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Wednesday, July 18, 2007

BIRTH OF A BOMB

Sixty-one days after the United States won its first war with Iraq in February 1991, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Merrill McPeak scrawled a note that would change the course of the next three wars fought by the U.S. military. "We need to lay down a requirement for an all-weather precision-guided munition," McPeak wrote on May 1, 1991. That brief order began the quest for a new kind of bomb and helped launch the age of precision warfare.


McPeak's new bomb-an updated version of some of the oldest bombs in the military's stockpile-now rides on the wings or in the belly of nearly every bomber or fighter flown by the Air Force and Navy. What's new is the 5-foot steel strap-on tail kit containing a central computer and tail fins bolted to each bomb. The kit adds brains and steering to "dumb" 1,000- and 2,000-pound bombs, which otherwise rely on gravity and luck to hit their targets. The kits save the Defense Department hundreds of millions of dollars by updating an outdated arsenal of aging munitions.


When bomb and guidance kit are married, they become a Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), one of the world's most accurate and cost-effective weapons. When a 2,000-pound JDAM hits, its 14-inch-wide steel warhead explodes into an 8,500-degree fireball of white-hot metal that moves faster than sound and leaves a crater at least 20 feet deep and often more than 50 feet wide.


JDAM kits can be attached to small bombs when the military seeks to limit damage, and for use against underground or reinforced targets, the kits can be strapped onto "bunker buster" bombs with thicker, harder shells. Because their location constantly is updated by satellite, JDAMs can be launched through clouds and thick smoke from up to 45,000 feet above and 15 miles away from their targets.


More than two-thirds of the 30,000 bombs dropped on Iraq in March were laser- or satellite-guided. Of the guided weapons, nearly a third were JDAMs. They had an accuracy rate of over 90 percent and were used against some of the war's most sensitive targets.


In surprise strikes that began the war, JDAMs dropped from F-117 fighters destroyed palaces, houses and underground bunkers in a southern Baghdad complex, known as Dora Farms, where Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was thought to be meeting with senior military advisers. And on April 7, near the war's end, an Air Force stealth bomber unleashed JDAM bunker busters on houses in the upscale Baghdad enclave of Mansour, where intelligence reports suggested Hussein was holed up with his sons. Those strikes leveled three buildings, left a 30-foot-deep crater, uprooted orange trees and broke windows and doors on houses more than 300 yards away, but probably missed Hussein.


A Bomb Problem


After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, McPeak skipped the ticker-tape parades, believing victory was a poor teacher. Instead, the former fighter pilot appointed only nine months earlier by President Clinton, pored over after-action reports from the Gulf. He was looking for flaws in the seemingly invincible armor of air power. It didn't take long to find a big one.


The Air Force had a bomb problem. About 90 percent of the bombs dropped during the war were 1,000- and 2,000-pound unguided munitions, which, on average, fell only within 200 feet of their intended targets. Dozens had to be dropped to take out a single target-an improvement from thousands during World War II, but not one that made air commanders much more confident. Commanders avoided using unguided bombs in urban areas for fear of hitting civilian targets.


But McPeak knew bombing precision was attainable. He was a forward air controller over Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh Trail in the spring of 1969, where he called in some of the first strikes using laser-guided bombs. The munitions consisted of a laser sensor attached to the tip of a dumb bomb. Pilots, or the weapons officers seated behind them, guided the bombs from aircraft by aiming handheld lasers at the targets. "The accuracy was amazing," McPeak says. "I'd call for them to cut off a street, they'd drop a bomb and leave a big crater right there." Twenty-two years later, those bombs were equally effective during the Persian Gulf War, accounting for only 7 percent of ordnance dropped, but delivering 75 percent of all damage wrought by the air war.


But laser-guided bombs must "see" their targets to hit them. During the Gulf War, one in three laser-guided bomb attacks was canceled because the lasers couldn't point out targets through storm clouds, sandstorms, and smoke and haze from oil fires. Military planners expected Operation Desert Storm's opening air war would last only 15 days, but bad weather caused so many bombing runs to be scrapped that the campaign lasted 43 days. Even in good weather, the use of laser-guided weapons was limited by their cost. At $100,000 each, they were too expensive for the Air Force to stockpile.


In addition, only a handful of Navy and Air Force fighters, and no Air Force bombers, could drop them. In 1991, McPeak was frustrated that more than 20 years after they starred in Vietnam, guided bombs hadn't come down in price or become more versatile. He sought a cheap guided bomb that could be dropped under any conditions from any aircraft. And so, on May 1, 1991, he sent his memo. "The idea was: Don't drop any more unguided munitions, period," McPeak recalls.


The Technology Debate


Air Force Maj. Gen. Joseph Ralston would oversee the quest for the new bomb. In the spring of 1991, Ralston was the Air Force's director of tactical programs, managing the development and purchase of many Air Force weapons. Ralston believed the best guidance system for bombs was the global positioning system (GPS), a constellation of satellites orbiting 12,660 miles above the Earth. Launched between the mid-1980s and early 1990s, the satellites created an Information Age version of the North Star for military, and later civilian, users. GPS receivers determine their exact longitude, latitude and altitude by picking up signals from up to four satellites every second.


Before Operation Desert Storm, the military purchased 10,000 commercial GPS receivers. The handheld, high-tech compasses won high marks for tracking tank and troop movements. They even allowed the Army to quickly deliver meals to troops on the front lines. Ralston envisioned another use for GPS receivers: steering bombs. "I had no doubt it would work," he recalls.
But there were plenty of doubters with more stars on their shoulders than Ralston's.


They were wary of a bomb that would use a commercial GPS receiver that anyone could buy for $200 at Radio Shack. They wanted a military-unique guidance system that relied on built-in radar. Ralston believed a bomb built with military-specified parts would be too expensive and take too long to build.


Air-to-air missiles that used such radar cost hundreds of thousands of dollars each. "I was the one preaching, 'You have to keep it cheap,'" he says. Ralston called the Air Force's munitions laboratory at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., and ordered up a prototype of a satellite-guided bomb.


As it turns out, Eglin engineer Louis Cerrato had been working on and off for six years to find a cheap way to make dumb bombs smart. In the mid-1980s, Cerrato had become intrigued with a concept that had been around for a decade, known as inertial guidance. Inertially guided munitions contain a central computer processor loaded with target coordinates. The processor uses data from onboard navigation hardware, such as gyroscopes and accelerometers, to direct tiny motors that maneuver tail fins to steer the munitions. The engineer pondered how to build large quantities of inertially guided weapons on the cheap.


Cerrato knew laser seekers were strapped onto dumb bombs, so he decided to create a strap-on inertial guidance system. The guidance kits could be attached to hundreds of thousands of dumb bombs the military had been stockpiling since the 1950s. But his idea languished. The Pentagon wanted to build new and bigger weapons, not retrofit old bombs. What's more, bombs guided by the inertial navigation system tended to drift off target. The research dollars dried up. "It was an orphan. Nobody wanted it," says Cerrato, who saved his notes anyhow.


Ralston's order sent Cerrato back into action. Finally, he would get to build the kits he had envisioned years before. But there would be a key difference: a commercial GPS receiver. By updating the bomb's location every second, the receiver would correct the tendency to drift. Cerato was so certain the concept would work, "I didn't even think a test was necessary," he recalls. But Ralston believed a live demonstration was the only way to convince the skeptics.


In the winter of 1992, an F-16 roared over a bombing range at Eglin carrying a 1,000-pound warhead packed with concrete instead of explosives and a GPS guidance system. Its target: a wooden outhouse built just for the occasion. Ralston wanted a dramatic target that could be videotaped to make his point. The location of the outhouse had been programmed into the test bomb. Ten thousand, 15,000, 20,000 feet, the fighter climbed into position. The pilot hit the pickle, a button on top of the fighter's steering joystick. The bomb fell away, plunging at 1,200 feet per second. The bomb updated its position via satellite second by second. A minute after the bomb fell free, the outhouse broke into splinters and disappeared in the dust of a 10-foot-deep crater. The debate was settled. The new bomb would be guided from space.


Pushing Boundaries


In 1993, not long after the bomb debate ended in splinters and dust, McPeak gathered a dozen Air Force procurement officials in his small conference room in the Pentagon's outermost ring. The general wanted to talk cost. He looked down the conference table toward the newly appointed leader of the GPS bomb program, Terry Little. An outspoken and sometimes arrogant civilian manager, Little had spent the last 15 years at Eglin turning around troubled classified weapons programs.


"What's the estimate?" McPeak asked.


"$65,000 apiece," Little replied, looking down at a sheet of figures provided by Defense contractors.


"And what's your goal?" McPeak asked, clearly unhappy with the figure. Little paused for a moment. Then, guessing he might be able to cut the price by a third, he blurted, "$40,000."


"By God, if it's one cent over, I don't want it," McPeak thundered, pounding his fist on the wooden table.


McPeak wasn't bluffing. The Cold War was over; the Reagan-era defense buildup was history. Between 1990 and 1997, the Defense budget would be slashed by a third. Not long after McPeak and the procurement managers met, then-Vice President Al Gore hammered an ashtray to bits on TV's David Letterman show to illustrate the Clinton administration's disdain for costly government specifications.


Congress was preparing to pass the 1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, designed to speed and ease government purchasing of everything from fax machines to weapons.


Little saw his opening. In the classified procurement world, he often stretched buying rules. Contractors and auditors paid less attention to secret programs, and the need to deliver them fast overrode concerns about the rules. Little viewed McPeak's low-price mandate as license to push the boundaries again. This time, the one-time union organizer-who cultivated a maverick image by puffing Lucky Strikes and nipping from a bottle of gin in his desk drawer-would need all the operating room he could get.


He had just promised to build a brand new bomb for $40,000 apiece when the cheapest guided bombs to date ran six figures each. Little convinced the Pentagon to waive more than 80 buying rules for the bomb kit contract.


The most important change exempted companies from having to reveal how much they spent designing and building the bomb kits. Normally, Defense requires weapons manufacturers to keep and share meticulous records on the cost of every component of a weapons system. The Pentagon uses cost figures to determine the price it's willing to pay, usually the total manufacturing cost plus a 10 percent to 15 percent profit. Little didn't care what companies spent building bomb kits; his only concern was getting them at the price he'd promised McPeak.


