Alan Note: CAIR appears to have lost several suits they brought against people to try to silence them. At last someone is striking back at a group which tries to play poor little victim, while they promote anti-Western culture and Islamist, undermining, policies.
WASHINGTON – It's no longer just a charge of copyright violation in the case of Michael Savage v. Council on American-Islamic Relations.
Now the radio talk star is going for the legal jugular in his battle with the group that bills itself as a Muslim civil rights organization.
The San Francisco-based talker has amended his lawsuit against CAIR for misusing audio clips of his show as part of a boycott campaign against his three-hour daily program to include charges the group "has consistently sought to silence opponents of violent terror through economic blackmail, frivolous but costly lawsuits, threats of lawsuits and abuses of the legal system."
The amended lawsuit, filed in U.S. District Court in Northern California, also charges CAIR with using extortion, threats, abuse of the court system, and obtaining money via interstate commerce under false and fraudulent circumstances – calling it a "political vehicle of international terrorism" and even linking the group with support of al-Qaida.
The federal government recently named CAIR, based in Washington, D.C., as an unindicted co-conspirator in an alleged scheme to funnel $12 million to the terrorist group Hamas.
And as WND has reported, CAIR has been associated with a disturbing number of convicted terrorists or felons in terrorism probes, as well as suspected terrorists and active targets of terrorism investigations.
"Groups like CAIR have a proven record of senior officials being indicted and either imprisoned or deported from the United States," said U.S. Rep. Sue Myrick, R-N.C., co-founder of the House Anti-Terrorism/Jihad Caucus.
Savage and celebrity civil rights attorney Daniel Horowitz are attempting to use the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act to make the case that "CAIR and its co-conspirators have aided, abetted and materially sponsored al-Qaida and international terrorism."
CAIR launched a campaign against "The Savage Nation," as the program is called, using extended audio clips of the show to make the case that advertisers who supported the talker were actually endorsing "hate speech" against Muslims.
Savage turned the tables on the activist group by initially suing for copyright violation of the show's material. This week the suit was expanded with some of the strongest allegations ever made against CAIR publicly.
Among the charges is that CAIR is "part of a deliberately complex and deliberately confusing array of related organizations" and that its "organizational structure is part of a scheme to hide the illegal activities of the group, funding, the transfer of funds and to complicate investigation of the group."
Other highlights of the suit:
"CAIR is not a civil rights organization and it never has been. … CAIR was and is a political organization that advocates a specific political agenda on behalf of foreign interests."
"The copyright infringement was done to raise funds for CAIR so that it could perpetuate and continue to perform its role in the RICO conspiracy set forth in Count Two and to disseminate propaganda on behalf of foreign interests that are opposed to the continued existence of the United States of America as a free nation."
"CAIR would have to register as a foreign agent if their activities were not hidden under the false claim that they are a civil rights organization that enjoys tax-exempt status."
"CAIR was tied to terror from the day it was formed. The group was incorporated on or about 1994 by Omar Ahmad and Nihad Awad. Both men were officers of a terror organization known as the 'Islamic Association of Palestine.'"
"CAIR's parent group, IAP, was founded in or about 1982 by Musa Abu Marzook. Marzook was IAP's ideological leader and controlling director from the date of its founding until shortly after his deportation from the United States in 1997.
At all time relevant, Marzook was an operative of, and/or affiliated with, the 'Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah,' or 'Hamas.' Hamas is an international terrorist organization."
In 1998, "CAIR demanded the removal of a Los Angeles billboard describing Osama bin Laden as 'the sworn enemy,' asserting that this depiction [was] 'offensive to Muslims.'"
In 1998, "CAIR denied bin Laden's responsibility for the two al-Qaida bombings of American embassies in Africa. CAIR's leader Ibrahim Hooper claimed the bombings resulted from 'misunderstandings on both sides.'"
"On October 5, 2001, just weeks after 9/11, CAIR's New York office sent a letter to The New York Times arguing that the paper had misidentified three of the hijackers and suggesting that the attacks may have been committed by people who were impersonating Arab Muslims."
"CAIR further exploited 9/11 as it put on its website a picture of the World Trade Center in flames and below it a call for donations that was linked to the Holy Land Foundation website." The Holy Land Foundation, the suit charges, is "a terror organization."
"CAIR receives significant international funding. For example, in 1999 the Islamic Development Bank gave a $250,000 grant to CAIR to purchase land for a national headquarters.
In 2002, the World Association for Muslim Youth, a Saudi government-funded organization, financed distributing books on Islam free of charge and an advertising campaign in American publications. This included a quarter page in USA
Today each Friday, for a year, estimated to cost $1.04 million.
In 2003, Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal donated $500,000 to distribute the Koran and other books about Islam in the United States. In 2005, CAIR's Washington branch received a donation of $1,366,466 from a Saudi Arabian named Adnan Bogary.
In 2006, Sheikh Hamdan bin Rashid Al Maktoum, deputy ruler of Dubai and UAE minister of finance and industry, financed the building of a property in the U.S. to serve as an endowment for the organization. This gift is thought to generate income of approximately $3 million a year."
"The role of CAIR and CAIR-Canada is to wage PSYOPS (psychological warfare) and disinformation activities on behalf of Wahabbi-based Islamic terrorists throughout North America. They are the intellectual 'shock troops' of Islamic terrorism."
"The Council on American-Islamic Relations is a Muslim Brotherhood front organization. It works in the United States as a lobby against radio, television and print media journalists who dare to produce anything about Islam that is at variance with their fundamental agenda."
"CAIR has links to both Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. Terrorism expert Steven Emerson has stated before Congress that CAIR is a front for Hamas."
Savage's case also cites another ongoing suit against CAIR filed by the estate of John P. O'Neill, the former head of security for the World Trade Center. It alleges a RICO conspiracy involving CAIR led to the 9/11 attack.
"Throughout this period," the Savage suit alleges, "CAIR conspired to support terrorism and to obfuscate the roles of the various participants and conspirators in Radical Muslim Terrorism, and/or al-Qaida and/or the International Islamic Front for the Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, which conspiracy culminated in the 9/11 attack."
It continues: "The pattern of racketeering activity conducted by CAIR is separate from the existence of Radical Muslim Terrorism, and/or the al-Qaida, and/or the International Islamic Front for the Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, but was a necessary component of the 9/11 attack.
