his movement and fighting.
* military shoes or high-quality athletic shoes with two pairs of socks
* a helmet to protect against bullets and shrapnel
* a dagger for close combat or assassinations
* any type of shackles that would be easy to use to carry out abductions
* at least four hand grenades to comb rooms or for close ambush operations
* a rope for climbing up and climbing down from buildings or mountain heights. This rope is made especially for such operations and known by the name of a harness. It has rings to help a person climb down securely.
Navigation and Communication Equipment
* an up-to-date military map of the area and the surrounding areas. If it is impossible to obtain a military map, one can use an up-to-date civilian map with a scale of 250,000 centimeters.
* a ruler to measure distances on a map
* a protractor to determine directions on a map
* a compass equipped for night use
One can compensate for all this by using any global positioning systems (GPS) set, such as Magellan, Garmen, and others. Obtaining this equipment does not mean stopping to use the map and the compass. The equipment is susceptible to failure, and there must be a substitute to it if it fails or its location is spotted.
* a hand-held radio communication set of any kind to communicate with other groups or individuals. Small batteries for the communication set and the GPS set are necessary.
* a flashlight for use at night. There are types of flashlights that operate by solar energy and do not need batteries.
* Other equipment may be needed according to the nature of the mission and the area, but we will mention the most important ones and leave out that which changes with the change of the situation:
* a water flask of no less than one liter capacity
* a sufficient quantity of food determined by the nature of the military mission
* a small, easy to carry military bed
* a plastic raincoat to protect the fighter, equipment, and weapons from water
* a small pickax for digging
* a small wood saw
* a small iron saw
* a medium-size knife with a sharpener
* matches or friction igniter or any substitute not affected by water and exhausted within a short time
* a rope of a medium-size and length
* a screwdriver
* a different caliber bolt wrench
* a barbed wire cutter
* personal medical supplies, such as cotton, gauze, scissors, antiseptic solutions, medical bandages, and ointments that repel mosquitoes, which carry most illnesses
* tooth picks or anything similar
* small binoculars
* a strong quality backpack to carry supplies
Certain equipment is not particular to every individual. It is enough for one group to have a sufficient amount of such equipment for their combat missions as it deems appropriate.
* suitable night vision goggles
* a video camera to film and study reconnoitered sites and operations
* a first-aid box equipped with the necessary supplies, including tranquilizers and all types of antibiotics to treat all cases that occur in the field, such as bleeding, fractures, burns, sunstroke, colds, electricity shocks, pest bites, diarrhea, malaria, and other sicknesses caused by pollution
* The group commanders should provide non-personal weapons such as medium-caliber machineguns, sniper guns, M/D rocket launchers, and M/T rockets (as received).
* suitable quantities of explosives, land mines, military detonators, fuses, and slow-burning fuses and explosive belts for martyrdom operations; poisons that cause death by touching, smelling, or eating; invisible ink; electronic circuits for the detonation of explosives by remote control, timers, light, movement, or sound; electrical shock equipment or anesthesia gases for abduction operations; and appropriate silencers for some pistols available to the group for assassinations
* sources of electric power by solar means and any ammunition, weapons, and stores a guerrilla group might need
The type of equipment depends on the mission entrusted to a group, the terrain, and the type of enemy.
The commander of the group must provide everything that the group might need for the various combat tasks, for movement, or for holding a position and defending it.
The unavailability of some of this equipment and supplies does not mean that action should not take place. However, a mujahid must do his best to obtain this equipment prior to meeting the enemy.
If he can obtain this equipment and other things that he might need and failed to do so, he violates God’s commandment to do what is within his ability and if he cannot, he should not recoil from the jihad, as God only asks a person to do what he can.
These are the most important pieces of equipment that we think a fighter needs to get ready for combat. A fighter does not necessarily have to carry all of this equipment and supplies on his back wherever he goes. However, this equipment and these supplies should be close to the fighter and within his reach and he should carry only what he needs for his mission.
Combat missions demand combat equipment and supplies. Reconnaissance missions demand a camera and navigation tools. Assassination tasks only require carrying poison. Therefore, each task has its own equipment and supplies that a fighter needs.
A fighter must not neglect this equipment and these supplies and should try to obtain them before combat so they will not become an obstacle to him in taking the initiative in the field and moving from one combat mission to another immediately.
(This question was answered by the mujahid Shaykh Yusuf al-Ayiri, may God bless his soul and accept him among the martyrs, in his series on The New Crusader War Against Iraq, which he published on the website of the Islamic Research and Studies Center.)
2. What are the most important field, combat, and physical skills that a fighter must command?
It is difficult to list the field and physical skills that a fighter must command. Field and fighting skills are the crux of combat operations.
Many books have been written about these numerous and varied skills. However, we will try to mention a few examples of fighting skills to clarify the task. We will mention some of the fighting skills that a mujahid needs in the cities. They are more important to us than others are. We will also only mention the physical standard that a mujahid should have without detailing the athletic programs.
There are two types of skills: field skills and fighting skills.
Field Skills
It is the ability to adapt to the field, move efficiently in it, and take up positions by using all forms of camouflage methods. It is the ability to activate all the firing power of the group in offensive or defensive postures.
Each field has its own basic arts and skills that cut losses in our ranks, surprise the enemy, and achieve victory.
Desert areas, for example, have their own climates and character which require a special kind of adjustment and camouflage. They also require a special method in offensive and defensive postures. They are completely different from mountain, jungle, and urban fields. Some methods of adaptation are acquired from the residents of the area.
A mujahid must receive training on these types of skills in the area in which he needs to operate so he will not be surprised by difficulties in obtaining water, food, or shelter that would prevent him from carrying out his combat mission, affect his performance, and perhaps lead to his defeat. Training on field skills in any area does not take much time. A mujahid does not need more than 10 days for this.
Combat Skills
Combat in mountainous terrain requires different tactical skills than combat in forests or cities. Attacks, encirclement, frontal assault, defense of a position, and ambushes are different in mountains than in other fields. All these tasks have a common name and strategy, but they involve different tactics according to the field.
We will not spend much time identifying each task or relating its strategy. This is not the place for this. However, we will mention some examples of individual combat skills in the cities.