So Little proposed a deal to seven companies that said they could build the bomb kits for $65,000 each. If the companies would agree to build as many bombs as the military wanted for no more than $40,000 apiece with a 20-year warranty, they would not have to reveal their costs, could choose their own suppliers, and the winner would be the sole JDAM supplier in perpetuity.


Contractors leapt at the deal. "We were willing to take a risk up front to get a long-term commitment to a price," says Kim Michael, the bomb kit program manager for Boeing, which now owns contract winner McDonnell Douglas.


By early 1994, Lockheed Martin and McDonnell Douglas had beaten five other companies to become finalists. The Air Force and Navy planned to buy 84,000 kits. The two companies had 18 months to come up with the best, most cost-effective design. Such competitions usually are tightly controlled. A cadre of contracting officers obsessed with fairness oversees them. Companies get little feedback from the government until the contract is awarded.


But Little believed this approach was too rigid and that the lack of communication led to flawed designs and overpriced products.
Little used another waiver to assign JDAM program officials who had spent their entire careers being tight-mouthed around companies to become contractors' confidants.


They were to work side by side with the firms at their plants and at Eglin. They were to show contractors their design weaknesses and likely places to cut costs. They would win or lose together. A few months into the competition, Little set up two teams-each with a dozen engineers, contract specialists and program analysts. He assigned a team to each contractor with orders to do everything possible to help its company win the deal.


"Terry Little told me, 'Your [performance] rating is going to be based on what the McDonnell Douglas program manager thinks of you,' " says retired Air Force Lt. Col. Joseph Schearer, who headed the Eglin team working with the St. Louis-based contractor. Schearer knew the only way he'd win McDonnell Douglas' respect was by helping the company bring home the contract.


Paring Costs


Schearer was concerned he'd drawn the weaker partner in McDonnell Douglas, and his fears were confirmed during his first meeting with the firm late that summer. Long a top but pricey player in the aerospace market, McDonnell Douglas had devised a "Cadillac" design. Shearer figured the elaborate strap-on device would cost nearly $10,000 more than the one being crafted by a Lockheed Martin team behind a closed door in the same building at Eglin. He told his new colleagues they'd lose the work if they didn't redesign the bomb and lower its $28,000 price tag by contract award time in the fall of 1995. That gave them a year.


McDonnell Douglas had little choice but to listen to Schearer. Like most weapons builders, the defense giant had drastically reduced its workforce-from 121,400 to 65,800 employees-as the Pentagon's budget fell between 1988 and 1994. In 1994, the company had lost its biggest missile program, the $1.5 billion Tomahawk cruise missile, to Hughes, mainly due to cost. McDonnell Douglas, which specialized in building planes, had few missile programs left.


Without the JDAM, the company would lose its foothold in the munitions business. So the cost cutting began. The team consolidated 11 wires to four, combined multiple circuit boards and replaced an expensive GPS receiver housing with a low-cost casing that protected the entire kit from electromagnetic interference.


McDonnell Douglas cut deals with suppliers to lower the cost of key parts-for example, agreeing to let the manufacturer of a GPS circuit decide which antenna to use in return for a better price. The cost cutting was relentless. "We've got to balance risk with cost," a McDonnell Douglas manager once warned Schearer. But Schearer fired back, "Keep taking out cost. I'll tell you when to stop."


The cutting ended in August 1995. Costs had been trimmed to $6,500 for the inertial navigation system, $3,000 for electric motors and fins, $2,000 for the central computer, and $1,800 for the GPS receiver.


Schearer believed McDonnell Douglas' proposal would be competitive with Lockheed Martin's. He was right. In September 1995, the Air Force announced McDonnell Douglas had won the contract with a price of $14,000 per kit-about half the $28,000 price projected just a year earlier.


Now it was time to prove the bomb could work.


Testing Woes


In October 1996, a 6-foot wooden pole rose from an Eglin test range awaiting obliteration. An Air Force F-16 flew overhead and released a 1,000-pound mix of high explosives and Information Age technology-a test Joint Direct Attack Munition. A few miles away in the test range command and control center, Oscar Soler, the new JDAM program manager, stared at a bank of color television screens waiting for video cameras on the range to pick up the blurry image of the bomb heading toward its target.


Ten seconds. Twenty seconds. Forty seconds. Soler grew impatient. "What happened? Where is it?" he asked frantically, cursing at the screen. The 10 airmen monitoring test measurement equipment didn't have to respond. Soler knew the answer: The bomb had gone off target and landed out of camera range. The wooden pole stood in the Florida Panhandle soil unscathed.


The failed test-caused by a faulty wire, not a design problem-was just the latest in a string of JDAM setbacks. Soler seemed to find a new problem at every turn in the 10 months since he had taken over from Little. The fins in the bomb's tail kit were too flimsy.


Software controlling the bomb's autopilot system wasn't working. The Pentagon scrutinized the program because its low cost had been such a shock. "I had to go to Washington every month to explain the problems," Soler recalls. A key challenge was convincing JDAM engineers and contract managers that changes or fixes had to be made even if they might drive up the price.


The tail kit problem was a case in point. McDonnell Douglas and Air Force program officials, including Soler, spent about a year trying to stabilize the tail fins. Adding springs didn't work, nor did driving more bolts into the tail. Nothing did. "Finally, it dawned on me that we were so obsessed with acquisition reform that we would not look at design changes that would cost more money," says Soler. Eventually, the laws of physics won out and the fins were redesigned, adding a few hundred dollars to the cost of each kit. "When you try to fix something on the cheap it doesn't work," Soler says.


By 1998, the Air Force had a final design and Boeing, which merged with McDonnell Douglas the previous August, began building the first 476 kits, which would undergo rigorous testing. The test results went to the Pentagon, which weighed them in deciding when the weapon was ready for full production.


The JDAM faced final exams at five training and test ranges from Guam to Barksdale, La. Almost immediately, the testers found problems. They worried about the maturity of the commercial software used to program the bombs. They fretted about the cheap fiberglass containers used to ship and store the kits. In a December 2000 final report, they deemed JDAM "operationally effective, but not suitable."


Seeing Action


Meanwhile, in early 1999, the United States and NATO had gone to war in the Balkans against Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic. Increasingly, the air war over the former Yugoslavia was encompassing urban areas. War planners feared collateral damage-the unintended killing of civilians who live or might simply be present near allies' targets. Laser-guided munitions weren't a good option because they couldn't negotiate the daily rain, snow, fog and sleet of springtime in the Balkans. The planners asked for better bombs.


Ralston, by 1999 a four-star general serving as vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, remembered the bomb he'd fought for 10 years earlier, the one guided from satellites. There's little doubt that as No. 2 military officer at the Defense Department, he had a large say in which weapons would fall on the Serbs that spring. But military leaders of the B-2 bomber wing at Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo., made the final call. The JDAM had done well in testing when dropped from the bat-winged stealth bombers, so the several hundred bombs at the base would be put to use.


Boeing ramped up deliveries from its JDAM plant to Whiteman, a few hours northwest. At the base, JDAM kits were strapped onto 2,000-pound bombs and loaded 16 at a time onto B-2s flying their first combat missions-30 hours to Kosovo and back. The JDAMs saw action almost immediately. Military planners wanted to take out a petroleum plant the Serbs used for refueling. But the oil tanks were located across the road from a centuries-old church.


JDAMs destroyed the fuel tanks without cracking a window in the house of worship. Bad weather had prevented the allies from hitting the Zezeljev Bridge stretching over the Danube River in Yugoslavia's second largest city, Novi Sad. JDAMs easily knocked the heavy concrete bridge into the water. The 652 JDAMs dropped during the 78-day air war with Serbia were 98 percent accurate.


The testers' concerns were rendered moot. Shortly after the war, the Defense Department placed an order for 84,000 kits. The era of smart bombs had dawned.


A year and half later, in November 2001 in Afghanistan, a Northern Alliance militia leader radioed allied forces that hundreds of Taliban soldiers were gathering on a ridge about a mile from the city of Kunduz, one of the last strongholds of the government that had harbored al Qaeda. In the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the United States was backing the Northern Alliance in a campaign to root out al Qaeda and its supporters.


The militia leader requested that the Taliban troops be bombed within 24 hours to enable his forces to advance. Help arrived in 19 minutes. A U.S. Special Forces operator nearby fixed a laser designator on the Taliban troops. He translated their location into GPS coordinates and relayed the request to U.S. combatant commanders headquartered in Saudi Arabia. Headquarters staff contacted B-52 pilots in the area.


The pilots programmed the location of the Taliban force into 12 JDAMs in their aircraft. Within minutes the sky rained iron. The Taliban soon gave up Kunduz.


In Afghanistan, JDAMs showed their mettle on short notice, delivering immediate blows to advancing troops. About 6,650 JDAMs have been dropped on Afghanistan since October 2001, and operations continue there. In early 2002, JDAMs had become so popular that the Defense Department nearly tripled its order, to almost 240,000 kits. Boeing suddenly had to churn out 3,000 kits a month from a factory already too small to build half that number.


Smart Bomb-Making


Not long after the Northern Alliance seized Kunduz in early 2002, Boeing introduced lean manufacturing - a process to shorten and streamline production - at its newly enlarged JDAM plant. There, in a barbed wire-ringed complex in St. Charles, Mo., about 20 miles west of downtown St. Louis, first McDonnell Douglas, then Boeing, had built cruise missiles for almost two decades.


Building No. 505, where JDAMs are assembled, doesn't stand out, even with its new two-story addition. It's about two hundred yards long and 100 yards across. From the road, it resembles an oversized storage shed. But inside, workers assemble the brains of one of the world's most precise bombs in 78 minutes.


Parts from 22 JDAM suppliers arrive continuously throughout the week. Boeing exercises tight control of its supply chain, through which 887,000 parts moved last year. The company sends its own trucks to transport parts so it can determine when and how often they are picked up and delivered. There are no stockrooms or rows of pallets inside the factory. Boeing saves space and money by storing no more than six days' worth of components. As trucks unload, forklifts carry their cargo directly to one of 20 lines of silver metal rollers that extend 20 feet from loading dock to assembly line.