The RICO enterprise conducts terrorism all over the world; the racketeering activity conducted by CAIR funds that activity, which activity culminated in the 9/11 attack."
CAIR has refused to comment on Savage's suit to date. But it has claimed a host of companies have stopped advertising on Savage's show as a result of its boycott campaign.
However, an investigation by WND shows some of those boycott victories are questionable. In one announcement claiming Universal Orlando Resorts "drops 'Savage Nation' ads," CAIR stated: "Advertisers that have already stopped airing, or refuse to air commercials on 'Savage Nation' include AutoZone, Citrix, TrustedID, JCPenney, OfficeMax, Wal-Mart and AT&T."
But AutoZone told WND the CAIR campaign had nothing to do with its advertising decision, and it had chosen not to advertise on any radio talk shows – of all parts of the spectrum – years before the CAIR effort.
CAIR officials declined to respond to WND queries about why it is listing companies as part of its boycott campaign that say they have not participated in the boycott.
Officials of Talk Radio Network, Savage's syndicator, confirmed to WND that companies including AutoZone and JCPenney never advertise on such programs.
"We do not sponsor syndicated radio talk shows," AutoZone spokesman Ray Pohlman told WND. "We have customers of all shapes and sizes and political persuasions. For us to sponsor [any radio talk shows] wouldn't make any sense."
But that policy is years old, and wasn't changed at all by CAIR's effort, he said.
"What I will tell you is the CAIR organization did, in fact, contact the marketing department [of AutoZone.] We responded with our full advertising policy which clearly states that we do not advertise on radio talk shows," he told WND.
The announcement about Universal was made by the Hate Hurts America Community and Interfaith Coalition, of which CAIR is a prominent member.
It said Universal Orlando Resorts "has joined a growing list of advertisers that have stopped advertising or refuse to place their ads on Michael Savage's 'Savage Nation' Radio program."
The campaign also has triggered a lawsuit by Savage against CAIR over its alleged misappropriation of Savage's radio broadcast material. In the lawsuit, Savage depicts CAIR as a "vehicle of international terrorism."
CAIR says it is challenging Savage's "hate speech," and referenced Savage comments such as:
"I'm not gonna put my wife in a hijab. And I'm not gonna put my daughter in a burqa. And I'm not getting' on my all-fours and braying to Mecca. And you could drop dead if you don't like it. You can shove it up your pipe. I don't wanna hear any more about Islam. I don't wanna hear one more word about Islam. Take your religion and shove it up your behind. I'm sick of you."
The Savage suit says comments like that are taken out of context.
Another major company CAIR claims has joined the boycott of Michael Savage is JCPenney. But as with AutoZone, JCPenney officials told WND readers they were not making any special provision in their advertising policy that would make them part of a protest campaign, but officials did not respond directly to WND inquiries.
"JCPenney did not 'pull' advertising from the show. JCPenney has had a long standing policy about not advertising on any show that can be construed as controversial.
An error in upholding this policy was made by a few local stations, and it has now been clarified," the company told a WND reader.
"Wal-Mart does not sponsor or advertise on the Michael Savage show. We have asked radio networks to ensure that Wal-Mart ads do not run in programming that we deem controversial and are sending out content guidelines reminders to radio networks and stations," said that company.
Savage's lawsuit alleges copyright infringement by CAIR, which the lawsuit says seeks to do "material harm to those voices who speak against the violent agenda of CAIR's clients."
Filed in U.S. District Court in California, the suit seeks damages equal to the ongoing donations from CAIR supporters "who expect CAIR to act in this manner in exchange for continuing financial support" as well as "actual damages according to proof."
A spokesman for Savage indicated the top-rated talk show host would have no further comment, saying the text of the lawsuit itself would answer questions.
The focal point of the lawsuit is a series of audio clips CAIR has been using in its promotions and fundraising efforts.
Those comments from Savage's show include his criticisms of Islam and Muslims. The lawsuit maintains such comments, taken in context, are Savage's verbal expression of the feelings of many Americans.
"The audience of 'The Savage Nation' expects this type of from-the-heart outrage and when it is directed at a murderer such as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his ilk, the piece is far more understandable and far more American mainstream.
While the strength of the outrage is remarkable and a hallmark of 'The Savage Nation,' the sentiment is shared by a huge number of Americans," the lawsuit says.
Sunday, December 30, 2007
Saturday, December 29, 2007
CLINTON STENCH & DRUGS BACK IN THE WHITE HOUSE AGAIN?
Prologue to Boy Clinton
By R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.
Regnery Publishing Inc.Washington D.C.
ARKANSAS STATE TROOPER L. D. Brown had just returned from a mission flown to Central America from Arkansas's Mena Airport in late December 1984. The flight was commanded by pilot Barry Seal, an operative with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and a contract employee with the Central Intelligence Agency.
Seal was also a legendary drug smuggler, known for having flown hundreds of drug-smuggling flights between 1977 and 1983 at low altitude and in complete darkness. (1)
Now, supposedly, he had gone straight. After parachuting arms into the jungle, Seal landed at a sleepy Central American airport. He picked up two duffel bags and flew back to Arkansas. Brown, seated behind him throughout the flight, was moonlighting as a CIA contract employee [see Appendix A, items A, B, and C]. His boss, Governor Bill Clinton, had encouraged and assisted him in his employment at the CIA.
Under the assumption that he was being trained for clandestine operations on this flight, Brown was following Seal's instructions. He was merely an observer, studying the activities of Seal and his crew.
But during this, his most recent flight, what Brown, a seasoned narcotics investigator, was to learn troubled him deeply. Seal was bringing drugs and money back in the duffel bags. Consequently, as soon as Brown returned to Little Rock he approached Clinton and asked, "Do you know what they're bringing back on those planes?" Clinton froze. "They're bringing back coke," Brown told him. In fact "they" were trafficking in cocaine, money, and arms, Clinton's response was blase.
He told Brown not to worry, adding "That's Lasater's deal. That's Lasater's deal.(2)
At the time Dan Lasater, an Arkansas "bond daddy" known for his wide-open parties, was a major Clinton supporter. Clinton's occasional attendance at Lasater's parties had presented his bodyguard, Brown, with problems; in addition to young girls, the parties also included plenty of cocaine.
Brown is unclear as to the rest of Clinton's reply. It was either "And your buddy Bush knows all about it," or "And your hero Bush knows about it." Brown admired President George Bush, having met him in Portland, Maine, while traveling with the governor. After that meeting the two Arkansans visited with the president at his Kennebunkport compound.