The success of combat tasks in any field depends primarily on good performance by the group. It should reflect the excellent execution of all the individual combat skills and the performance of weapons and equipment in the fighting. For example, a fighter in urban areas needs to know:
* how to fight in developed areas;
* how to move in developed areas;
* how to clear buildings and rooms;
* how to use hand grenades in developed areas and rooms;
* how to choose a firing position for any weapon he uses; and
* how to move, camouflage, conceal, and hide behind barriers.
These are some of the combat tasks in cities. Many exercises branch from them, which a mujahid needs to be trained on before he engages in a battle. These exercises are not a big problem that a person can only overcome through an intensive course. It is possible to reach a reasonable level of skills appropriate for a battle, God willing, without the need for an intensive course.
We will try to give examples of exercises for each task we mentioned earlier to clarify what we mean. We will not elaborate on every exercise but will try to give the example to clarify what we mean without details.
How To Fight in Developed Areas
Combat activity in cities develops from one stage to another according to the guerrilla warfare theory. In its first stage, it depends on agility and speed. The target should be easy and simple, and the security around it should be weak. The combat action against this target should be quick and not be based on a complex plan.
Operations at this stage differ, ranging from assassinations, raids, quick ambushes, infiltration, planting mines, poisoning food and water, sending booby-trapped parcels and toxic letters, and blowing up installations with booby-trapped equipment.
In this stage, fighters should not take up positions, barricade themselves in any place inside a city, or even plan an operation with a view to seizing control of a neighborhood. Such an idea is totally rejected at this stage in which the enemy has military superiority that enables him to destroy any visible body.
The idea is for the mujahidin to be like gas or air; that is, present but not seen. If the mujahidin lose this characteristic, they would suffer because their efforts would be jeopardized.
Combat action in the second stage of guerrilla warfare will be a development of the first stage in the sense that the mujahidin had already familiarized themselves with their enemy and absorbed his tactics and reactions.
They also had gained combat and security experience that made them skillful. These qualifications enable them to select bigger targets in size and importance.
Therefore, the plans for their operations at this stage would be characterized by complexity and effectiveness because the operations would be larger and the results would be greater.
The new characteristic of this stage is that the day is for the ruling regime and the night is for the mujahidin forces.
It is possible at this stage for the mujahidin to have some control over some neighborhoods that have certain characteristics, such as rough terrain and population composition.
The third stage in the war is when guerrilla fighters begin coming down from rough terrain areas and start occupying the cities.
In this stage, combat in urban areas, in the case of an attack from outside, passes through three stages.
The first stage is isolation. This is the stage in which the fighters besiege and isolate the targeted village or city by taking control of the roads leading to it. They approach the village or town and try to isolate it to block the way to any support force or factors that could make it withstand an attack.
After a sufficient time of isolation to exhaust the defenders, the next stage begins, which is the stage of attack. The objective in this stage is to destroy the defenses of the defenders and establish positions on the outskirts of the village or city.
It is possible to carry out an attack on the enemy to destroy him in two ways: the converging axes way or the parallel axes way. After destroying the defenders and making sure that no regular defenses exist, the third stage begins, which is the mopping up stage.
This stage involves combing the streets and buildings in ways that we will mention later. A mujahid must know that movement by a group during combat in cities takes place in stages.
A group or an individual takes up position to cover the advance of a group or an individual. The advancing group or individual then takes cover and provides cover for the advance of the previous covering group or individual, and so forth. A mujahid must have experience in shooting and aiming from the right or left shoulder, because the corner of a building dictates from which side of his body he should shoot. He or his shadow must not appear while firing.
How To Move in Developed Areas
To minimize exposure to enemy fire while advancing in built-up areas, a mujahid must not become a target. He must do everything to conceal or disguise himself and hide behind barriers.
He must avoid movement in open areas, such as streets, gardens, and lanes that lack exits. If he has to move in such areas, he must do it under the cover of fire or smoke in a zigzag way, or crawling. He must choose with his own eyes the next position that could provide him with appropriate cover before he moves out of his position.
He must conceal his movement by all methods. He must move quickly and cautiously. If he expects to be shot at while moving from one position to another, he must cover his movement by firing his personal weapon against the positions where he expects someone would be waiting for him. If he needs to climb walls, he must explore the other side to which he is moving.
Before that, he must specify the easiest area for climbing the wall. He also must move quickly toward the wall, and if he climbs, he must lower his body, jump close to the wall, and move quickly to the other side.
If a mujahid wants to observe the movement on a street, he must not expose his entire body or head from the corner of the street or door. He must lie down, wear a helmet, and show only a small part of his head to enable him to explore movement on the street.
He can also use a periscope without having to show any part of his head. One of the biggest dangers that face a mujahid in cities is passing in front of windows behind which enemy soldiers usually take up positions.
There are two kinds of windows: ground floor windows and cellar windows. A mujahid must be weary of these windows. He must know how to pass in front of these windows.
To pass in front of ground floor windows, a mujahid must bow down below the level of the window, keep close to the wall, and pass quickly and quietly. For a mujahid to pass over cellar windows, he must jump over the window without exposing his legs to danger. If the window is wide and a mujahid cannot jump over it and pass, he must use a barrier between him and the window to pass.
A mujahid must be careful and avoid using doors to enter and leave. Often, the enemy places these doors within his firing range, or he uses deceptive traps and mines to kill anyone who tries to enter buildings by climbing up or down. He must not pass through open areas without firing or smoke cover. If a mujahid has to do that, he must pass quickly in a zigzag way. During movement inside a building, he must avoid getting close to doors and windows to avoid enemy fire from inside or outside the building.
A plan must be prepared carefully for secure movement during the evacuation of the wounded from each building to secure locations. Members of a group must leave a distance of three to five meters between them during movement inside cities.
How To Clear Buildings and Rooms
A mujahid must choose his point of entry before moving toward a building. He must avoid entering through windows and doors. He must use a smoke screen or firepower to cover up his advance toward the building. He must open gaps to enter the building by using explosives, rockets, or tank shells to avoid using the windows and doors. He must also use hand grenades before entering any open space in the building.
He must enter immediately after the hand grenade explodes in order not to give the enemy any chance to recover. He also must have protection by one of his colleagues while entering a room to clear it of enemy elements.
The best method to clear buildings is to start from top to bottom. A mujahid must climb to the top floor of a building by any method, whether by climbing with ropes, over water pipes, on ladders and trees, or through the roofs of neighboring buildings or by any other method.