Most parts never touch the factory floor.


The only steady noise inside is the drone of the ventilation system, occasionally interrupted by the high-pitched warning beep of forklifts backing up and the crash of boxes onto the metal conveyors. Nothing's cut or welded here. All the shipping containers are reusable-having to trash them would waste space and cost money.


At the end of the metal rollers, a munitions mechanic wearing a special white lab coat to protect circuit boards from static electricity places a GPS circuit card inside a steel 12-inch control unit. He grabs a black automatic screwdriver hanging overhead. Twenty-seven turns later, half-inch silver screws connect the card to the control unit. In six minutes, the mechanic creates a bomb's sense of direction. Forty-two munitions mechanics on two shifts working five days a week can build 3,000 JDAM kits each month.


Hiss. Thwap. Hiss. Thwap. An automatic machine whips thick translucent green plastic straps around a dark green fiberglass box. The boxes carry JDAM kits out the door and around the world. Stacked two high and three across, 54 containers holding 108 kits can fill one 18-wheeler. Most days, the factory fills a trailer and a half.


In May, a truck pulled out, bound for an Army arsenal; Boeing wouldn't say where. Upon arrival, the kits it carried likely were stored in temperature-controlled bunkers alongside the bombs they would one day steer. The Defense Department generally gives Boeing a week's notice of a shipment's destination, but that can change en route.


One destination is known: At least a half dozen 18-wheelers full of JDAMs wound up on the aircraft carrier USS Constellation heading for the Persian Gulf.


Baghdad Bound


In mid-March, bomb builders clad in red turtlenecks and camouflage pants hustled about the fluorescent-lit bunker inside the Constellation. The young sailors had been working 18 hours, seven days a week, for more than a month assembling bombs, including JDAMs, for war with Iraq. The "Bomb Build-Up Chart" on a whiteboard detailed which tails and fins were to go on which bombs and how many were to be built each day.


"I can build two or 2,000 bombs," said Gunner Joe Thompson, a former enlisted man turned naval officer who managed the Constellation's 108 ordnance handlers.


Bombs come in pieces-munitions in wooden crates and tail kits encased in fiberglass. It takes two ordnance men about 30 minutes to bolt silver tail kits to the dull gray bombs sporting two yellow rings around their noses. After a quick electronics test, the bombs are stored.


On the eve of war, bombs were stacked three-high, 10 rows deep in the ship's arsenal awaiting the elevator trip up 10 stories to the flight deck. On a clear night during the third week of March, the wind whips hard across the Constellation's flight deck. It takes two or three ordnance men to pull two JDAMs in a small cart toward the fighter planes parked diagonally at the flight deck's edge.


They attach two bombs under each wing of the F-14 Tomcats and F-18 Hornets. Five minutes later, pilots climb in and roll the planes to the ship's steam-powered catapult, where they're latched on. A safety officer taps a white light on the deck.


Yanked by the catapult, the planes jerk upright and accelerate from zero to 150 miles an hour in two seconds, barreling down the deck and off the carrier. Each one hovers precariously just off the ship's bow, weighed down by 4,000 pounds of bombs.


Then flames shooting out the tail from the afterburners grow longer and whiter. Each fighter begins to climb and disappears into the stars over the Persian Gulf to deliver its JDAMs to Iraq.

George Cahlink gcahlink@govexec.com Government Executive

Tuesday, July 17, 2007

WORLDWIDE WEB OF TERROR

Al-Qaeda’s most famous web propagandist is jailed, but the internet remains its best friend BY HIS own admission, he never fired a single bullet or “stood for a second in a trench” in the great jihad against America . Yet the man who called himself “Irhabi007” — a play on the Arabic word for terrorist and the code-name for James Bond — was far more important than any foot soldier or suicide-bomber in Iraq . He led the charge of jihad on the internet.

In doing so, Irhabi007 was a central figure in enabling al-Qaeda to reconstitute itself after the fall of the Taliban and its eviction from Afghanistan . Al-Qaeda (“the base”) and its followers moved to cyberspace, the ultimate ungoverned territory, where jihadists have set up virtual schools for ideological and military training and active propaganda arms.

Irhabi007 pioneered many of the techniques required to make all this happen. He was a tireless “webmaster” for several extremist websites, especially those issuing the statements of the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq . Intelligence agencies watched powerlessly as Irhabi007 hacked into computers, for instance appropriating that of the Arkansas Highway and Transportation Department to distribute large video files, and taught his fellow cyber-jihadists how to protect their anonymity online.

Despite his celebrity, this was not good enough for Irhabi007. “Dude,” he complained to a fellow cyber-jihadist (who called himself “Abuthaabit”) during one encrypted web chat, “my heart is in Iraq .”

Abuthaabit: How are you going to have enough to go there?Irhabi007: I suppose someone gotta be here!

Abuthaabit: This media work, I am telling you, is very important. Very, very, very, very.Irhabi007: I know, I know.

Abuthaabit: Because a lot of the funds brothers are getting is because they are seeing stuff like this coming out. Imagine how many people have gone [to Iraq ] after seeing the situation because of the videos. Imagine how many of them could have been shaheed [martyrs] as well.

Irhabi007’s desire for real action may have led to his downfall. He was not only involved in a dispersed network of jihadi propaganda, but also, it seems, in a decentralised web of terrorist plots. In October 2005 police in Bosnia arrested a cyber-jihadist who called himself “Maximus”, a Swedish teenager of Bosnian extraction called Mirsad Bektasevic. He and three others were later sentenced to jail terms of up to 15 years for plotting attacks that were to take place either in Bosnia or in other European countries.

Among the material recovered from Mr Bektasevic’s flat, police found 19kg of explosives, weapons, a video with instructions for making a suicide vest and a video recording of masked men proclaiming their membership of “al-Qaeda in northern Europe ”. On his computer they found evidence of contacts with other jihadists across Europe . Among them was Irhabi007.

Two days later, British police raided a flat in a terraced house in west London next to one of the rougher pubs in Shepherd’s Bush. After an altercation, they arrested Younis Tsouli (pictured above). The elusive Irhabi007 turned out to be the 22-year-old son of a Moroccan tourism board official and a student of information technology. Two other men, also students, were arrested at the same time, although Mr Tsouli had never met them except on the internet.

The trial of Mr Tsouli and his co-defendants—Waseem Mughal, a British-born graduate in biochemistry (aka Abuthaabit), and Tariq al-Daour, a law student born in the United Arab Emirates—came to an end this month when they belatedly pleaded to charges of incitement to murder and conspiracy to murder. The court also heard that Mr al-Daour ran a £1.8m credit-card fraud and used the funds to buy equipment for jihadi groups. Mr Tsouli and Mr Mughal used stolen credit-card numbers to set up jihadi websites. Mr Tsouli was sent to jail for ten years; the others received shorter sentences.

There have been several arrests in Denmark , where a 17-year-old man of Palestinian origin was convicted last February for his involvement in Mr Bektasevic’s plot. Three others were found guilty, but the jury’s verdict was overturned. Irhabi007 has also been reported to be linked to plots in America , where two men living in Atlanta , Georgia , have been charged with planning attacks against civilian and military targets in and around Washington , DC , including the Capitol, the World Bank, the George Washington Masonic Memorial and a fuel depot. According to the indictment, the two men—Syed Ahmed, 21, and Ehsanul Sadequee, 19—sent Irhabi007 photographs of the proposed targets, and also travelled to Canada to meet fellow plotters and discuss attacks.

Many of the details are still subject to court restrictions. But these interlinked investigations underline the words of Peter Clarke, the head of the counter-terrorism branch of London ‘s Metropolitan Police, who said in April that his officers were contending with “networks within networks, connections within connections and links between individuals that cross local, national and international boundaries”.
In light of this month’s failed attempts to set off car bombs in London and at Glasgow airport, allegedly by a group of foreign doctors and other medical staff, one exchange of messages found on Irhabi007’s computer, in a folder marked “jihad”, makes intriguing reading. “We are 45 doctors and we are determined to undertake jihad for Allah’s sake and to take the battle inside damaged America , Allah willing,” ran part of it.

The message purported to set out a plot to attack a naval base, apparently Mayport in Jacksonville, Florida, with the aim of achieving the “complete destruction” of the USS John F. Kennedy, an aircraft carrier, and 12 escort vessels, as well as blowing up “clubs for naked women” around the base. “The anticipated number of pig casualties is 200-300,” said the author, unidentified except for the boast that he had been discharged from the Jordanian army. He claimed to have the support of a pilot who would provide air cover for the operation, but he lacked one essential piece of information that he asked Irhabi007 to provide: a guide for making car bombs.

The FBI said it had investigated the plot at the time and found it to be “not credible”.

Nevertheless, the capability of the internet to promote terrorism is worrying intelligence agencies. According to America ‘s National Intelligence Estimate in April 2006, “The radicalisation process is occurring more quickly, more widely and more anonymously in the internet age, raising the likelihood of surprise attacks by unknown groups whose members and supporters may be difficult to pinpoint.”

Bomb.com

Past technological innovations, such as telephones or fax machines, have quickly been exploited by terrorists. But the information revolution is particularly useful to them. To begin with, encrypted communications, whether in the form of e-mail messages or, better still, voice-over-internet audio, make it much harder for investigators to monitor their activity. Messages can be hidden, for instance, within innocuous-looking pictures.

More important, the internet gives jihadists an ideal vehicle for propaganda, providing access to large audiences free of government censorship or media filters, while carefully preserving their anonymity. Its ability to connect disparate jihadi groups creates a sense of a global Islamic movement fighting to defend the global ummah, or community, from a common enemy. It provides a low-risk means of taking part in jihad for sympathisers across the world.

The ease and cheapness of processing words, pictures, sound and video has brought the era not only of the citizen-journalist but also the terrorist-journalist. Al-Qaeda now sends out regular “news bulletins” with a masked man in a studio recounting events from the many fronts of jihad, whether in Iraq , Afghanistan , Chechnya or Palestine .

Jihadi ticker-tape feeds provide running updates on the number of Americans killed (about ten times more than the Pentagon’s death toll).