Clinton's references to Bush and Lasater added confusion to Brown's anger. Brown was angry after this last flight when Seat showed him cocaine and money that he had just flown into the country. Brown feared that he, a member of the governor's security, was being set up to be blackmailed. Now upon finding out that Clinton knew about the operation, the trooper felt betrayed and a bit stupid. He says that the moment he saw the drugs Lasater's involvement should have "dawned" on him. "I'd never seen the governor around coke," Brown says, "unless he was around Lasater." At Lasater's parties Brown would hustle the governor away when the drugs came out.
Though he had seen Clinton "stoned" he had never actually seen him using drugs. Others have, namely two of Clinton's lovers, Sally Perdue and Gennifer Flowers. Both have attested to Clinton's drug use during assignations.
Feeling angry, betrayed, and played for a fool, Brown left the governor and proceeded directly to a cottage on the mansion grounds where Becky McCoy, his future wife, lived. Listed on the mansion's payroll as a "courier," she was actually Chelsea's nanny. Eleven years after that day Becky remembers Brown's arriving in tears and complaining, "I've been betrayed.(3)
Over the next few months Brown would seek another assignment with the state troopers, but it would take him more than a decade to sort out his involvement and possible culpability as the governor's man on the Mena airport flights.
At the time, 1984, Brown was twenty-eight years old. He was not only Clinton's favorite bodyguard, but also a close friend. The other troopers called him Clinton's "fair-haired boy." He and Clinton shared an interest in books, ideas, and night life.
Brown still has books that Clinton gave him, one being a bar exam study book in which the politician made some ironic underlinings. One passage discussed the deductibility of charitable donations, and another the length of residency required in Washington before tax liability is incurred. Like Clinton, Brown passed through a radical stage when he attended the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville. Indeed, when Clinton was a law professor in Fayetteville, Brown was working on an off-campus magazine, the radical Grapevine.
In the autumn of i984, Brown made his first flight with Seal. It was on October 23 or very close to that date, and Brown found himself seated on a bench inside a cavernous C- 123 K cargo plane roaring over a Central American jungle. Seal, who piloted the plane, was one of the greatest daredevil flyers of the day. His C- 1 2 3 K also had a history [see Appendix A, items H and 11.
It was originally an Air Force transport plane. Seal dubbed it "the Fat Lady." He had purchased it from Doan Helicopter, Inc., of Daytona Beach, to which it would eventually be returned; both transactions appear suspicious. The plane would later be serviced and financed by Southern Air Transport, a CIA front company. It is the same C- I 2 3K that was eventually shot down over Nicaragua in a doomed supply effort to the Contras that left an American, Eugene Hasenfus, a prisoner of the Sandinistas and revealed the CIA link to the Contras. The plane's two pilots died.
On the morning of that first particular flight, Seal had told Brown to drive to Mena Intermountain Regional Airport in a remote area near the Oklahoma border. It is a tiny facility, infrequently used, and interesting only for an exceedingly long runway, the kind used by large planes with transcontinental ranges. Brown had expected to find, he says, a Baron or a King Air, small, twin-engined planes in which he had some training as a pilot. He had accompanied the governor on such planes, throughout the state. Instead, he says, he found this "huge military plane" that was not actually a military plane.
It was dark, almost black, and had only the minimal tail markings necessary for civilian operation. The C-123K is a military transport with twin engines, and Seal's had a tailgate at the end of its fuselage capable of loading such cargo as a small automobile.
Inside the plane, according to Brown, were another pilot and two "beaners"-common laborers who looked like Central American Indians. Later Brown would come to know them as "kickers," for they "kicked" cargo from the plane. All were wearing jeans, tshirts, and sneakers. Seal, Brown says, had prescribed the dress code and insisted that no one carry identification, not even keys or jewelry. To Brown's surprise Seal even asked about his shoes. They had to be untraceable.
When Brown got on the plane, Seal's co-pilot was at its controls fiddling with gauges and making notes. Then Seal started the engines, and Brown remembers, "This fuckin', excuse me, I mean just thunderous noise. Scared the shit out of me just taking off." Brown says that when the plane took off, he was sitting on a bench behind the two pilots. The "kickers" were seated far to the back of "this shell of a plane" where there were pallets on casters. On the pallets were stacked crates, partially covered by a tarpaulin.
After it left Mena, the plane made a refueling stop-"Nobody got off," Brown says-and then resumed flight. The stop was at Stennis Airfield in Gulfport, Mississippi, an airfield frequently used by the DEA.4 Once back in the air Brown recalls, Seal startled him by yelling, "Well, you all hang on." The plane dropped to what Brown calls "an altitude a hell of a lot lower than what you'd think you'd fly." He suspected Seal was trying to evade radar. Soon, he says, they regained altitude, but then they descended again and "that's when these two crazy bastards get these pallets and roll them on casters."
Parachutes opened from the cargo on the pallets. Later Seal confirmed Brown's suspicions: the pallets carried M- 16s for the Contras. It is unclear whether they ever got to the Contras. Seal seems to have had equally cordial relations with the Cali Cartel and the Sandinistas. He proved to be a very unreliable government employee.
Approximately thirty minutes later, Brown says, the C-123K landed in what he later thought was Tegucigalpa, Honduras, though my investigations leave me doubtful that this was their Central American landing site. After landing, the plane was refueled. While Seal and the kickers went to collect Seal's duffel bags, Brown and the co-pilot, who never exchanged more than a few words, remained on board. Then, Brown says, Seal and the kickers returned, carrying four bags. Brown says he never saw the bags again.
Once back on the ground at Mena, Brown says, he told Seal he had anticipated flying in a plane similar to those that he had been on with the governor. Seal, he says, laughed, and told Brown that all he had wanted him to do was "sit back for the ride." Then he paid Brown for the flight, handing him an envelope with $2,500 in cash-"not marked money, not banded money, just twenties, fifties, mostly twenties, used money, like you just went out and spent."
When Brown returned to the Governor's Mansion after this first flight he recalls, Clinton greeted him jovially, "You having any fun yet?" Clinton had been asking him variations of that question since the previous spring when he began encouraging Brown to apply for a job with the CIA. Indeed, Clinton had taken an active role in helping Brown.