A fighter must be experienced in climbing buildings with ropes equipped with anchors, throwing the anchor at the roof of the building and climbing up. It is preferable to make knots in the rope approximately one meter apart to help in climbing up. A fighter must also be experienced in climbing down with a special rope, a harness.
These ropes enable a fighter to climb down from the top of the building and easily comb rooms facing the outside.
How To Use Hand Grenades in Developed Areas and Rooms
A mujahid must master the use of hand grenades because they are used extensively in fighting in urban areas. A mujahid will need to use grenades to clear each room, opening, or staircase. He must know how to throw a grenade in various circumstances. He must learn through training how to aim and throw a grenade accurately at the desired target.
He must also receive training to time the grenade trigger so he can throw it and prevent the enemy from throwing it back before it explodes. He must know how to pull the security pin of the grenade if he is carrying his personal weapon in the other hand, if he is lying down, and in all other situations as well.
He must also know how to keep the security arm after throwing the grenade for fear the enemy will take the fingerprints, learn the type of grenade, or learn any other information beneficial to him.
A mujahid must know the effects of the grenade shrapnel and the destructive power of the grenade to take precautions and hide behind a barrier during the combing of a building.
How To Choose a Firing Position for Any Weapon
The success of operations inside buildings depends on an individual’s skill in combat. However, such skill will not serve its purpose in defense, offense, retreat, or advance by an individual or group until the fighter becomes experienced in directing his fire at the enemy and silencing his fire.
The firepower of a fighter in cities is his capital, and it is wrong to use this firepower uselessly.
He must know how, when, where, and why he is shooting.
He also must know with what he is shooting and from where he is shooting. These are urgent requirements, and a mujahid must have enough intelligence, intuition, firmness, and courage to enable him to interact with these requirements quickly during combat. One of these demands is knowing from where to shoot.
A mujahid must always look for a suitable position from which to fire and not to expose himself to enemy fire, taking advantage of his firepower and avoiding dead corners that the enemy exploits in his movements.
He should fire from building corners, from behind walls, window corners, rooftops, small openings prepared by the shooter, from behind sand barriers, from water service halls on the streets, or from flowerbeds on sidewalks. If he is using anti-armor weapons, a mujahid must keep a distance from a wall behind him so the flames will not spread to him.
He must choose positions overlooking the main streets. He must know that if a tank comes close to a building, it cannot elevate its gun at an angle of 45 degrees to aim at the roof of the building. This allows the mujahid to use rooftops overlooking the main streets to hit tanks.
We must draw the attention of the mujahid that window glass poses a danger to him. Therefore, before using windows to open fire, he must remove all the glass to prevent being hurt if an explosion takes place near him.
He must also install an iron mesh on the window to prevent hand grenades thrown by enemy soldiers from outside the building from entering.
How To Move, Camouflage, Conceal, and Hide Behind Barriers
To exhaust the enemy and achieve security, the mujahidin must use camouflage, concealment, and disguises skillfully. The first thing to do is to study the area carefully to camouflage the equipment, weapons, personnel, and armored vehicles with the same colors of the surrounding area.
Do not try to open holes in buildings for shooting if there is no destruction and cracks in the buildings because of war.
Do not try to exaggerate the camouflage because it often reveals the location. Do not use luminous and shining materials in your position because this will expose you and subject you to random shelling.
Darkness is an excellent natural cover for concealment and movement.
The shadow of walls and buildings is appropriate for concealing armored vehicles and equipment because a person from a distance cannot distinguish anything under a shadow unless he comes close. Try to disguise the glow of your skin, equipment, or weapons by using charcoal, mud, or burned cork.
Place a wet fabric material under the muzzle of any kind of weapon during firing to prevent stirring up dust. Try to shoot from inside rooms at night. If the neighboring buildings or the other rooms in the building are lit, try to fire while the lights are on to conceal the rifle flashes.
You must conceal the muzzle of the rifle during firing to prevent its flash from showing and exposing your location.
The mujahidin should conceal all their traces, including any location they settled in or passed through, such as garbage, paper, campfires, footsteps, and any trace that could lead to information about the number of elements in the group, their types of weapons, or anything about them.
It is appropriate to create fictitious targets for the enemy to exhaust him, distract his attention, and make him lose confidence in the results of his reconnaissance.
This is a brief explanation of some of the combat tasks inside cities. It is enough to explain what we mean by combat skills that a fighter should master. This is not an exclusive list. We drew attention to the most important skills. Still, there are many more things we did not draw attention to, and giving details of these skills is inappropriate here.
Such combat skills require a special volume. We already mentioned that the combat skills needed in cities are different from the combat skills in mountains and jungles.
However, the most difficult combat skills are the combat skills in cities. The dangers surrounding a mujahid in cities are much more than the dangers in mountains and jungles. In this answer, we think we drew attention to several combat skills in the cities, which explain hardships of combat in this field.
In response to the second part of the question regarding the fighter’s physical skills, we say that fighting requires a high level of physical fitness. This fitness is represented in muscle strength, endurance, speed, aerobic and non-aerobic fitness, agility, and flexibility.
It is easy for a mujahid to reach this suitable level within two months of training through a daily program involving all athletic exercises that the body of a mujahid needs to perform his combat tasks as best as possible.
In any case, the physical fitness of a mujahid and his ability to run for long distances and tolerate physical activity for long periods are the main factors in his good performance in the field.
A mujahid could be experienced with firearms, but because of a lack of physical fitness, he will not be able to select the appropriate place for shooting and will not be able to jump over walls or climb buildings to comb them.
All this is because he lacks physical fitness. A mujahid who enjoys good physical fitness can complete all his tasks very well even if his use of weapons has not reached the level of perfection because he is able to maneuver, assume the best positions for shooting, and fulfill his tasks quickly.
Physical exhaustion will not disturb his thinking, initiative, or speed. We learn from this that physical fitness is an important demand for a mujahid in the urban combat field.
However, training should be appropriate for an individual’s age and capability. Training should be limited to a number of days per week and no more than five days for most. For the advanced ones, it should be two or three times a day. Training should follow a gradual program.
The training period should begin with warming up, then training, and end with cooling down. This approach helps the muscle to fulfill its task and benefit from training without causing unpleasant repercussions.