Battlefield footage of American Humvees being blown up to shouts of “Allahu Akbar!” (God is Great) appear on the internet within minutes of the attacks taking place. The most popular scenes are often compiled into films with musical soundtracks of male choirs performing songs such as “Caravans of Martyrs”. Jihadists have even released a computer video game, “Night of Bush Capturing”, in which participants play at shooting American soldiers and President George Bush. Inevitably, experts say, jihadists have also started to create “residents” in the virtual world of Second Life.

As well as war fantasies, there is sometimes also a dose of sexual wish-fulfilment. A video recording by a Kuwaiti ideologue, Hamid al-Ali, declares that a martyr in the cause of jihad goes to paradise to enjoy delicious food, drink and a wife who will “astonish your mind” and much else besides; her vagina, apparently, “never complains about how much sex she had”, and she reverts back to being a virgin.
The internet is awash with communiqués from insurgent groups extolling their own success or denouncing rivals.

Even the most hunted figures, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, the second-most-senior figure in al-Qaeda, regularly put out video statements commenting on political developments within just a few days.

In short, the hand-held video camera has become as important a tool of insurgency as the AK-47 or the RPG rocket-launcher. As Mr Zawahiri himself once put it in an intercepted letter to Zarqawi, “More than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media.” Or as one jihadi magazine found on Irhabi007’s computer explained: “Film everything; this is good advice for all mujahideen [holy warriors]. Brothers, don’t disdain photography. You should be aware that every frame you take is as good as a missile fired at the Crusader enemy and his puppets.” Just before his arrest, Irhabi007 had set up a website that, he hoped, would rival YouTube, to share jihadi videos. He called it Youbombit.com.

Of jihad and camels

The internet’s decentralised structure, with its origins in military networks designed to survive nuclear strikes, now gives jihadi networks tremendous resilience. Jihadi websites constantly come and go, sometimes taken down by service providers only to reappear elsewhere, sometimes shifted deliberately to stay ahead of investigators. As one expert put it: “It’s like the old game of Space Invaders. When you clear one screen of potential attackers, another simply appears to take its place.”

The number of extremist websites is increasing exponentially, from a handful in 2000 to several thousand today. Some are overtly militant, while others give jihad second place to promoting a puritanical brand of piety known as “salafism”, that is modelled on the earliest followers of the Prophet Muhammad and regards later developments as degenerate. Most are in Arabic, but some have started to translate their material into English, French and other languages to reach a wider audience.

The most headline-grabbing material on the internet is the military manuals—whether as books, films or PowerPoint slides—giving instruction on a myriad of subjects, not least weapons, assassination techniques, the manufacture of poisons and how to make explosives. But intelligence agencies say there is nothing like having hands-on experience in a place like Iraq , or at least a training camp. In the latest attempted attacks in London and Glasgow , for example, the attackers clearly botched the manufacture of their car bombs even though many of the alleged plotters were well educated.

Still, internet-based compilations such as the vast and constantly updated “Encyclopedia of Preparation”, as well as militant e-magazines such as the Tip of the Camel’s Hump (used to mean “the pinnacle”) found on Irhabi007’s computer, make it easier for self-starting groups around the world to try their hand at terrorism. The Dutch counter-terrorism office, which publishes many of its studies on extremism, concludes that the existence of virtual training camps “has the effect of lowering the threshold against the commission of attacks”.

Many jihadi websites put their most inflammatory information and discussions in password-protected areas. Here participants can be gradually groomed, invited to take part in more confidential discussions, drawn into one-on-one chats, indoctrinated and at last recruited to the cause.

But the very anonymity that the internet affords jihadists can also work against them; it lets police and intelligence agencies enter the jihadists’ world without being identified. Many postings to web forums are filled with (rightly) paranoid postings about who is watching. A lengthy posting on a Syrian jihadi site in 2005, entitled “Advice to Brothers Seeking Jihad in Iraq ”, said raw recruits offering only “enthusiasm or impetuousness or love of martyrdom” were no longer wanted.

Instead, the mujahideen needed money and experienced fighters, but they should not assume that the smuggling routes through Syria were safe. It advocated communicating in secret through trusted sources in mosques rather than on the internet, noting that “this forum, like the others, is under...surveillance; any information is obviously not secret, so any individuals you meet and correspond with on the forums cannot be trusted at all.”

Contributors to jihadi web sites are regularly told not to divulge secrets. When news of Irhabi007’s arrest emerged last year, some of the postings stressed the need for greater caution online. One of these, signed by “Badr17”, gave the warning “Trust in Allah, but tie your camel.”

Open university of jihad

One of the most prolific al-Qaeda strategists is Abu Musab al-Suri. He is now in American custody, but his 1,600-page opus, “The Global Islamic Call to Resistance”, survives. It advocates the creation in the West of self-starting, independent terrorist cells, not directly affiliated to existing groups, to stage spectacular attacks.
For many who study the jihadi websites, however, the bigger danger is indoctrination.

The Dutch domestic intelligence service, the AIVD, regards the internet as the “turbocharger” of jihadi radicalisation. Stephen Ulph, a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, an American research institute that monitors terrorism, says the internet provides an open university for jihadists. At least 60% of the material on jihadi websites deals not with current events or with war videos, but instead concerns ideological and cultural questions.

Jihadists, Mr Ulph says, are fighting less a war against the West than “a civil war for the minds of Muslim youth”. In this process of radicalisation, “the mujahideen attract the uncommitted armchair sympathiser, detach him from his social and intellectual environment, undermine his self-image as an observant Muslim, introduce what they claim is ‘real Islam’, re-script history in terms of a perennial conflict, centralise jihad as his Islamic identity, train him not only militarily but also socially and psychologically.”

A key text is the ever-expanding e-book, “Questions and Uncertainties Concerning the Mujahideen and their Operations”, which seeks to arm jihadists with responses to questions and doubts about their actions, ranging from the admissibility of killing Muslims, the use of weapons of mass destruction and the acceptability of shaving one’s beard for the sake of jihad. “It is important we do not get distracted by focusing on organisations rather than against ideology,” argues Mr Ulph.

The point is underlined in a study by the Combating Terrorism Centre at America ‘s military academy at West Point , which has tried to “map” the most important ideological influences by searching citations in jihadi online documents. Top of the list is Ibn Taymiyya, a scholar who lived at the time of the medieval Mongol invasions. He strove to return Islam to the pure faith of Muhammad’s followers, advocated jihad to repel foreign invaders and taught that Mongol leaders who converted to Islam were not really Muslims because they did not implement sharia. These ideas strike a chord with today’s jihadists, who see Americans as the new Mongols.

Osama bin Laden does not make the top ten most-cited figures, even among modern authors. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the theorist jailed in Jordan (and who directly inspired Zarqawi), is regarded as a higher authority. And Mr Zawahiri, the ubiquitous internet propagandist who is often described as the real brains behind al-Qaeda, does not even figure in the jihadists’ intellectual universe.

Western intelligence agencies trawl the internet to look for evidence of terrorist plots, but lack the resources or desire to challenge the wider ideology. In a global network, outside the control of any single government, attempts to close down extremist sites are little more than short-lived harassment. What is needed is a systematic campaign of counter-propaganda, not least in support of friendly Muslim governments and moderate Muslims, to try to reclaim the ground ceded to the jihadists.

“Intelligence agencies are dealing with the problem once people have manifested themselves as existing terrorists,” says Professor Bruce Hoffman, an expert on terrorism at Georgetown University . “We have to find a way to stanch the flow. The internet creates a constant reservoir of radicalised people which terrorist groups and networks can draw upon.”

So Irhabi007 may be off the internet, but others like him remain. Among the most prolific is a figure who roams the web by the name of, yes, Irhabi11.
Source: http://www.economist.com/world/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9472498

SOME WORLD EVENTS/NEWS

[Gulf Times] PHILIPPINES - Manila military warns of ‘all-out war’ on militants
“Philippine military on Monday warned it could launch an “all-out war” against Islamic militants if they did not surrender those behind an ambush last week in which 14 marines were killed, and 10 later beheaded”

http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=161364&version=1&template_id=45&parent_id=25

[AP] EGYPT - 2 Palestinians wounded in riots at Egyptian airport near Gaza
“About 100 Palestinians smashed doors and windows inside an airport building in this Egypt-Gaza Strip border town early Tuesday after being trapped there for more than a month since the border’s closure”

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/882931.html

[Reuters] ALGERIA - Algerian army foils al Qaeda attack
“About 50 members of the al Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb attacked two police stations in Yaourene village in Tizi Ouzou province”
“Before the attack, the group planted five bombs on a road leading to the stations targeting any reinforcements by government forces. Two of them exploded without causing casualties”

http://www.stuff.co.nz/4129546a12.html

[Jerusalem Post] ISRAEL - Fake bomb left on Jerusalem - Ma’ale Adumim Road
“The object, which was composed of a bottle attached to a battery, had the word “Hamas” written on it in Arabic and the word “TNT” in English along with a swastika”

http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1184489824849&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

[PAKTRIBUNE] AFGHANISTAN - Taliban behead civilians

http://paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?184116

“The above incident(s) were located, qualified, and added to the incident map by www.GlobalSecurityAnalysis.com asan approved partner of GlobalIncidentMap.com”
[AP] UKRAINE - Hundreds Evacuated After Train Crash Releases Toxic Cloud in Ukraine

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,289569,00.html
See also http://english.pravda.ru/news/hotspots/17-07-2007/95008-train_ukraine-0

[Jurnalo] PAKISTAN - Pakistani police detain 39 suspects in failed attack on Musharraf “Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies have detained 39 people suspected of involvement in a failed attempt on the life of President Pervez Musharraf earlier this month”

http://jurnalo.com/jurnalo/storyPage.do?story_id=48424

Saturday, July 14, 2007

HOW AL QAEDA TRANSFORMED ITSELF FROM THE ORIGINAL 1980 PROFILE

New book on terror, includes Bosnia.

"This book provides the missing piece in the puzzle of al-Qa’ida’s transformation from an isolated fighting force into a lethal global threat: the Bosnian war of 1992 to 1995. John R. Schindler reveals the unexamined role that radical Islam played in that terrible conflict--and the ill-considered contributions of American policy to al-Qa’ida’s growth.