He told Brown he had acquaintances in the CIA who could expedite his application. As part of the application process, Brown had written an essay: "Marxist Influence in Central America." Three early drafts of the essay contain interpolations in Clinton's handwriting, the authenticity of which has been verified. Clinton also suggested that Brown study Russian, a suggestion Brown took seriously enough to be in attending night classes at the University 91 of Arkansas at Little Rock. He began making entries in his daybook in Cyrillic. Clinton, Brown believed, was familiar with the CIA.
He occasionally spoke of a college classmate who had ended up working there. The governor also talked as though he knew of ongoing operations nearby. "When I got back from that first trip he knew I had been out doing something," although Brown had not had a chance to tell Clinton "anything about it. That's when he said, 'You having any fun yet?"'
The CIA does not talk about these things, so we may never know whether Brown was actually a CIA employee or being deceived into thinking that he was. Whatever the case, he had good reason to believe that he was in the CIA's employ. It may also never be known for sure whether CIA officials approved or knew of Seal's activities.
Some facts, however, are indisputable. Entries in Brown's daybook indicate his flights. A month before his October flight the Southwest personnel representative for the CIA, Ken Cargile, in a letter to Brown, wrote that "I am pleased to nominate you for employment with the Central Intelligence Agency." Another entry in Brown's daybook indicates that he had met with another CIA representative only a few days before.
Brown has identified him as Dan Magruder and says that he spoke admiringly of Clinton. Magruder, Brown says, asked him if he would be interested in paramilitary, counterintelligence, and narcotics." Brown, who had worked in narcotics enforcement as a police officer, said he was interested. He then, he says, signed a secrecy agreement and was told he would be contacted further.
Finally, there was a very suggestive call that Governor Clinton made to Becky (McCoy) Brown after she married Brown. It came a half year after Brown's last flight. It was summer, and Becky had announced that she was leaving the mansion staff. Clinton was livid. In this call he insisted that she stay, and then he reminded her of the help he had given Brown in "getting into the CIA."
In Dallas, Magruder told Brown that a contact would be made after he returned to Arkansas. Next Cargile sent him his letter of nomination. Then Seal called him at home and set up a meeting at Cajun's Wharf, a popular Little Rock watering hole. Bill McKuen, former secretary of state of Arkansas, has told Danny Harkins, senior criminal investigator for the state of Arkansas, that he remembers seeing Seal and Brown together at Cajun's wharf in 1984. Seal, according to Brown, was familiar with the biographical information Brown had given the agency, thus reassuring Brown that he was the CIA contact Magruder had told him to expect. Seal was not, however, what Brown was expecting from the CIA.
Magruder had been a "clean cut Ivy League-looking guy." Seal was "a very distinctive guy. I mean, a nut, big guy. And you never forget this kind of guy. Robust, devil-may-care, kind of, you know, dangerous."
If Seal's appearance and demeanor were not what Brown had come to expect from the "Ivy League" CIA, his conversation was reassuring. Brown says he talked knowledgeably about airplanes and spoke of an "operation" he was planning. He also referred to Clinton, familiarly, as "the guy." He talked as though "the guy" knew all about the CIA operation going on in Arkansas. Brown theorizes that Seal "needed all the help he could get."
Trafficking in drugs, weapons, and currency often attracts unwanted attention. The more people around Clinton whom Seal might compromise, the less likely Clinton and other Arkansas authorities might be to sacrifice Seal in time of danger. Brown believes that this is why Seal eventually showed him that kilo of cocaine.
Also, Brown would have made an excellent lieutenant for Seal who was always in need of competent hands. Brown adds that, "the more people close to Clinton that he [Seal] could get working with him, the more comfortable he'd feel." When Seal was sentenced for drug dealing in 1985 and again in early 1986 his activities at Mena were never mentioned.
Brown's break with Clinton came after Brown made what he says was his second flight from Mena to Central America on or about December 24, 1984. Becky Brown remembers the date of the flight vividly. Her brother, Read, was dying, and she was surprised Brown left town. He and her brother had been close.
During that second flight two duffel bags were put on board the plane at what Seal identified as Tegucigalpa. Back at Mena, Brown says, he and Seal walked to Brown's car, a Datsun hatchback, and Seal put one of the duffel bags under the hatchback. Then both men got into the front seat of the car, and Seal reached back into the duffel bag, and pulled out a manila envelope with $2,500 in it.
He said the money had been brought back from Tegucigalpa. Brown considered this a currency violation. The next thing Seal pulled from his duffel bag was an even graver breach of the law, that kilo of cocaine.
That was it for Brown. He got upset. He says he feared he was being set up-made a conspirator in an operation he despised. He told Seal he wanted no part of what was happening; then he left.
When he returned to Little Rock, he called his brother Dwayne. Dwayne Brown says his brother seemed "terribly upset." Dwayne immediately drove over to the Governor's Mansion to meet him. Like Becky, Dwayne Brown says he knew his brother had made some unexplained trips out of the country. He suspected a CIA involvement, although his brother did not confirm it. But when he asked his brother,
"Who's pushing this?" his brother, Dwayne, Brown says, "nodded over toward the Governor's Mansion." From then on, until he left Clinton's security detail in June, Dwayne Brown says, his brother was in "a high level of despair." He says he feared his brother might be suicidal.(5)
Meanwhile, Brown confronted Clinton, asking him if he knew that Seal was dealing in drugs and unreported currency. That was when Clinton told him not to worry-"That's Lasater's deal. That's Lasater's deal." Lasater was well known to Brown. As early as 1982, his firm had been censured by Arkansas's security commissioner for cheating customers, which did not end or even impair his relationship with Clinton.
By 1984-the time of the Seal flights-Lasater was contributing to Clinton's political campaigns. He was also providing Clinton with the use of a private airplane and entertaining him at various places, including his New Mexico resort, Angel Fire.
He hired Clinton's brother, Roger, and helped him pay off a $20,000 cocaine debt. Later Roger was imprisoned for his dealings with a cocaine ring. As for Lasater, he was sentenced to two years in jail for dealings with the same ring and lost his state securities license. After six months in prison he got out on probation.