We must know that a weak program will not lead to the desired result and intensive training that exceeds the capability of a person will produce undesirable counter results. No training, in such a case, could be better than exercising in this way.
We cannot give a longer response than this to the question before we mention the exercise program that allows a mujahid to reach a suitable level of fitness within one and a half or two months to help him fight as best as he can through a gradual daily program that does not exhaust the body and does not cause repercussions or tear up the muscles.
We say in this respect that the physical fitness level that a mujahid should have is measured by his ability to jog for 10 kilometers without stopping within a maximum of 70 minutes and to carry out an exercise of penetrating a neighborhood and running for three kilometers in no more than 13.5 minutes.
He should be able to run a 100-meter distance in 12 to 15 seconds. He should be able to walk without long stops for no less than 10 hours. He should be able to walk carrying a load of up to 20 kilograms for no less than 4 hours.
He should be able to do 70 push-ups at a time without a pause. He should be able to do the abdomen exercises (sit-ups) 100 times without stopping.
He should be able to do the crocodile crawl for 50 meters within a maximum of 70 seconds.
To test his endurance capability, he must carry out an exercise similar to the Fartlek method with slight variation. This exercise combines walking, fast walking, jogging, running, and racing. The mujahid begins by walking normally for two minutes and then walking fast for two minutes and then jogging for two minutes and then running for two minutes and ends with racing for 100 meters.
He then goes back to walking and repeating the same exercise without stopping 10 times. There is a difference between walking normally, walking fast, jogging, running, and racing. Everyone knows what is normal walking. A fast walk is to walk fast while not lifting one of the two feet from the ground for a long period close to the period of normal walk.
Jogging is covering a distance of a kilometer within no less than 5.5 minutes. Racing is covering a kilometer in no more than 4.5 minutes. Fast racing is calculated by the time a person needs to cover a distance of 100 meters, and it ranges between 12 and 15 seconds. It constitutes approximately 80 percent of the physical effort.
A mujahid who makes a serious effort could reach this level within one month, provided he observes progression in exercising and does not exhaust his muscles.
For example, if a mujahid begins at the beginning of the month with jogging for 15 minutes and increases the rate by two minutes every day, this means that within one month he could jog for one hour without stopping (a month consists of 20 days of exercise, if the program covers five days a week).
Likewise, if he began at the beginning of the month with 10 push-ups and increased that by three every day, he would be able to reach 70 push-ups within one month.
Progression and continuity has a big effect in gaining physical fitness. The exercise program must include Swedish exercises to help extend, relax, and strengthen the muscles. A mujahid must try to focus on all types of Swedish exercises and keep away from equipment to continue his exercise program anywhere because equipment has a negative effect on the body in the long-run.
The best exercises are Swedish exercises that are easy to apply, depend on the body and its strength, and have much less negative effect than others. The physical exercise program that includes all types of exercises needs a long explanation, which we cannot do here.
However, what we already mentioned is the level that a mujahid must reach before engaging in battle.The response to the previous two questions was somewhat long because of their importance. Still, we did not provide the details and explanation they deserve, but we can say that what was contained in the above response will enable a mujahid to exercise even if he does not have access to a training camp where he can do such exercises.
Sportsmanship is available to everyone. A mujahid can receive training in the combat skills we mentioned without engaging in shooting exercises. Most of these combat skills can be included in an athletic program.
3. What are the best combat methods a fighter would need in Iraq against the invaders?
We agreed in the previous responses that the best ways to confront the Crusader enemy in Iraq, based on the military, political, and economic realities and the difference between the two sides, is the guerrilla warfare method whether in cities or mountains.
Whether a fighter is in cities or mountains, he needs to have an idea about the combat methods he needs in Iraq before he goes there.
The names and strategies of the tactics and military offensive methods a defender of Iraq would use do not change, whether he is working with a small unit, a relatively large unit, or a combat cell.
Only the scope and type of weapons in each operation change according to need. A defender must take all the following methods into consideration: martyrdom operations and operations involving sniping; mine-planting; laying traps and carrying out detonations by remote control; blowing up and sabotage; cutting supply routes; operating behind the enemy; attacking units that cooperate with the enemy; raiding enemy bases, foremost airbases; focusing on all types of ambushes; poisoning food and drink; kidnappings or assassinations; and reconnaissance tasks. They are important methods to every defender. All of these types have firm strategies.
Only tactics change according to the demands of the terrain, the situation of the attacker and the defender, the timing, and other things learned through reconnaissance.
Whether these operations are large or small, they must be carried out accurately to advance from the first stage of guerrilla warfare and maintain the pressure on the occupier, which helps to advance from this stage.
Detailing the strategies of these methods would require more space, which is inconsistent with this article. They should be taught as special lessons, which we pray God will facilitate. However, for the sake of illustration and for making the intention understood, we will explain in brief and without elaboration some of these strategies in urban warfare, which we think are the most important in Iraq, in responding to future questions, God willing.
(This question was answered by the Mujahid Shaykh
Yusuf al-Ayiri, may God bless his soul and accept him among the martyrs, in his series on The New Crusader War against IraqStudies Center.) which he published on the website of the Islamic Research and
4. Would it be better for each group to be independent in supplies, equipment, fighting, and tactics or to be interrelated and coordinate their actions? If it is better to be interrelated, how should the interrelationship and coordination take place?
In the previous answer, we mentioned that interrelationship is unsuitable for guerrilla warfare in cities (secret activity). We also mentioned its inapplicability and danger, to some extent, to the method of guerrilla warfare in the mountains, jungles, or street fighting at the beginning of the first stage.
We repeat here that interrelationship is essential after the beginning of the first stage of guerrilla warfare.
Independence is necessary for fear groups would be attacked while in a weak state at the beginning of the first stage. After gaining strength and becoming experienced in warfare, they must move to cooperation.
Cooperation is not only a demand in military tactics, but also a shari’ah demand for achieving victory. Holding fast, all together, by the rope that God stretches out and the absence of division and disagreement are factors of victory.
The absence of cooperation would definitely cause disputes, disagreement, and failure because administrative division would gradually turn into division in the field.
Then, we would have commanders who issue separate decisions that violate the order of the day, causing catastrophe to all. Cooperation is essential as a shari’ah demand and a military demand. What we said earlier should not be understood to mean that we are against cooperation and centrality in command.