His book explores a truth long hidden from view: that, like Afghanistan in the 1980s, Bosnia in the 1990s became a training ground for the mujahidin. Unholy Terror at last exposes the shocking story of how bin Laden successfully exploited the Bosnian conflict for his own ends--and of how the U. S. Government gave substantial support to his unholy warriors, leading to blowback of epic proportions."


Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qa'ida, and the Rise of Global Jihad (Hardcover) by John R. Schindler (Author)
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Book Description

Al-Qa’ida: in the 80s they were in Afghanistan, supported by America and fighting the Russians. In the new century they have metastasized throughout the world’s geopolitical body. Where were they in the 90s?

Unholy Terror provides the answer, with all its terrifying implications for our world today. This book provides the missing piece in the puzzle of al-Qa’ida’s transformation from an isolated fighting force into a lethal global threat: the Bosnian war of 1992 to 1995. John R. Schindler reveals the unexamined role that radical Islam played in that terrible conflict--and the ill-considered contributions of American policy to al-Qa’ida’s growth.

His book explores a truth long hidden from view: that, like Afghanistan in the 1980s, Bosnia in the 1990s became a training ground for the mujahidin.

Unholy Terror at last exposes the shocking story of how bin Laden successfully exploited the Bosnian conflict for his own ends--and of how the U. S. Government gave substantial support to his unholy warriors, leading to blowback of epic proportions.From the Inside Flap

The Bosnian conflict of 1992 to 1995 has been largely misrepresented in the West . . . until now. In Unholy Terror, John R. Schindler—professor of strategy at the Naval War College and former National Security Agency analyst and counterintelligence officer—reappraises the war in Bosnia, illuminating its pivotal role in the development of radical Islamic terrorism.

The long hidden truth is that Bosnia played the same role for al-Qa’ida in the 1990s that Afghanistan did in the 1980s, providing a battleground where mujahidin could learn to wage holy war. Schindler exposes how Osama bin Laden exploited the Bosnian conflict for his own ends and the disturbing level of support the U.S. government gave to the Bosnian mujahidin—just as had been done with the Afghan mujahidin.

Repeating the mistakes of Afghanistan contributed to blowback of epic proportions: Khalid Sheikh Muhammad (the mastermind of 9/11) and two of the 9/11 hijacker pilots were veterans of the Bosnian jihad. Unholy Terror is a compelling and meticulously researched step toward finally learning the lessons of Bosnia, which can only help in the continuing battle against Muslim extremists and their global jihad.

From the Back Cover

Al-Qa’ida. In the 1980s they were in Afghanistan, supported by the United States as they fought the Soviets; by the new millennium they were responsible for the deadliest attack on American soil in the history of the republic. Where were they in between, and how did they transform themselves from scrappy Afghan rebels to worldwide threat? This enlightening new book, Unholy Terror, provides the frightening answer: the Bosnian war of 1992 to 1995 was the core of Osama bin Laden’s growing global jihad.

It is frightening not so much because of the tragedies of that war, but because those tragedies occurred under the nose of the U.S. government—at times with U.S. complicity. John R. Schlinder served for nearly a decade with the National Security Agency—work which took him to many countries in support of U.S. and allied forces operating in the Balkans—and was NSA’s top Balkans expert.

He is uniquely qualified to demonstrate • how the Bosnian conflict has been misrepresented by the mainstream media, covering up the large role played by radical Islam and al-Qa’ida;

• how Osama bin Laden used Bosnia as a base for terrorist operations worldwide—including attacks on the United States from the Millennium Plot to 9/11; • how veterans of the Bosnian jihad have murdered thousands of Americans and conducted terrorist attacks around the world;

• how the Clinton administration, in collaboration with Iran, secretly supplied Bosnia’s mujahidin, including al-Qa’ida, with millions of dollars of weapons and supplies;

• how America’s Bosnian allies have been in covert alliances with radical anti-American regimes in several countries;

• why Bosnia and its secret jihad matter to America and our War on Terrorism today.

About the Author

John R. Schindler is a professor of strategy at the Naval War College and a former National Security Agency intelligence analyst and counterintelligence officer. He speaks several languages and has published widely on issues of espionage, terrorism, and military history, including the periodicals War in History, the Journal of Strategic Studies, Orbis, Jane’s Intelligence Review, and the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

His first book, Isonzo: The Forgotten Sacrifice of the Great War (2001), was a featured selection of the History Book Club. Professor Schlinder lives in Newport, Rhode Island.

Monday, July 09, 2007

DETAILS OF BRIBING OF UN Special Envoy

Exclusive

Evidence That UN Special Envoy for Kosovo Marti Ahtisaari Received Albanian Mafia Bribes for Kosovo Independence

Defense & Foreign Affairs Analysis.


By Valentine Spyroglou, GIS Station Chief, South-East Europe.

On July 8, 2007 the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army, Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës or UÇK) war veterans issued an announcement warning the international community and especially the United Nations (UN) not to interfere the process of recognizing Kosovo’s independence.

The KLA announcement specifically said that the Albanian leaders of Kosovo should not accept more suspensions (delays) or new negotiations because these would lead to new hostilities. If their demands were not accepted, then the KLA veterans warned that they would have to take action as KLA soldiers and honor the oath of their national heroes.

The announcement came while the UN Special Envoy for Kosovo, former Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari, was publicly accused of having connections with the Albanian mafia in Kosovo.

The Finnish News Agency, STT, published on June 26 and June 27, 2007, two articles stating that the UN Special Envoy for Kosovo was “bought” by the Albanian mafia in order to support independence for Kosovo. The STT articles reported that the information was initially published by the Banja Luka (Republica Srpska, Bosnia & Herzegovina) Daily Fokus on June 21, 2007, entitled “Albanian Mafia Bought Ahtisaari”.

According to the Banja Luka report, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon had requested that the German Federal Intelligence Service, BND, inform him in detail on what was happening in Kosovo, and he finally received a detailed report on Special Envoy Ahtisaari’s activities in Kosovo.

Based on the Banja Luka article, the UN Secretary General was informed that Albanian separatists in Kosovo had paid for Ahtisaari’s plan which proposed independence for the Serbian province. The BND secret service team, headed by Brigadier Luke Neiman, who was directly appointed by the German Government to designate part of the German Secret Service apparatus to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNOSEK: United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo), discovered the connection between the Albanian mafia and Marti Ahtisaari. Brig. Neiman had recordings of discussions between Ahtisaari and Albanians; how they transferred money; the banks accounts plus codes in Switzerland and Cyprus.

One of the BDN recordings revealed the transportation of two-million euros from the Swiss Bank based in the city of Visalia, account number 239700-93457-00097, owned by Exhet Boria, which was masked by an offshore account with a code XS52-KOLER to Ahtisaari’s bank account in the Bank of Cyprus, account number 3459346699004533, code VOLANND.

What was also reported was the visit of two men to UNOSEK, in the presence of Ahtisaari on February 12, 2007, at 06:23 hrs (local time) in one black Mercedes four-wheel drive SUV, with license plate PR-443-22CD, which was confirmed to belong to the Albanian Government in Priština.

The two visitors carried two silver briefcases which were handed to Ahtisaari. A source inside the UNOSEK facilities confirmed that the briefcases contained cash and were delivered to the UN Special Envoy for Kosovo. Twelve days later, at 17:44 hrs (local), the same car, with the license plates removed, visited UNOSEK but this time it was Exhet Boria himself and two bodyguards that entered the building, carrying again two silver briefcases.

Exhet Boria is a Kosovo Albanian figure involved in organized crime and heroin trade in Europe and he is the “right hand” of Behgjet Pacolli, the Albanian billionaire mafia boss, living in Switzerland.

The BND agents realized that the four briefcases had diplomatic luggage labels, and noted that they finally arrived in Finland without being checked — because of the diplomatic tagging — and were delivered at Ahtisaari’s house. The briefcase cash totaled 40-million euros. The German agents also confirmed that Ahtisaari had many telephone conversations with Behgjet Pacolli.
Furthermore, on February 28, 2007, at 23:47 hrs (local), the BND agents noted the arrival of a NATO KFOR (Kosovo Force) four-wheel drive vehicle carrying two women who were followed by Boria’s bodyguard. The women stayed in Ahtisaari’s quarters until 05:17 hrs next day, and left with the same car.

The office of the UN Special Envoy for Kosovo responded to STT that “this is a silly story that comes from the press of Serbia (Bosnia & Herzegovina). We have nothing to add”, said Remi Derlo, Ahtisaari’s spokesman based in Vienna. According to STT, the accusations where not commented on by the UN or by Ahtisaari himself.

However, the President of the National Assembly of Serbia, Oliver Dulić, has made a formal inquiry into the allegations in order to confirm Ahtisaari’s involvement with Albanian organized crime.

Meanwhile, on the date on which the accusations on Ahtisaari were published, June 21, 2007, the UN Security Council session discarded the US-UK proposal to suspend negotiations for 120 days and then apply the Ahtisaari plan for giving independence to Kosovo. Also, that same day the EU warned the Albanians in Kosovo not to take unilateral decisions/action because these would be characterized “irresponsible behavior”.

The GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs station in south-eastern Europe has conducted research in the Balkans and from secure sources it was revealed that the BND report does indeed exist, and that the information contained is not “Serbian fiction” but a reality.

The research also revealed additional secure and confirmed information. Specifically, it was confirmed that the former KLA leader, Hakim Thaci (also known as “the snake” of KLA), had made a plan of “100 days” for Kosovo’s independence.

It is foreseen that elections would be held in Kosovo, in November 2007; the Kosovo Parliament will have 120 seats from which 100 seats will be taken by Albanians, 10 seats by the Serbs, and 10 seats will be occupied by the remaining minorities in Kosovo. The election winner would be Hakim Thaci, winning 75 seats.

The remaining 25 seats would be taken by Albanian parties in Kosovo. They consider that the Serbs would not vote, hence the 10 Serbian seats would be taken again by representatives of Hakim Thaci.

The first session of the Kosovo Parliament would, under the plan, then decide and announce Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). According to highly-reliable sources, Thaci and his friends had taken their decisions unilaterally and despite the UN Security Council decision, regardless of what this could mean for the security of the region.