Eventually Clinton pardoned him, claiming that the pardon was necessary to enable Lasater to renew his hunting license.(6)
Clinton's relationship with Lasater was obviously risky. It might still prove to be criminal. When Lasater went to prison his operations were taken over by an associate, Patsy Thomasson. She was a politically active Arkansan whose employment with Lasater was to last nearly a decade, despite his problems with the law and with drugs. DEA documents in my possession show her flying with him on one of his private planes to Belize on February 8, I 984, where he was interested in buying a ranch that was a known drug trafficking point [see Appendix A, item G].
In I993 she joined the White House where she has served as White House director of the Office of Administration and later deputy director of Presidential Personnel. The night of Deputy White House Counsel Vince Foster's death she was one of the trusted Clinton aides who entered Foster's office to spirit away documents.
As for Lasater, by the mid- 1980s he had become involved in several shaky savings and loans, at least one of which, First American Savings & Loan of Oak Brook, Illinois, had its difficulties with Lasater negotiated by the bank's legal team of Vince Foster, Webster Hubbell, and Hillary Rodham Clinton of Little Rock's Rose Law Firm, much to Lasater's satisfaction.
Apparently the thrift was unaware of the relationship its own legal team enjoyed with Lasater. Though the thrift had sought millions, it ended up settling for $200,000.(7)
Drug trafficking was linked to Arkansas throughout the 1980s, occasionally to Clinton's friends and supporters. An investigator wrote in the minutes of a Resolution Trust Corporation meeting held on June 29, 1994, that Lasater "may have been establishing depository accounts at Madison and other financial institutions and laundering drug money through them via brokered deposits and bond issues.(8)
Among the "other financial institutions" Lasater has been linked to is the Arkansas Development Finance Authority created by Governor Clinton. In 1994 when Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy resigned owing to allegations that he was accepting gifts from the Arkansas poultry tycoon, Don Tyson, London's Sunday Telegraph published a story based on numerous state and federal police documents showing that Tyson was "under suspicion of drug dealing from the early 1970s until the late 1980s" by such diverse organizations as the Arkansas State Police and the DEA.(9) No charges were ever filed.
Still the most serious information on drug trafficking in Clinton's Arkansas has come from Brown. His revelations were first published in the American Spectator in the summer Of 1995, and though objected to by President Clinton they have never been disproved. After splitting with Clinton, Brown spent the next few years investigating white-collar crime for the Arkansas State Police. He says that he became increasingly interested in going public with his knowledge of the Mena operation, but that he was mindful of the secrecy document that he had signed.
Moreover, with officials at both the state and federal level involved, he did not know whom to tell. Eventually, it was the Clintons' heavy-handed incompetence in trying to control another damaging story involving Brown that led Brown to tell his story to me.
In the April-May 1994 issue of the American Spectator, Brown was quoted as saying that Lieutenant Governor Jim Guy Tucker had asked him and trooper Larry Patterson for compromising information on Clinton's private life in 1990. When Tucker became aware of Brown's revelation, he retaliated against Brown by demoting him from white-collar investigations to highway patrol. "I don't want to be getting any more reports from Brown" is the statement by Tucker that Colonel Tommy Goodwin, the former head of the Arkansas State Police, quoted in explaining the demotion to me in an interview.(10)
Brown believed the demotion to be illegal because he was at the time working on a case that could have implicated Tucker.
An indignant Brown began toying with the idea of exposing the corruption of Arkansas politics. About this time, the special prosecutor investigating Whitewater subpoenaed Brown to disclose what he knew about Clinton' connections to a Whitewater figure, David L. Hale. Clinton was supposed to have pressured Hale, the head of an Arkansas lending agency, into making illegal loans to Susan McDougal, the Clintons' Whitewater real estate partner.
Brown's subpoena convinced him that "everything is going to come out." Nonetheless, he still seemed reluctant to disclose all he knew. The irony is that he might have remained silent about Mena had not Clinton's imprudent intervention provoked Brown into coming out into the open.
In the fall of 1994 ABC News interviewed Brown, principally about Hale. But the White House panicked, assuming that the interview was about Mena. And Clinton set out to malign Brown. White House officials, as well as Clinton's lawyer, David Kendall, who according to Time was "working very, very hard to keep Whitewater out of the headlines," (11) approached ABC with numerous false allegations against Brown.
Meanwhile, Betsey Wright, a Clinton political fixer and his former chief of staff, told ABC that Brown was a "pathological liar," even though his personnel file in Arkansas abounded with recommendations-some from Clinton and even one from Dr. Joycelyn Elders. ABC was also told that Brown had failed a psychological test. Goodwin assured me and ABC that Brown had passed it.(12) But of the charges leveled at Brown by the White House, the most unintentionally revealing was that Brown had flunked a CIA examination in the mid-1980s.
That charge could only have come from the man--then-Governor Clinton-- who knew that his former bodyguard had had dealings with the CIA a decade before.
An ABC producer told me at the time that "Brown is telling the truth. You can trust him." Nonetheless the network apparently yielded to White House pressure. The interview with Brown, in which he had spoken mostly about Hale and not about Mena, was killed. Brown's patience was now strained beyond endurance. He decided to talk to me about Mena.
Clinton's position has always been that he knew nothing substantial about Mena and that the "state really had next to nothing to do with it.... We had nothing-zero-to do with it, and everybody who's ever looked into it knows that."(13) Brown says he is lying. His daybook records one visit to Mena by Clinton on May 21, 1984, and he says that he accompanied Clinton to Mena on several other occasions.
Clinton claimed in a rare reference to Mena late in the 1980s that he was unaware of any problem at Mena until 1988. But a 1991 deposition by Betsey Wright reveals that the governor's office had in the early 1980s received repeated calls about drug trafficking there. In fact, in 1991 Governor Clinton revealed that a state police investigation had discovered drug "linkages to the federal government." He mentioned the CIA.(14)
Given the remoteness of Mena it is curious that the governor would be showing up there so frequently in the mid- 1980s. The airport is small and handles little traffic. The town itself is sleepy and extremely rural. Its voter turnout is, perhaps, the lowest in the state. Clinton could not have been stopping by the airport for political purposes. Since Clinton's election as president, moreover, others have come forward to implicate him in Mena. Arkansas State Trooper Bobby Walker has told me that "sometime in the mid1980s" he was at Mena with Clinton.
Walker said a "huge darkgreen military plane" was parked there and that when he expressed surprise at seeing a military plane at Mena, Clinton said it was not military; it served another purpose.