However, this interrelationship and centrality should be delayed for a while until the groups become stronger and able to enter the stage of interrelationship without causing a defect in the general structure.
Some groups might not need such delay in cooperation and centrality because they start in a strong position, as was the case at the beginning of the second Chechnya war. We mentioned these details because of their importance.
As for the question of whether it would be better for each group to be independent in supplies, equipment, fighting, and tactics or to be interrelated, we say that after the groups impose themselves on the ground and strengthen their roots, they have a duty under the shari’ah not to be independent.
They must also maintain an interrelationship militarily and not remain independent. Jihad is a collective worship.
From the military standpoint, it is a collective action aimed at defeating the enemy and deciding the battle in favor of the mujahidin. It is impossible to defeat the enemy and decide the battle except through unity and integration of supplies, equipment, fighting tactics, and other combat actions. A single central command should direct operations to produce the desired results.
The worst mistake is for separate groups to work in one sector without interrelationship. This would result in no group achieving any of its military goals because the actions of a group would negatively affect the other groups operating in the same sector if the other groups were not ready for the enemy’s reaction and initiatives.
For operations to succeed there must be interrelationship and no independence. Perhaps a group might think it would be better to maintain independence in supplies and equipment and in preparing stockpiles as a way of advancing the work and easing the burden and responsibility of the command to provide supplies and equipment and prepare stockpiles.
This is fine, provided the command is made aware of the details of such an initiative. If this initiative moves the group toward independence in carrying out certain military actions without coordination with the command, such independence in equipment, supplies, and stores would be prohibited militarily and primarily by the shari’ah.
This is because we have seen that rupture and division begin first with independence in supplies and equipment and then develop into finding independent commanders and carrying out independent operations that only add to the nation’s weakness. We must be weary and eliminate any reason for division and dispute.
As for the second part of the question about ways to establish cooperation and coordination, the answer to this question cannot be given before studying the situation.
Cooperation and coordination could take place through the establishment of a command council that includes a shura (consultative) council. If the situation is not conducive to this, cooperation and coordination could take place through messengers and verbal messages, or if the situation allows, through telephone and radio communication or the exchange of written messages, audio tapes, videos, or any other method of coordination and cooperation.
Each situation demands a particular method of communication and coordination.
There is no general strategy that we can point to. We can only say that communication and coordination can only take place if the groups operating in the field give up many of their ideas and agree on a unified command that all can listen to and obey; a command that can direct and coordinate the work so all can achieve God-supported victory, as the Almighty God has promised.
We repeat that the question of mastering these military skills does not only depend on battle experience. It is a shari’ah command from God, the Almighty, who said, ‘Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of Allah and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know.
Whatever ye shall spend in the cause of Allah, shall be repaid unto you, and ye shall not be treated unjustly’ (Al-Anfal 8:60). The question of doing whatever one can do is a shari’ah commandment that has nothing to do with embarking on a battle now or later. A servant must prepare himself to the best of his ability or else he would be committing a sin.
Whoever is able to prepare and enter the battle without preparation would not be doing what he has been commanded to do. This is if the decision to enter the battle is in his hands and not in the hands of the enemy that attacks him.
If the enemy invades a Muslim country, no one should say he did not make ready his strength to the utmost of his power and could not resist the enemy until he made the necessary preparations, even after years. Such words are unacceptable according to the shari’ah. What needs to be done immediately is to resist the invading enemy with whatever resources we have.
The demand to be prepared does not mean incurring expenses beyond our ability. It is legitimate to say we will not launch a jihad until we have fighter aircraft, interception missiles, or ballistic missiles to match the enemy.
However, this, in our case today, is beyond our ability. God asked us to do what we can. A person who can do something and fails to do it would be considered a failure.
However, a person who could only do a little would be doing what God had commanded him to do.
Many young Muslims today want to engage in the jihad and wish they could join the jihad but they did not do what they could to prepare for it.
If we go back to the ninth part of this series, we would find that many of those who want to join the jihad are able to prepare everything contained in it and more, but they have not done anything yet to justify themselves before the Almighty God, and there is no strength except in God.
If in explaining the previous Koranic verse we focused on military power, it is not because the verse specified power as military power only. The verse talked about the most important types of power.
5. What is the military importance of attacking the rear of the Crusader army on the borders of the agent states around Iraq?
Attacking the rear of the Crusader armies on the borders with Iraq or within the Iraqi borders is considered one of the best actions to disrupt all the Crusaders’ plans. As we said, the rear is the logistical support base, and logistical support constitutes three-quarters of an army’s operations.
A combat soldier needs three soldiers to support him, and this means that three-quarters of the army’s operations are concentrated in the rear. It is easy to threaten the rear because it is not manned by combat units but by support units.
Attacking the rear and cutting off the support would cause much disruption to the combat units, which might be forced to shift their efforts from fighting in the field to returning to the rear or to the supply routes to defend them.
Attacking the supply lines, which are normally in the rear, is very important. A threat to the flow of support opens a new front to them that requires a separate force to defend it.
The important thing in this war is to expand the scope of the battle with the American enemy as much as possible, scatter his efforts by all methods, and disperse his forces on the ground.
This would make it possible to exhaust the enemy and render him incapable of standing fast for long and causing him to collapse, God willing.
Thursday, April 26, 2007
Why CAIR Dropped its Lawsuit
Why CAIR Dropped its Lawsuit
VIDEO ABOUT CAIR ALSO ON ANTIMULLAH
April 26, 2007
by Joseph Prudoe
Andrew Whitehead, a former serviceman with the U.S. Navy has a website named Anti-CAIR on which Whitehead accused CAIR of partially funding terrorist organizations. CAIR routinely tries to intimidate the likes of Whitehead in the hope of stifling any criticisms and/or allegations made against it.
On March 31, 2004 CAIR filed a lawsuit against Andrew Whitehead in the Virginia Beach Circuit Court demanding $1 million in damages from Whitehead for what it called ‘libelous defamation.’ The lawsuit, scheduled to begin in the summer of 2006 was dismissed in April 2006.
Last Thursday, April 12, 2007, the Philadelphia/South Jersey chapter of the Republican Jewish Coalition (RJC) under the leadership of Regional Director Scott Figelstein, hosted a program with Reed Rubinstein, Esq. of the Washington, DC-based law firm of Greenberg Taurig. The RJC serves as a liaison between the Jewish community and Republican decision makers.