Meanwhile, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs sources confirmed that the BND report also contained extensive additional information on the involvement in corrupt activities of other international community personalities involved in Kosovo.

As a result, it was understood that, under the pressure of the emerging information/facts, the UN was now considering promoting the partition of Kosovo, rather than adopting the Ahtisaari plan for granting complete independence to Kosovo.

Sunday, July 08, 2007

LATEST TRAVEL ALERT

Indonesia has been put on the extra alert list and Indonesian airlines of any size have been banned from Europe. Ostensibly for poor aircraft maintenance & safety reasons but more likely to contain the threat of Indonesian terrorists who intend to kidnap "foreigners".

Here is the text of the overarching public safety and travel announcement of April 10, 2007

This Public Announcement updates information on the continuing threat of terrorist actions and violence against Americans and interests overseas. This supersedes the Worldwide Caution dated October 11, 2006 and expires on October 9, 2007.
The Department of State remains concerned about the continued threat of terrorist attacks, demonstrations and other violent actions against U.S. citizens and interests overseas.

Current information suggests that al-Qaida and affiliated organizations continue to plan terrorist attacks against U.S. interests in multiple regions, including Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East. These attacks may employ a wide variety of tactics to include assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings and bombings.

Ongoing events in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East have resulted in demonstrations and associated violence in several countries. Americans are reminded that demonstrations and rioting can occur with little or no warning.
In August 2006, British authorities arrested a significant number of extremists engaged in a plot to destroy multiple passenger aircraft flying from the United Kingdom to the United States.

The September 2006 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Syria and the March 2006 bombing near the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan illustrate the continuing desire of extremists to strike American targets.

Extremists may elect to use conventional or non-conventional weapons, and target both official and private interests. The bomb attacks targeting buses carrying foreign workers in March 2007 and December 2006 in Algeria, a series of bombings in Thailand in May and September 2006 that targeted commercial and tourist destinations in the far south, and the bombings in the the Egyptian resort town of Dahab in April 2006 all illustrate how terrorists exploit vulnerabilities associated with soft targets. Additional examples of such targets include high-profile sporting events, residential areas, business offices, clubs, restaurants, places of worship, schools, public areas and locales where Americans gather in large numbers, including during holidays.

Financial or economic targets of value may also be considered as possible venues; the vehicle-based suicide attack on an oil facility near Mukalla and Marib in Yemen in September 2006 and the failed attack on the Abqaiq oil processing facility in Saudi Arabia in late February 2006 are such examples.

In the wake of the August 2006 plot against aircraft in London, numerous terrorist attacks on trains in India in 2006, the July 2005 London Underground bombings, and the March 2004 train attacks in Madrid, Americans are reminded of the potential for terrorists to attack public transportation systems. In addition, extremists may also select aviation and maritime services as possible targets.

U.S. citizens are strongly encouraged to maintain a high level of vigilance, be aware of local events, and take the appropriate steps to bolster their personal security. For additional information, please refer to “A Safe Trip Abroad” found at

http://travel.state.gov .

U.S. Government facilities worldwide remain at a heightened state of alert. These facilities may temporarily close or periodically suspend public services to assess their security posture. In those instances, U.S. embassies and consulates will make every effort to provide emergency services to U.S. citizens. Americans abroad are urged to monitor the local news and maintain contact with the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate.

As the Department continues to develop information on any potential security threats to U.S. citizens overseas, it shares credible threat information through its Consular Information Program documents, available on the Internet at http://travel.state.gov .

In addition to information on the Internet, travelers may obtain up-to-date information on security conditions by calling 1-888-407-4747 toll-free in the U.S. or outside the U.S. and Canada on a regular toll line at 1-202-501-4444.

Wednesday, July 04, 2007

SYRIA'S INNER CIRCLE FRACTURES

Exclusive. Analysis. From GIS Station Damascus.

The inner circle of Syrian Pres. Bashar al-Assad began to show the serious signs of real or imagined pressures in June 2007. The predominant concern of the inner circle around the President is Bashar's own growing fear that he will end up like the late Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein.

Bashar al-Assad is convinced that, with Damascus increasingly ensnared in Iran's web of confrontation with the West, it is only a question of time before the US, Israel, or any one of the European allies whose forces are with UNIFIL in Lebanon and whose economies depends on Persian Gulf oil will decide to put an end to the thinly-veiled hostile actions of Damascus.

The key officials involved in these disputes are: Bashar al-Assad; his brother Maher al-Assad; brother-in-law Gen. Assef Shawqat (Director of Military Intelligence); sister Bushra (Mrs Shawqat); and Bashar's cousin Rami Makhlouf.

These are not idle fears. Damascus is presently involved in sponsoring terrorism at the heart of West, in the destabilization of Lebanon, in supporting a myriad of Palestinian terrorist groups and jihadist movements — both Sunni and Shi’ite (HizbAllah) — in Lebanon, and in facilitating the escalation of the anti-US escalation in Iraq and the a web of jihadist groups (again both Sunni and Shi’ite) in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States.

Moreover, Syria markedly increased the flow of weapons, of both Syrian and Iranian origin, to a myriad groups and organizations in Lebanon (mainly Palestinian jihadist groups and the HizbAllah).

Faced with the specter of escalation — mainly US and Israeli retaliation — the inner-circle in Damascus is increasingly concerned by the possible loss of perks and power. At the same time, Bashar and his inner-circle are cognizant that fleeing Damascus would only embolden and encourage their enemies.

Hence, there have developed bitter disputes on how to confront the challenges and whether to offer compromises to the West.

Under the surface, there is a major dispute between Bashar and Rami Makhlouf. For years, Makhlouf has been responsible for smuggling, concealing and investing the personal funds of Bashar al-Assad. His importance grew as other members of the inner-circle were slapped with sanctions and their bank accounts frozen.

However, in recent weeks, Bashar was becoming apprehensive about the loyalty of Makhlouf and ordered the gradual dissolution of their business partnership, the removal of funds from joint accounts and selling of stocks. Most of the funds were invested in a series of special accounts, some in London, in the name of Bashar's wife and her family.

Rami Makhlouf now argues that Bashar removed funds in excess of his share in their joint accounts and investments. Both had bitter quarrels in which Makhlouf threatened Bashar.

The second conflict is strategic-political and its reverberations are affecting the entire political scene in Damascus. This conflict is the deterioration of a long-standing dispute between Bashar, on the one hand, and Maher al-Assad and Assaf Shawqat on the other.

Bushra is wavering, frequently changing sides, and thus adding to the instability at the top. The roots of the conflict lie in the dispute over what should be Damascus' reaction to the implications of both Maher and Assaf being involved in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on February 14, 2005, (and subsequently several other Lebanese politicians). Although Bashar was also implicated, the international tribunal expressed an interest only in Maher and Assaf.

Needless to say, the two named suspects do not want to be extradited, but Bashar is adamant on remaining in power even if it means placating the West (by, among other ways, floating rumors about willingness to negotiate peace with Israel). Bushra is wavering between loyalty to her brother and her husband.

The position of Maher and Assaf is that there is no way the West would make a deal with Bashar al-Assad, given Syria's sponsorship of terrorism and insurgency throughout the region.

Besides, they argue, the US is on the verge of defeat in, and withdrawal from, Iraq while Iran is the winning power on the ascent. They note, quite correctly, that Damascus is closely allied with Tehran and would thus benefit from Tehran's victory.

Moreover, the Arab world — led by the pro-US Riyadh and Cairo — wants a Sunni administration in Damascus, and is pushing former Syrian Vice-President Abdul Halim Khaddam and the Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood), so that Bashar had no hope there, either.

Hence, only the major contribution of the ascent of Iran — that is, actively expediting and contributing to Iranian victory — would increase Tehran's regional posture and commitment to Damascus.

Presently, Maher and Assaf both convinced Bashar that theirs' is the only way out of the current crisis, as well as markedly increased the Syrian sponsorship of, and involvement in, terrorism and insurgency throughout the region, thus making it virtually impossible for Bashar to extricate himself even if he wanted to.

Footnotes:

The United Nations Security Council on May 30, 2007, authorized the formation of an international tribunal to try suspects in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. The International Court came into force on June 10, 2007, although Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem said in early June 2007 that Damascus would not co-operate with the tribunal.

Saturday, June 30, 2007

BALKAN ROAD TO PEACE HAS BAD INTENTIONS

The Road to Peace in the Balkans is Paved With Bad Intentions

An Address By Gregory R. Copley to the Conference on A Search for a Roadmap to Peace in the Balkans, organized by the Pan-Macedonian Association,
Washington, DC: June 27, 2007

Note: This paper draws on a wide range of current and historical intelligence reporting, but, for the sake of brevity, it is not possible to cite all these, and all historical sources. What is presented are the conclusions and trend projections based on analysis of the source material based on some two decades of close involvement in Balkan, South-Eastern European, and related developments.

This conference is aptly titled “A Search for a Roadmap to Peace in the Balkans”, because we have yet to find a road map, let alone, should we find it, the right road to take. In any event, because of the short-term thinking, greed, fear, and ignorance which have plagued decisionmaking with regard to the region by players inside it and out, the road to peace in the Balkans is paved with bad intentions.

It has been long and widely forecast that the security situation in the Balkans — indeed, in South-Eastern Europe generally — would become delicate, and would fracture, during the final stages of the Albanian quest for independence for the Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija. As pessimistic as those forecasts were, however, the situation was considerably worsened by the eight-hour visit to Albania on June 10, 2007, by US Pres. George W. Bush. The State Department told the President that he would he would receive a hero’s welcome in Albania, and perhaps the White House felt that this might resonate in his ratings at home.
The Albanian visit, however, did nothing for Mr Bush’s ratings in the US electorate, but it did have strategic consequences. None of the consequences were positive either for stability in the Balkans or for US interests.

From the standpoint of those State Department elements promoting Kosovo independence — and particularly Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns — however, the move was designed to make Kosovo independence a de facto reality. This would then bypass the United Nations Security Council, where Russia was determined to veto the stampede toward Kosovo independence, despite the attempts to make it seem inevitable.
This deteriorating security situation in the Balkans, even if it falls short of major conventional warfare, seriously jeopardizes regional economic growth, and the planned development of an infrastructure to transport energy from the Caspian/Central Asian region to markets in Western Europe, and into the Mediterranean terminals. This damages the strategic and economic interests of most regional states, the European Union, and the US. Of course it particularly has ramifications for South-Eastern Europe in general, and the entire Eastern Mediterranean theater, ultimately impacting Cyprus, Lebanon, Syria, and Israel.