In March 1995, in a legally binding deposition, Trooper Larry Patterson also said that Clinton knew about Mena. Patterson said he had overheard conversations about "large quantities of drugs being flown into Mena airport, large quantities of guns, that there was an ongoing operation training foreign people in the area." When asked, "Were any of these conversations in the presence of Governor Bill Clinton?" he replied: "Yes, sir."
Patterson was being deposed in a legal suit filed against Buddy Young, the former head of Clinton's security detail, by Terry Reed, who says he trained Contra pilots, under Seal's supervision, at Nella, Arkansas.
In another deposition in the case, John Bender, a mechanic, says he saw Clinton at Mena three times in the summer of 1985. There were no local dignitaries present, Bender says, and Clinton did not seem to be taking part in any official function. Bender says that Clinton arrived in a Beech aircraft and was still there when Bender left for the day. Clinton's stays lasted for hours.
During his deposition Bender was shown a photograph of Buddy Young. He identified him as "Captain Buddy Young-that little beady-faced fellow," and said that Young was with Clinton at Mena. Young has since been made head of the Federal Emergency Management Administration in Denton, Texas. In another deposition in the Reed case, Russell Welch, an Arkansas state police investigator who has investigated Mena extensively, says that Young asked him in 1992 if Clinton's name had ever come up in connection with Mena.
Welch said it had not, but Young's concern is intriguing.
At this juncture, no one, including Brown, can say precisely what Clinton was doing at Mena. Brown's role, after all, was quite limited. In early 1985, after Brown told Seal-and Clinton-that he would no longer take part in the drug flights, Seal contacted Brown again. Encouraging Brown to continue working with him, Seal said, "There's good money to be had."
But Brown said he was out of that game for good. Brown was not going to have anything to do with drug shipments. He was not, however, done with the CIA.
In January 1985 while Brown was on duty at the Governor's Mansion he was paid a visit by a man he believed to be another contract employee of the CIA, Felix Rodriguez, alias Max Gomez. Before visiting Brown at the mansion, Rodriguez telephoned Brown while he was on duty there. Later he drove over, entering through the compound's back gate. His familiarity with the place surprised Brown.
In the following months Brown concluded that Rodriguez must have known Clinton and was in continuing contact with him. Eventually Clinton made it clear to Brown that he knew Rodriguez. On the occasion of this first meeting with Brown it seems that Rodriguezs mission was to placate Brown. He wanted Brown to work with him on clandestine operations, but he wanted to reassure Brown that no more "monkeying around with Seal would be involved." At Rodriguezs mention of Seal, Brown explained, "I have had some bad experiences." Rodriguez responded, "Don't worry about Barry....
We're going to take care of that." He also told Brown he would "take care of things" with Clinton. Apparently he did. Clinton never talked to Brown about Mena or Lasater again.
Rodriguez said he was beginning a new operation and wanted Brown with him. Aware of how Seal's drug trafficking had compromised him, Brown was uneasy. Rodriguez attempted to propitiate him. He offered to get Brown another meeting with Magruder. Rodriguez talked of his friendship with two men Brown admired from his training days in narcotics work, Nick Navarro and Raul Diaz.
The combination of Rodriguezs persuasiveness, Brown's continuing interest in a career in intelligence work, and the prospect of earning $1,000 for each mission convinced Brown to join Rodriguez in his new operation. It involved guarding the transshipment of weapons from the Caribbean to Central America'. From what he saw on these missions Brown believed the shipments included AK-47s and explosives meant for the Contras.
The missions took place in 1985. During that year Brown's contact with Rodriguez was sporadic and by telephone. But Brown was confident that Rodriguez was his CIA contact. His confidence was bolstered when Rodriguez suggested they enroll Brown in a medical school in Montserrat. The purpose, Brown thought, was to establish cover for his further intelligence operations. Rodriguez also talked with Brown about
Seal, saying Seal had gotten "out of hand." On one occasion Brown expressed apprehensions to Rodriguez about Seal's co-pilot on their flights out of Mena. Brown feared exposure. Rodriguez responded, "Don't worry about it. We're going to take care of him. We're going to take care of all of it." Brown did not know the pilot's identity or his whereabouts, but in 1986, on February ig, Seal was shot dead as he entered a halfway house in Louisiana. Three Colombians eventually were arrested and convicted of the murder.
The Louisiana attorney general has estimated to the Justice Department that Seal had "smuggled between $3 billion and $5 billion in drugs into the U.S."
In May of 1986, after Seal's death, Brown got another call from
Rodriguez. "You hear about our man?" he asked. Brown had indeed heard of Seal's murder in Baton Rouge. "Well, we know who was flying in the second seat." Brown interpreted this remark to mean, "It's like we're going to eliminate everybody." Brown went on to relate that Rodriguez "talked about Clinton... and gave me the impression they were going to do something to his ass."
His impression from this conversation with Rodriguez was that Rodriguez's employer had been embarrassed by the drug trafficking that Seal and perhaps Clinton had mixed into the Mena resupply operations. Now they were going to kill "anybody that apparently had anything to do with what happened over at Mena." Brown began to fear for Clinton's life-though critical of Clinton's character and reckless improprieties, Brown obviously still harbored affecdon for his friend from the exciting days of the early 1980s.
After Rodriguezs May telephone call, he sent Brown a manual for a light automatic rifle, a Belgian-made F.A.L. Brown still has the manual. The official title of the gun as referred to in the manual is "FN Light Automatic Rifle, caliber 7.62mm. NATO." The gun is usually known as the "F.A.L." Rodriguez told Brown to fly to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, where he would carry out a plan to kill the man he was led to believe was Seal's co-pilot.
With his wife, Becky, to serve as cover Brown flew to Puerto Vallarta on June 18, 1986, on American Airlines flights 537 and 535 [see Appendix A, item E]. A guard standing by the guard house of the port's naval installation gave Brown the F.A.L. It was disassembled in a straw bag which explains why Rodriguez sent Brown the manual.
Using the alias Michael Johnson, a name he had used in undercover work in Arkansas, Brown was to proceed to the Hotel Playa Conchas Chinas on the morning of June 21. There he was to identify himself as Johnson to the hotel clerk and give him $50. The clerk would direct him to his target. All went according to plan until the clerk pointed out Brown's prospective victim.