Reed Rubinstein, with the backing of his law firm, provided pro-bono counsel for Andrew Whitehead in the CAIR v. Whitehead lawsuit. Rubinstein is credited with defeating the defamation suit ‘by an Islamic extremist group against the U.S. Navy enlisted man.’
On January 6, 2004, CAIR attorney Jeremiah A. Denton III of Virginia Beach , VA sent Whitehead a personal and confidential letter in which he cited the alleged defamatory paragraphs on Whitehead’s Anti-CAIR website.
He concluded his letter with, ‘Notwithstanding my recommendation, in lieu of a lawsuit CAIR has asked me to give you the opportunity to voluntarily cease and desist the publication of defamatory statements about CAIR on your website and elsewhere. If you persist in the publication of defamatory remarks about CAIR, or if you elect to publish this personal and confidential letter to any person, a suit will be filed forthwith.’
The ‘false and defamatory’ statements irking CAIR officials made by Whitehead were: CAIR is a ‘terrorist front organization that is partially funded by terrorists’; CAIR is an ‘organization founded by Hamas supporters which seeks to overthrow the constitutional government in the U.S’; and, ‘Why oppose CAIR? CAIR has proven links to, and was founded by, Islamic terrorists…CAIR is here to make radical Islam the dominant religion in the U.S…In addition, CAIR receives direct funding from Islamic terrorist-supporting countries.’
Whitehead, not easily intimidated, responded by filing over 300 separate interrogatories, requests of documents and requests for admission. CAIR then filed an amended ‘motion for judgement’ dropping the allegations regarding CAIR’s ties to Hamas and terror were false and defamatory, some discovery answers, and a motion for protective order.
Whitehead then filed a motion to compel, seeking a court order obligating CAIR to answer his information requests.
In court, CAIR was asked to admit that ‘Hamas murdered innocent civilians’ to which it replied: ‘Objection, calls for legal conclusion…’
Questioned as to whether CAIR has had ‘one or more communications with Abu Musa Marzook?’ The Plaintiff’s reply was, ‘To be subject to Plaintiff’s motion for Protective Order…’, restricting the response to Whitehead’s counsel.
Called to confirm Article Seven of the Hamas Charter which states that ‘the Hamas has been looking forward to implementing Allah’s promise whatever time it might take. The Prophet, peace be upon him, said: The time will not come until Muslims will fight the Jews, until the Jews hide behind rocks and trees, which will cry: O Muslim! There is a Jew hiding behind me, come on and kill him!’
CAIR again refused to respond by stating: ‘CAIR objects because the Hamas Charter speaks for itself and because the Plainiff is without means to obtain current, accurate, and reliable copy of the Hamas Charter.’
Shortly before the court hearing on the motion to compel the case settled. There was no apology, and no retraction. The ‘false and defamatory’ allegations remain posted on Whitehead’s website. CAIR simply did not wish to supply the requested documents.
Rubinstein learned a great deal about CAIR while preparing for the trial. According to Rubinstein CAIR ‘is not a domestic grassroots organization in the usual sense of the term.’ It is, instead, a ‘top down’ group. CAIR, Rubinstein said ‘was formed by Hamas supporters, apparently as part of an integrated anti-Israel and anti-Jewish strategy.’
In addition, Rubinstein observed that, ‘CAIR is dedicated to spreading Islam in the U.S. and that it is an evangelical organization whose activities are funded by foreign Arabs.’
Steven Emerson, a former CNN reporter who produced ‘Jihad in America, a PBS documentary on Islamic groups in America, said in a testimony before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, in February 1998 that he has ‘found links between CAIR and the radical Palestinian Islamist group Hamas.’
Emerson added, ‘Pretending to be a civil rights group, CAIR is representative of the new transformation of militant Islamic groups.’ Emerson indicated that ‘CAIR was formed not by Muslim religious leaders throughout the country, but as an offshoot of the Islamic Association of Palestine.’
Why did CAIR drop its lawsuit against Andrew Whitehead?
Apparently it feared exposure that would reveal its leaders connections to terrorist groups like Hamas.
If that is the case, namely, CAIR’s fear of exposure, why has the media been silent on this matter? Rubinstein explained, ‘CAIR is protected by the mainstream media,’ which he said, ‘has studiously ignored a decade of evidence, and has, instead, adopted a ‘see no evil, speak no evil’ stance.’
Although CAIR is legal under the constitution, it is important to remember that the Communist party and the neo-Nazi parties in America were legal too. The activities of these organizations, including CAIR, however, is not necessarily sanctioned by the constitution, especially since CAIR represents a ‘profoundly anti-Semitic and anti-Christian ideology, and relies for its existence and activities on foreign Arab money.’
As Rubinstein has put it, ‘In another time (before the onset of a PC culture), activities such as those CAIR is involved in, would have been labeled as subversive.’
Source: http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=28019>
VIDEO ABOUT CAIR ALSO ON ANTIMULLAH
April 26, 2007
by Joseph Prudoe
Andrew Whitehead, a former serviceman with the U.S. Navy has a website named Anti-CAIR on which Whitehead accused CAIR of partially funding terrorist organizations. CAIR routinely tries to intimidate the likes of Whitehead in the hope of stifling any criticisms and/or allegations made against it.
On March 31, 2004 CAIR filed a lawsuit against Andrew Whitehead in the Virginia Beach Circuit Court demanding $1 million in damages from Whitehead for what it called ‘libelous defamation.’ The lawsuit, scheduled to begin in the summer of 2006 was dismissed in April 2006.
Last Thursday, April 12, 2007, the Philadelphia/South Jersey chapter of the Republican Jewish Coalition (RJC) under the leadership of Regional Director Scott Figelstein, hosted a program with Reed Rubinstein, Esq. of the Washington, DC-based law firm of Greenberg Taurig. The RJC serves as a liaison between the Jewish community and Republican decision makers.
Reed Rubinstein, with the backing of his law firm, provided pro-bono counsel for Andrew Whitehead in the CAIR v. Whitehead lawsuit. Rubinstein is credited with defeating the defamation suit ‘by an Islamic extremist group against the U.S. Navy enlisted man.’