In large part, the deteriorating viability of many areas of the former Yugoslavia is the result of the continuation of the policies toward the Balkans of the former US Clinton Administration by the US State Department. The US State Department, with many careers put in place and sustained during the Clinton era, fought hard to have the current Bush Administration sustain the Clinton policies, on the basis that the Bush White House already had too many issues to deal with as a result of the Iraq War and the so-called “Global War on Terror”. Under-Secretary Burns, in particular, insisted on having the Bush Administration, through Secretary Condoleezza Rice, formally sign off to that specific policy decision: to continue the Clinton Administration line. The results have been profoundly damaging to US and Western strategic and security interests.

As a result, not only Kosovo, but all of Albania and other Balkan communities have become captive of the criminal-political movements which owe their power to their alliance with al-Qaida, Iran, and the Saudi-funded Wahhabist movements.

The Kosovo region is now a lawless area. It has been ethnically-cleansed of Serbs (more than 300,000 in the past five years), and re-populated by Albanians who have progressively and illegally, over the past decades, migrated into the area. Albanian gangs, virtually all linked with either the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) — which legally no longer exists — or other Albanian militant groups control all trade and life in Kosovo. Years of so-called peacekeeping by the international community count for nothing. Kosovo’s presence as a nominally independent state, without any of the essential foundations to meet the true criteria for sovereignty, can in no way further the stability of the region, or of Europe. Neither can it serve US strategic interests, unless US interests can be defined as a breakdown of viability of Eastern and southern Europe.

The visit to Tiranë by Pres. Bush signaled the start of an open season of expanded Albanian-backed terrorist and political activities in the region, which will re-ignite armed and political conflict in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), in Kosovo itself, in parts of Serbia proper — including the Raška area linking Serbia and Montenegro, and linking Kosovo with Bosnia at the area of the Gorazde Corridor, and in the Preševo Valley area — and also, most significantly, within Greece, and within Montenegro. This new warfare will be supported by many elements of the international jihadist movements which work closely with Albanian groups such as the KLA along the so-called Green Transversal line (or Zelena Transverszala) — really a clandestine highway or network — which not only carries jihadists but also narcotics and weapons along international supply lines crossing from Turkey and the Adriatic into the Balkans and on into Western Europe. And there will also be increased support from a variety of governments and from co-opted officials from outside the direct region: Iran, Turkey, the People’s Republic of China, and others.

What we saw with the Bush visit to Tiranë was the emergence of the Albanian thrust — supported by both the Government of Albania and the KLA — of an Albanian-sponsored group, the UCC, seeking secession for part of Greece, Epirus, known historically also as Chameria. The Cham people draw, to some extent, their identity from a community formed in the Epirus area of Greece by the Roman Army some two millennia ago. The reality today, however, is that the Chameria Liberation Army — the UCC — was formed by the KLA and is in fact a part of the quest for a “Greater Albania”, and its proponents have said as much.
A delegation of the UCC on June 10, 2007, delivered a letter to Pres. Bush during his visit to Tiranë. The UCC letter referred to the existence of an Albanian minority in Western Greece (Epirus) and the UCC requested recognition of the “genocide of the Albanian Chamerians” allegedly conducted by the Greeks in the end of World War II, and to recognize “the right of the people to return to their homes in Greece from where they were expelled”, and “return their estate that was attached”, plus other nationalist requests.

And a few weeks before Pres. Bush’s arrival in Albania, UCC delegations delivered letters to the US embassies in Rome and Tiranë. Albanian nationalist sentiment and protests increased, along with strong propaganda against the Greek minority in southern Albania, after the Bush visit to Tiranë. The UCC, meanwhile, has been building its support base with demonstrations and events leading toward today — June 27, 2007 — the date that the Albanian Parliament in 1994 called the “Chameria national anniversary”.

The presence of Pres. Bush in Albania, then, and his statements supporting the independence of Kosovo, encouraged and triggered the extreme feelings of nationalist Albanians, who are also seeking independence in western FYROM, and the Greek region of Epirus. Indeed, the Albanian people have for decades, but increasingly in the past 15 or so years, been so distracted by leaders who have promised that they could, and should, have some of their neighbors’ wealth, that they have allowed those leaders to fail them in actually creating wealth and strength in Albania itself.

Significantly, although Albanian organizations are now re-grouping to seize more and more control over parts of FYROM, threatening the existence of that state as a viable entity, there are also FYROM Government elements voicing louder and louder claims to the Macedonian areas of Greece. It is obvious that some temporary common cause will be found among the Albanian groups and the FYROM groups, given that they are both seeking to break off parts of Greece, even though they are, in other respects, mortally opposed to each other. It could even be argued that, given the reality that the foundation of Greece as a modern, multi-societal nation-state began with the unification of Hellenism under King Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great, it is not those elements in Skopje which should be seeking to compromise the integrity of Greece, but, rather, the other way around. Greece, if historical and cultural precedent were to hold sway, should be seeking parts of the former Yugoslavia which were integral to the original Greek Macedonian entity.

So, the broader battle is now being joined in South-East Europe, in Kosovo, Raška, the Preševo Valley, in FYROM, Montenegro, and Epirus. It is also linked to issues and players which at first may seem peripheral to the Balkans; indeed, it is in large part proxy warfare which is symptomatic of the emergence of a new Cold War on a global scale. Meanwhile, Turkey’s rejection of the advice of the great modernist leader, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, to abstain from attempting to revive pan-Turkism and Islamism, has led Ankara to provide official and unofficial support for a wide range of radical and jihadist causes in the Balkans. Thus, the instability of the Balkans has been fed by Ankara’s romanticism, even to the extent that members of the Bosnia-based terrorist group Kvadrat have been facilitated in traveling through Turkey to get into Chechnya, where they have been engaged in terrorist and insurgent operations, and then repatriated through Turkish-controlled Northern Cyprus, where they are clearly supported by the Turkish Cypriot and Ankara authorities.

Significantly, Kvadrat is not only linked into al-Qaida, but its members receive training in Bosnia from Iranian Intelligence officials.

The greater question of Turkish-Greek relations, then, and Turkey’s position on Cyprus, all become part of the equation related to the stability of the Balkans, quite apart from issues relating to the expanding and planned networks of oil and gas pipelines.

But, regardless of causes, the reality is that Greek-Turkish relations are now more tense than would be ideal if the two countries are to effectively cooperate to exploit the massive web of oil and gas supply lines beginning to emerge from the Caspian region and across the Caucasus and Black Sea and through the Balkans. Within all of this, too, we see the historical paranoia between states: between Ukraine and Russia, between Turkey and Greece, between Turkey and Armenia, between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and so on. The question of Turkish stability becomes a key factor in itself, and the Turkish General Staff knows that it is constrained by the elected Government and the process of European Union (EU) entry from dealing as it would like with the massively-increasing Kurdish insurgency and the perceived threat from the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK[8]) safe-havens in northern Iraq.

The Turkish Armed Forces may decisively end, once and for all, through a disguised coup, the Turkish EU entry process so that the General Staff can unequivocally control internal stabilization operations. Within this context, then, international pressures on Ankara to negotiate over Northern Cyprus will fail, and Turkey will consolidate its position in Cyprus and may even threaten to expand it. This, and resentment by Turkey of Greece’s control of the Ægean, will further increase tensions. Indeed, it is surprising that military tensions over the Ægean did not erupt by around August 2006. But in the event that the Turkish General Staff assumes primacy in the country then we can expect a significant heightening of tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. There is no question but that the Greek General Staff is highly conscious of this.

We can only imagine the negative consequences for Balkan stability if, for example, Turkey’s status changes and Ankara no longer feels obliged to temper its activities, or its use of Islamist surrogate or proxy groups to further pan-Turkist ambitions. This would be particularly significant if Ankara saw a strategic advantage in destabilizing Greece through the support of separatist groups trying to wrest control of Epirus away from Athens, or to transform the stability of northern Greece’s Macedonian region, which gives Greece its window into both the Balkans and Turkey. Greece would probably be forced to respond by supporting Kurdish separatist activities in Turkey, or by supporting Iran’s radical leadership in undermining Turkey’s strategic depth — and wealth — which derives from the energy pipelines linking Turkey with the Caspian. This would profoundly impact European plans for increasing its energy supplies from Central Asia and the Caucasus, and would have negative effects on the Black Sea littoral countries and the Balkans.

All of these possible ramifications are negative for the stability of the Balkans, for Europe, and for Western interests generally, not to mention the delicate process of stabilization and growth in Central Asia and the Middle East. How the Balkans impacts the greater region, and how the greater region impacts the Balkans are equally important. The US, meanwhile, has fostered Turkish belief that it need not comply with either international law or the profound teachings of Atatürk who, for all his anti-Hellenic feelings, offered Turkey a path to a prosperous, strong future, divorced from the sweet-scented rot of the decaying Ottoman Empire.

What disturbs me is that none of the US officials with whom I have spoken on State Department policy toward the Balkans, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus have been able to articulate a comprehensive understanding of the region’s history, the realities of current activities, or the linkage of their policies to any identifiable US or Western interests. US policies toward the region, as a result, have been crude, ill-considered, and more likely to hurt the friends of the US and the West rather than further US, Western, and allied interests.
None of this, however, excuses the failings of regional politicians in the Balkans.

Most Serbian politicians are, for example, still beholden to a US private citizen, financier George Soros, who, in a deal struck in the Budapest Hilton Hotel in 1999, paid some $250-million to the leaders of what became the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) to help in the overthrow of the Serbian Milosevic Government. These parties — unlike the Serbian Radical Party, which did not receive Soros funding — sold their soul (and subsequently gave commercial concessions in Serbia proper and Kosovo) — to Soros who now, through various front groups such as his International Crisis Group (ICG), demands the independence of Kosovo from Serbia.