The victim did not look at all like Seal's co-pilot. Brown left the hotel, ditched the gun, and flew back on American Airlines flights 292 and 512. The man he had been set up to kill was, according to Rodriguez, Terry Reed, the very same man Seal had been working with in training the Contras and the man who in 1991 was to file the aforementioned lawsuit against Buddy Young alleging that Young had "manufactured, altered, tampered with and/or removed evidence, all in the pursuit of advancing a wrongful criminal indictment."
Reed believes that Young, the head of Governor Bill Clinton's security detail, set him up in 1987 to be killed. Young has admitted to authoring a national police profile saying that Reed was armed and dangerous and known to use a concealed weapon.
Brown did not know anything about Reed until 1995. Upon returning to Little Rock he received a call from Rodriguez who wanted to arrange an appointment. Rodriguez was en route to Washington but would fly down to Little Rock on his way home. Brown said no. He wanted nothing more to do with Rodriguez.
These last revelations of Brown's are now documented. His airplane tickets were purchased in late May. I have photocopies of them in my files. The date of purchase is May 27. I have seen the F.A.L. manual. Copies of Brown's map from Puerto Vallarta and copies of documents in which the Arkansas State Revenue Department lists Brown's alias, Michael Johnson, are also in my possession. Brown had used that alias in undercover police work and had an Arkansas driver's license under that name.
Reed too has inadvertently provided evidence supporting Brown's revelations. Without knowing anything about Brown, Reed wrote a book chronicling his misadventures with the CIA and with Arkansas officials while training Contras. The book implicates Clinton in Mena and places Reed in Puerto Vallarta. Oblivious of the fate that was awaiting him at the Hotel Playa Conchas Chinas, Reed reports that he was told to be at the hotel on June 21 to meet his new CIA handler. The man who ordered him there was Felix Rodriguez, known to Reed as Maximo Gomez.
Rodriguez somewhat imprudently has also written a book about his life, Shadow Warrior. In it he mentions Navarro and Diaz, saying he knew them as investigators in south Florida. He mentions traveling to Washington, at precisely the time Brown says he traveled there, June 1986. On June 25 he met with Ollie North. Of course, North was the National Security Council aide engaged in resupplying the Contras. (15), (16)
Brown has two more revelations. Though he left the govemor's security detail in June 1985, he obviously continued to have numerous encounters with Clinton. Just before he went down to Puerto Vallarta thinking he was being sent by the CIA to kill one of the last living figures associated with Mena, he told Clinton what their acquaintance Rodriguez had put him up to.
According to Brown, he encountered Clinton, probably at the Capitol, and told him, "I'm going to take care of that problem in Mexico." Clinton acted as though he were aware of the mission, saying, "Oh, that's good, that's good, L.D." Looking back on that exchange, Brown believes Clinton also knew the identity of Brown's quarry, Reed.
Brown's second revelation is that during the Iran-Contra hearings he discovered the real identity of Dan Magruder, the CIA official whom he met in Dallas on August 30, 1984, and whose name Rodriguez invoked in persuading Brown to undertake their Caribbean operation.
Brown says he was actually Donald P. Gregg, at the time Vice President George Bush's national security adviser. Brown explains that he became aware of Magruder's real identity during the television coverage of Iran-Contra. The Donald Gregg appearing on screen and being accused of associating with one Felix Rodriguez in the Contra resupply operation looked and sounded to Brown like Dan Magruder.
Corroborating evidence that Gregg was involved with arming the Contras has been mounting for years. The stories began when Iran-Contra broke. They continued when Gregg's nomination as ambassador to South Korea came before the Senate early in the Bush presidency. Of particular interest during those hearings was Gregg's relationship with a CIA operative long famed for his daring anticommunist operations, Rodriguez. Gregg did not deny their friendship.(17)
The Magruder whom Brown met in Dallas talked of his prior service in and extensive knowledge of Korea [see Appendix A, item D]. He told Brown that he was an "Asian expert." Gregg, it turns Out, was CIA station chief in Seoul in the 1970s. Now two intelligence agents have come forward and confirmed that Gregg used the name Magruder while assisting in arming the Contras in the early 1980s in Florida and California.
Finally, remember Clinton's remark after Brown's last flight with Seal, "and your buddy Bush knows all about it." Were Clinton and Bush both politically exposed on Mena? This might explain one of the mysteries of the 1992 campaign, the mildness of the famously competitive George Bush and his refusal to attack Clinton where the challenger was most vulnerable-character. Some political observers have speculated that Bush's Graves' disease explains his listless campaign.
Others have claimed that Bush lost his relish for political life.
An alternative explanation might be that both men had a tacit agreement not to get personal, owing to their exposure on Mena. But there is no evidence that Bush or one of his financial supporters was involved in drug trafficking at Mena. Clearly Clinton had more to fear from Mena than Bush, which suggests a tantalizing detail: Might Clinton have hoodwinked Bush into a tacit agreement that lost Bush the election?
Looking back on his years of service with Clinton, Brown recalls contacts between the two men that, given the Clintons' remoteness from Washington, were unusually frequent and cordial. Bush and Reagan were hated by Hillary, Brown says, but not by Clinton.
When Brown's revelations about Mena were published in the American Spectator in the summer of 1995 they met with mixed reaction. The Wall Street Journal's lead editorial pronounced: "Mena cries out for investigation. A congressional committee with resources, subpoena power and the perseverance displayed by some past chairmen should look into this. If some chips fall on the Republican side, so be it. Important questions need to be answered."(18)
Other Journalists for the most part ignored the story though they had previously vowed that if a Clinton bodyguard ever came forward with claims of serious wrongdoing by Clinton, as opposed to mere adultery and satyriasis, they would investigate to the utmost.
Finally, there was a handful of journalists who set out to expose Brown as a fraud. I have in my files a cocky letter from one on the letterhead of a major news organization ridiculing Brown's assertions about flying with Seal and, incidentally, erroneously observing that Seal died in January rather than February.
That Brown's story stands unimpeached must give him great satisfaction. For over a decade he had lived in fear. He feared that his flights with Seal implicated him in a conspiracy to import cocaine. As people whom he had known at Mena disappeared or died violently he began to fear for his life. And as mentioned a few paragraphs back, he even feared for Clinton's life.
While I was encouraging Brown to reveal his story to me and later while I was encouraging him to go public with it, I never quite understood the intensity of these fears until he revealed to me his dealings with Rodriguez.