On January 6, 2004, CAIR attorney Jeremiah A. Denton III of Virginia Beach , VA sent Whitehead a personal and confidential letter in which he cited the alleged defamatory paragraphs on Whitehead’s Anti-CAIR website.
He concluded his letter with, ‘Notwithstanding my recommendation, in lieu of a lawsuit CAIR has asked me to give you the opportunity to voluntarily cease and desist the publication of defamatory statements about CAIR on your website and elsewhere. If you persist in the publication of defamatory remarks about CAIR, or if you elect to publish this personal and confidential letter to any person, a suit will be filed forthwith.’
The ‘false and defamatory’ statements irking CAIR officials made by Whitehead were: CAIR is a ‘terrorist front organization that is partially funded by terrorists’; CAIR is an ‘organization founded by Hamas supporters which seeks to overthrow the constitutional government in the U.S’; and, ‘Why oppose CAIR? CAIR has proven links to, and was founded by, Islamic terrorists…CAIR is here to make radical Islam the dominant religion in the U.S…In addition, CAIR receives direct funding from Islamic terrorist-supporting countries.’
Whitehead, not easily intimidated, responded by filing over 300 separate interrogatories, requests of documents and requests for admission. CAIR then filed an amended ‘motion for judgement’ dropping the allegations regarding CAIR’s ties to Hamas and terror were false and defamatory, some discovery answers, and a motion for protective order.
Whitehead then filed a motion to compel, seeking a court order obligating CAIR to answer his information requests.
In court, CAIR was asked to admit that ‘Hamas murdered innocent civilians’ to which it replied: ‘Objection, calls for legal conclusion…’
Questioned as to whether CAIR has had ‘one or more communications with Abu Musa Marzook?’ The Plaintiff’s reply was, ‘To be subject to Plaintiff’s motion for Protective Order…’, restricting the response to Whitehead’s counsel.
Called to confirm Article Seven of the Hamas Charter which states that ‘the Hamas has been looking forward to implementing Allah’s promise whatever time it might take. The Prophet, peace be upon him, said: The time will not come until Muslims will fight the Jews, until the Jews hide behind rocks and trees, which will cry: O Muslim! There is a Jew hiding behind me, come on and kill him!’
CAIR again refused to respond by stating: ‘CAIR objects because the Hamas Charter speaks for itself and because the Plainiff is without means to obtain current, accurate, and reliable copy of the Hamas Charter.’
Shortly before the court hearing on the motion to compel the case settled. There was no apology, and no retraction. The ‘false and defamatory’ allegations remain posted on Whitehead’s website. CAIR simply did not wish to supply the requested documents.
Rubinstein learned a great deal about CAIR while preparing for the trial. According to Rubinstein CAIR ‘is not a domestic grassroots organization in the usual sense of the term.’ It is, instead, a ‘top down’ group. CAIR, Rubinstein said ‘was formed by Hamas supporters, apparently as part of an integrated anti-Israel and anti-Jewish strategy.’
In addition, Rubinstein observed that, ‘CAIR is dedicated to spreading Islam in the U.S. and that it is an evangelical organization whose activities are funded by foreign Arabs.’
Steven Emerson, a former CNN reporter who produced ‘Jihad in America, a PBS documentary on Islamic groups in America, said in a testimony before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, in February 1998 that he has ‘found links between CAIR and the radical Palestinian Islamist group Hamas.’
Emerson added, ‘Pretending to be a civil rights group, CAIR is representative of the new transformation of militant Islamic groups.’ Emerson indicated that ‘CAIR was formed not by Muslim religious leaders throughout the country, but as an offshoot of the Islamic Association of Palestine.’
Why did CAIR drop its lawsuit against Andrew Whitehead?
Apparently it feared exposure that would reveal its leaders connections to terrorist groups like Hamas.
If that is the case, namely, CAIR’s fear of exposure, why has the media been silent on this matter? Rubinstein explained, ‘CAIR is protected by the mainstream media,’ which he said, ‘has studiously ignored a decade of evidence, and has, instead, adopted a ‘see no evil, speak no evil’ stance.’
Although CAIR is legal under the constitution, it is important to remember that the Communist party and the neo-Nazi parties in America were legal too. The activities of these organizations, including CAIR, however, is not necessarily sanctioned by the constitution, especially since CAIR represents a ‘profoundly anti-Semitic and anti-Christian ideology, and relies for its existence and activities on foreign Arab money.’
As Rubinstein has put it, ‘In another time (before the onset of a PC culture), activities such as those CAIR is involved in, would have been labeled as subversive.’
Source: http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=28019>
Tuesday, April 24, 2007
SWEDISH ISLAM MODEL COLLAPSES
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1821598/posts
Jihad and the Collapse of the Swedish Modelislam watch ^ 20 April, 2007 Fjordman
Posted on 04/22/2007 8:12:58 AM PDT by george76
I decided to write this essay following the riots in Malmö this weekend. Malmö is Sweden’s third largest city and by far the worst city in Scandinavia when it comes to Muslim aggression. I read recently that an Arab girl interviewed in Malmö said that she liked it so much there, it felt almost like an Arab city.
Native Swedes have been moving away from the city for years, turned into refugees in their own country by Jihad, not too different from the non-Muslims in some regions of the Philippines, southern Thailand or Kashmir in India, or for that matter Christian Serbs in Kosovo.
Native Swedes have thus been reduced to just another ethnic group in Sweden, with no more claim to the country than the Kurds or the Somalis who arrived there last Thursday. The political authorities of the country have erased their own people’s history and culture.
Jens Orback, Minister for Democracy, Metropolitan Affairs, Integration and Gender Equality from the Social Democratic Party said during a debate in Swedish radio in 2004 that “We must be open and tolerant towards Islam and Muslims because when we become a minority, they will be so towards us.”
This is a government that knows perfectly well that their people will become a minority in their own country, yet is doing nothing to stop this.
On the contrary. Pierre Schori, Minister for immigration, during a parliamentary debate in 1997 said that: “Racism and xenophobia should be banned and chased [away],” and that one should not accept “excuses, such as that there were flaws in the immigration and refugee policies.”
In other words: It should be viewed as a crime for the native population not to assist in wiping themselves out.
(Excerpt) Read more at islam-watch.org ...