So Serbian politicians, except those of the Radical Party, can do little but mumble their complaints while Kosovo is taken from them. Short-sighted, self-interested policies prevail, and unrest and conflict will follow. It is probable that the US will successfully bypass the UN Security Council and create — before the end of 2007 — a de facto recognition of Kosovo independence, but in all this time, the Serbian Government has not yet developed the capacity or policy to physically contain the ongoing expansion of Albanian militant activity across from Kosovo into Serbia proper.

In my recent book, The Art of Victory, I said that the world was, in the post-Cold War age of Global Transformation, entering a period of cratocide and cratogenesis: the murder and the birth of nations. In a series of lectures recently, I also said that we were equally in the process of the transformation of existing societies: cratometamorphosis. My friend and learned colleague in Athens, Professor Marios Evriviades, worked with me to put into these Greek-derivative words the phenomena which I saw emerging. We have not yet seen the completion of the break-up of Yugoslavia, and even the wrenching of Kosovo may not complete it. We will then see the dismemberment of some of the Yugoslav parts already independent, perhaps even the dismemberment of FYROM and Bosnia. For if Kosovo is allowed to separate from Serbia, why not Republica Srpska from Bosnia? If FYROM is to be rend asunder by the voracious Albanian activities, should not Greece stake its claim to reunifying the Macedonian lands which once constituted the heartland origins of the modern, unified Greek state?

Indeed, the question of resolving FYROM’s name may be a key to its survival as a nation-state. It is at present a claimant to the legacy of the Macedonian people, but in reality, ethnic Macedonians are only a minority of the population. A secret Greek suggestion to Skopje was that the country should settle on the name “Slavic-Macedonia-Skopje”, which is clearly unworkable and cumbersome. However, some name which suggests geographic – rather than ethnic – legitimacy would probably help Skopje retain control, and perhaps it is worth investigating whether the FYROM region should resume its historical legitimate name, “Dardania” .

This was the name of the region until 1900. And Tito only suggested naming the area “Macedonia” after World War II when, while the Greek civil war was underway, there was a slim chance that the Macedonian part of northern Greece could be seized, assuming the communists fighting in the region could have their way.

In any event, the growing regional unrest demands that the FYROM name issue be resolved soon. Greece will almost certainly veto FYROM entry into NATO in 2008 unless the matter is decided, quite apart from anything else.

And if the matter lays unresolved, then the continual tearing away at FYROM will continue. The KLA and Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha have begun talking about a future entity called “Kosovar-Macedonia”. The fact that both the KLA and Berisha use this name indicates that the “Greater Kosovo” and “Greater Albania” concepts are one and the same.

And Bulgaria, too, sensing the turmoil, has re-awakened its interest in its historical claims to the FYROM territory should Skopje be unable to retain control of the territory. Bulgaria has already given some 100,000 Bulgarian passports to FYROM citizens in recent years, making those passport-holders now European Union citizens. The reality is that FYROM’s Slavic citizens are seeking an insurance policy should FYROM fail as a state.

Some 85 percent of the FYROM economy is already controlled, or sustained, by Greece, and yet it is the Albanians and Bulgarians who actively seek to grasp the territory. Therein, quite apart from all the other factors, lie the seeds of a new Balkan war. And the key to saving the stability of the FYROM territory, and the region, may lie in finding a way to allow the leaders in Skopje to save face over the name issue. “Dardania” or “Slavic Macedonia” would do it, and give Skopje the legitimacy it needs to assert control over a multi-ethnic state: a modern nation-state in the context of the Westphalian principle.

Meanwhile, the US State Department says that the case of Kosovo is sui generis; unique and unconnected from any other parallel examples, such as Republica Srpska. Vain, arrogant, wishful thinking. Perhaps those State Department officials will be surprised, too, to see — a decade or two hence — the claims of autonomy emerging for parts of Arizona, Southern California, or Texas, citing the same pretext of “self-determination” now being claimed by those who moved across the borders to occupy Serbia’s Kosovo province. The US thought, too, in the 1980s, that igniting jihadism among Afghans against the Soviet occupation was an example sui generis, containable and unrelated to the outside world.

But the flame captivated other elements of Muslim society, and continued to spread until parts of lower Manhattan, the Pentagon, and London, Madrid, Casablanca, and Bali were in smoldering ruin.

But let me conclude with my main points:

The US will cause the de facto recognition of Kosovo independence before the end of 2007, even if it means a further round of so-called negotiations before going back to acceptance, in toto, of the recommendations of UN Special Representative Marti Antisaari, who, not coincidentally, is a former associate of George Soros’ International Crisis Group which has always been committed to Kosovo independence;

As a result of the encouragement given to the Albanian expansionist cause, there will be continued dynamism in Albanian separatist, terrorist, and agitation movements throughout the Balkans, and a renewed confidence and vitality to Albanian criminal activities in narco-trafficking, human trafficking, and illegal arms trade through Europe;

Conflict issues in the Middle East, and specifically in Iraq, and relating to Iran, will continue to have a profound impact on the stability of the Balkans, and vice-versa;

None of the regional states, but particularly Serbia, are doing enough to address the security ramifications of the coming de facto independence of Kosovo, and the US State Department itself cannot articulate a valid set of reasons why it is working against US and Western interests with its policies in the Balkans;

The Balkans region and the Eastern Mediterranean generally are entering a further period of crisis, insurrection, and possibly open conflict. This will significantly constrain the development of emerging patterns of trade, and particularly energy trade, from the Caspian and Black Sea regions into Europe, and into the Mediterranean basin.

There is little good news from the region, given the fact that the local and global players are moving around the Balkans without a coherent roadmap. But when roadmaps for peace are being drawn up, let us at least consult all the locals so that we can get a comprehensive view of the region and its possibilities.

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[Gregory Copley is President of the International Strategic Studies Association (ISSA), based in Washington, DC, and also chairs the Association’s Balkans & Eastern Mediterranean Policy Council (BEMPC). He is also Editor of Defense & Foreign Affairs publications, and the Global Information System (GIS), a global intelligence service which provides strategic current intelligence to governments worldwide.

He is a founding Director of Future Directions International (FDI), the Australian strategic research institution, based in Perth. Mr Copley is author of numerous books on strategic issues and history, including the recent book published by Simon & Schuster, The Art of Victory. In the latest of a series of awards, he was made a Member of the Order of Australia in the Queen’s Birthday Honours List of June 11, 2007, for his contributions to strategic philosophy.

His Washington-based institute has for more than three decades worked on issues related to terrorism, psychological strategy and grand strategy issues, as well as intelligence. He advises a number of governments, often at head-of-state level, on these issues.

An estimated 90 percent of the population of the Kosovo and Metohija region by 2007 was believed to have been made up of ethnic Albanians. Some of these were the descendants of Albanians who had earlier illegally migrated into the area, but some 40 percent of the territory’s population is comprised of Albanians who crossed illegally into the territory in the past decade or so. In that time – in fact in the past five years – some 300,000 Serbs whose families had lived in the area for a thousand years or more were essentially forcibly

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is also known by its Albanian name, Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves (UCK) (OVK in Serbo-Croat), has a variety of offshoots and derivations, such as the Albanian National Army (ANA), the Liberation army of Preševo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (LAPMB), and so on. The KLA was, as part of its nominal disbanding after the NATO-led war against Serbia in 1999, to provide the key cadres to form the official Kosovo Protection Corps.

Der Spiegel on May 7, 2007, noted that the extremist paramilitary Albanian organization, UCC (Chameria Liberation Army/Ushtria Climentare e Camerise) — also known by the initials OVC, which seeks the annexation of part of Greece to “Greater Albania” — threatened to use violence to pursue its claims within the Greek state. UCC is a branch of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army: UCK) terrorist organization, and its aim, according to its own public statements, is to “free the Chameria area, that is under Greek occupation”. UCC calls Chameria an area of Western Greece which borders with Albania. In 1995, after a secret meeting, the KLA had announced the future creation of UCC. The political mastermind of UCC and leader of the organization is known only by an alias: “Alban Vjosa”.

However, the real name of the UCC leader is Idajet Beqiri, 52, an Albanian lawyer and founder of the “Albanian National Unity Party” (FBKSh). Beqiri is friend of former Albanian Prime Minister Fatos T. Nano and the present Prime Minister, Sali R. Berisha. On November 10, 2003, Der Spiegel (issue number 46) had published an article titled The Albanian Rebellion, in which it made reference to the “Albanian revolt” in the Chameria area (of Greece), during the Athens 2004 Olympic Games. The article also included an interview with an Albanian KLA terrorist, named Ahmet, in the city of Thessaloniki in northern Greece. Ahmet described in the interview his theories for “Greater Albania”.

The question should also be raised as to the widespread activities in FYROM of the intelligence services of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), particularly since the FYROM Government switched its recognition from the Republic of China (ROC: Taiwan) to the PRC in 2001. As well, PRC intelligence officials have clearly had significant dealings with Albanian groups, including the KLA, and have assisted in the KLA’s acquisition of weapons and explosives. See, in particular, Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, October 25, 2005: New Evidence Highlights Albanian Link to Explosives Used in London, Madrid Bombings.]

See Copley, Gregory: Clausewitzian Friction and the New Cold War, in Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, 6-2007.

The Global Information System (GIS) and Defense & Foreign Affairs first brought the activities, funding, training, and operation of Kvadrat, in 2004, including detailing the locations of training camps in Bosnia, the funding by Saudi groups, and the military training by Iranian intelligence officials. The detailed intelligence on Kvadrat highlighted the reality that Turkish, Saudi, and Iranian officials have all been linked with an al-Qaida terrorist operation.

Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK: Kurdistan Workers’ Party). See also Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, August 30, 2006: Turkey and the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK): Preparations for the Confrontation.

Copley, Gregory R.: The Art of Victory: Strategies for Personal Success and Global Survival in a Changing World. New York, 2006: Simon & Schuster’s Threshold Editions. ISBN-13: 978-1-4165-2470-0, or ISBN-10: 1-4165-2470-3.

Significantly, Wikipedia describes Dardania as an ancient country encompassing
southern parts of present-day Serbia (including the area of the modern-day province of Kosovo), mostly, but not entirely, western parts of the present-day FYROM, and parts of present-day north-eastern Albania.