Jihad and the Collapse of the Swedish Modelislam watch ^ 20 April, 2007 Fjordman
Posted on 04/22/2007 8:12:58 AM PDT by george76
I decided to write this essay following the riots in Malmö this weekend. Malmö is Sweden’s third largest city and by far the worst city in Scandinavia when it comes to Muslim aggression. I read recently that an Arab girl interviewed in Malmö said that she liked it so much there, it felt almost like an Arab city.
Native Swedes have been moving away from the city for years, turned into refugees in their own country by Jihad, not too different from the non-Muslims in some regions of the Philippines, southern Thailand or Kashmir in India, or for that matter Christian Serbs in Kosovo.
Native Swedes have thus been reduced to just another ethnic group in Sweden, with no more claim to the country than the Kurds or the Somalis who arrived there last Thursday. The political authorities of the country have erased their own people’s history and culture.
Jens Orback, Minister for Democracy, Metropolitan Affairs, Integration and Gender Equality from the Social Democratic Party said during a debate in Swedish radio in 2004 that “We must be open and tolerant towards Islam and Muslims because when we become a minority, they will be so towards us.”
This is a government that knows perfectly well that their people will become a minority in their own country, yet is doing nothing to stop this.
On the contrary. Pierre Schori, Minister for immigration, during a parliamentary debate in 1997 said that: “Racism and xenophobia should be banned and chased [away],” and that one should not accept “excuses, such as that there were flaws in the immigration and refugee policies.”
In other words: It should be viewed as a crime for the native population not to assist in wiping themselves out.
(Excerpt) Read more at islam-watch.org ...
MANAGEMENT OF SAVAGERY
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/naji.asp
The Management of Savagery
By Abu Bakr Naji
Translated by William McCants
DOWNLOAD THE MANAGEMENT OF SAVAGERY
Translation of Major al-Qaeda Book that Outlines Its Plan for Defeating U.S. and Its Allies
The genre of “strategic studies”—the name given by jihadi ideologues to their books and articles on the strengths and weakness of the jihadi movement and those of its enemies—had, until recently, been neglected by Western governments and analysts involved with counterterrorism.
In 2004, Hegghammer and Lia called attention to the genre (which they dubbed “jihadi strategic studies”) and usefully commented on its features (Hegghammer and Lia, SCT, 2004).
More recently, Brachman and McCants demonstrated how this genre can be used to identify and exploit the weaknesses of the jihadi movement (Brachman and McCants, SCT, 2006—a draft is available online).
Despite this growing attention, a full translation of one of these books has not been publicly available.
One reason for the neglect of works in this genre is that they are written in Arabic and they are often quite lengthy. Moreover, they are much more difficult to translate than the usual diatribes by Bin Ladin and other prominent jihadi leaders.
Unlike the latter, which are meant for popular consumption, jihadi strategic texts require translators to have a familiarity with Western strategic studies (from which they draw heavily), medieval Islamic history and theology, and contemporary developments in the jihadi movement.
The reward for overcoming these obstacles is immeasurable—these works are brilliant (if diabolical) studies of global insurgency written by its most intellectually-gifted participants.
While it is still an open question as to whether these texts guide the actions of foot soldiers, they are certainly read by the jihadi intelligentsia and they remain the best source for understanding the nature of the jihadi movement.
In recognition of their value, the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard commissioned William McCants in 2005 to translate one of the most recent and significant of these works, Abu Bakr Naji’s Management of Savagery (some of its salient features are summarized in the Brachman and McCants article cited above).
The Olin Institute, in collaboration with West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center, is making this translation available online for free.
Writing as a high-level insider, Naji explains how al-Qaeda plans to defeat the U.S. and its allies in the Middle East, establish sanctuaries for Jihadis, correct organizational problems, and create better propaganda.
It is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the strategic thinking of al-Qaeda’s leadership and the future of the jihadi movement.
Download “Stealing al-Qa`ida’s Playbook” [link is here]
The translation is available at the Olin Institute website (www.wcfia.harvard.edu/olin/) and the Combating Terrorism Center website (www.ctc.usma.edu).
The Management of Savagery
By Abu Bakr Naji
Translated by William McCants
DOWNLOAD THE MANAGEMENT OF SAVAGERY
Translation of Major al-Qaeda Book that Outlines Its Plan for Defeating U.S. and Its Allies
The genre of “strategic studies”—the name given by jihadi ideologues to their books and articles on the strengths and weakness of the jihadi movement and those of its enemies—had, until recently, been neglected by Western governments and analysts involved with counterterrorism.
In 2004, Hegghammer and Lia called attention to the genre (which they dubbed “jihadi strategic studies”) and usefully commented on its features (Hegghammer and Lia, SCT, 2004).
More recently, Brachman and McCants demonstrated how this genre can be used to identify and exploit the weaknesses of the jihadi movement (Brachman and McCants, SCT, 2006—a draft is available online).
Despite this growing attention, a full translation of one of these books has not been publicly available.
One reason for the neglect of works in this genre is that they are written in Arabic and they are often quite lengthy. Moreover, they are much more difficult to translate than the usual diatribes by Bin Ladin and other prominent jihadi leaders.
Unlike the latter, which are meant for popular consumption, jihadi strategic texts require translators to have a familiarity with Western strategic studies (from which they draw heavily), medieval Islamic history and theology, and contemporary developments in the jihadi movement.
The reward for overcoming these obstacles is immeasurable—these works are brilliant (if diabolical) studies of global insurgency written by its most intellectually-gifted participants.
While it is still an open question as to whether these texts guide the actions of foot soldiers, they are certainly read by the jihadi intelligentsia and they remain the best source for understanding the nature of the jihadi movement.
In recognition of their value, the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard commissioned William McCants in 2005 to translate one of the most recent and significant of these works, Abu Bakr Naji’s Management of Savagery (some of its salient features are summarized in the Brachman and McCants article cited above).
The Olin Institute, in collaboration with West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center, is making this translation available online for free.
Writing as a high-level insider, Naji explains how al-Qaeda plans to defeat the U.S. and its allies in the Middle East, establish sanctuaries for Jihadis, correct organizational problems, and create better propaganda.
It is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the strategic thinking of al-Qaeda’s leadership and the future of the jihadi movement.
Download “Stealing al-Qa`ida’s Playbook” [link is here]
The translation is available at the Olin Institute website (www.wcfia.harvard.edu/olin/) and the Combating Terrorism Center website (www.ctc.usma.edu).
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