In my journalistic life I have not had to deal with many desperate men. Documents revealing drug dealing, gun running, intelligence gathering cloak-and-dagger operations, and ultimately murder do not make amusing reading. As I have mentioned earlier, we might never know for sure what took place at Mena or who the principal players were.
Yet there is a serious policy issue involved when government intelligence services link up with unsavory types and lose control of their operation. Further research into Mena leads me to believe that Seal's drug dealing might have been going on independent of and perhaps even unknown to the CIA.
In fact it is possible that the CIAs dealings with him were not terribly close and that the guns that he dropped were going to the Sandinistas rather than the Contras, or perhaps even to Colombian drug tycoons. Possibly Rodriguez was not even working that closely with the CIA but with others, for instance with North and Gregg, who had really lost control of their operation.
I have gathered information that sketches several agencies working with varying degrees of responsibility at Mena. In the early 1980s it appears that to avoid prosecution for international drug trafficking, Seal approached the Drug Enforcement Administration, offering to serve as an informant. The DEA eventually used him on three counternarcotics operations.
Through a government register, the National Source Register, our intelligence agencies became aware of him. They knew of his easy aerial access to Central and South America. By 1983 Washington had become concerned about the possible presence of Soviet-made missiles in Nicaragua and even the possibility that the Soviet Union might have nuclear weapons there.
The National Security Agency (NSA), which monitors such foreign activity, needed low-flying airborne platforms like Seal's drug flights on which to place the sophisticated devices that would detect nuclear weapons in a place such as Nicaragua.
The CIA recruited Seal to undertake these flights. The CIA provided the front for dealing with Seal while the NSA equipped Seal's C- 123K with the required gadgetry. The plane was equipped with very sophisticated Nuclear Detection Devices manufactured by EG&G in Las Vegas, a highly classified Department of Defense contractor.
The NSA fabricated a TOP SECRET specially compartmented program for all electronic collection directed against the Sandinista government. The program was called "RAPPORT." When I filed a Freedom of Information request to the Pentagon it went immediately to NSA without any urging from me.
Owing to Seal's status as a CIA asset, Customs and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) could allow Seal to leave and enter the country without inspection. For security reasons the NSA barred Customs from inspecting Seal's plane. He was free to return from his flights south with small duffel bags of drugs. All the NSA wanted was its intelligence data tapes. Seal duped all these government agencies until someone put an end to his duplicity.
But to return to Brown's revelations about Clinton at Mena.
One might wonder why the governor of Arkansas would want one of his top security guards on the Mena flights. The answer seems obvious to anyone who has studied Clinton's behavior. Were the Mena operation exposed, Clinton could claim that he had a top state trooper with experience in narcotics investigations flying surveillance.
When Brown's story was published in the August 1995 issue of the American Spectator I was unable to get an official White House response. More surprising was the silence of all major news organization except for the Wall Street journal and the Arkansas Democrat Gazette. For years journalists, most notably on the Left, had been on to Mena. Now a conservative was validating at least some of what the Left had suspected. As for Brown, major news organizations had been after him for months, suspecting that he knew something portentous about Mena.
Once the story broke their calls to him petered out. Unlike the aftermath of the troopers' revelations about Clinton's sex life, when he found himself peppered with journalists' inquiries day after day, the president never had to face similar inquiries from the press about this far more serious matter.
Thus one can imagine my delight on the evening of July 17, a week after publication of the August Spectator, when the president entered the dining room of Washington's Jockey Club. I was seated a few feet away with my fourteen-year-old daughter, Annie, and her young friend, Zana Arafat. Finally I would get the official White House response to the L. D. Brown story and from the White House's top official-all in the comfort of Washington's finest eatery.
The president proceeded to a table in the back of the restaurant where fifteen old friends greeted him. Upon meticulous reflection and with the principia of Miss Manners in mind I asked the maitre d' to tell the president that "Mr. Tyrrell of the American Spectator" would like to send over a bottle of champagne.
The Secret Service, of course, had to be consulted, but apparently the president was pleased. A beaming maitre d' returned to tell me that "President Clinton" would like to thank me after my meal, but, she advised, there were fifteen people in the president's party. "Two bottles," I insisted. My generosity is the stuff of legends.
Frankly I was rather surprised by the president's response. Since late 1993 when the American Spectator's Troopergate stories began detailing the scortatory side of Clinton's life, I had personally overseen an investigative team of journalists that both in Arkansas and Washington had turned up reports of conflicts of interest and abuse of power (for instance, David Brock's piece on Travelgate), and campaign irregularities, such as using "walking around money" to buy votes and filing false financial papers. We had reported real estate shenanigans, banking scams, and sharp tax filings that revealed the Clintons taking deductions on such piffles as the president's underwear.
Yet I should not have been all that surprised. For over two years I had been doing research on the Clintons for this book.
Clinton is a very reckless man, and he has many quirks, one of which makes him a tireless schmoozer. Down in Arkansas it was known that if there was one person at a party who, he felt, disliked him he would spend the entire party heaving himself at the skeptic. The evening of July 17, 1995 was my turn.
As we were almost finished with our meal when I sent over the champagne, I soon notified the maitre d' that we were ready to accept the president's gratitude. Past a wall of security and through a corridor of flunkies we were lead. The Clintons were seated at one long table with their guests and fifteen tiny servings of champagne. Large and amiable, the president rose from his chair to greet us. He was all smiles; Mrs. Clinton, seated across from him, was less joyous.
"And so we meet," I said. He joked, shook my hand, and immediately turned the charm on my daughter and Zana. He asked the girls their ages. He spoke of Chelsea's- summer camp. Out of the corner of my eye I espied an increasingly uneasy Hillary.
Time might be running out. Her eyes put me in mind of a snake about to strike.
Quickly I made my move for the White House's official response to the L. D. Brown-Mena story. Reminding the president of my respect for the Clintons' characteristically 1960s trait of "talking and talking" and debating every issue, I briskly addressed the issue of the moment. "What did you think of the L. D. Brown story?" I asked.
He reddened. He ignited.
He denied that he had read the piece. He said I should be "ashamed" of publishing it. "Lies, lies," he intoned indignantly. The flunkies stiffened. The president's next charges were curiously familiar. He called Brown a "pathological liar" who had tried to destroy his own family. Those were precisely the lines that the White House's operatives had employed months before against Brown to kill ABCs interview with him.
I replied that the president's hometown paper, the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, had just described Brown as a very credible witness who had never yet been caught in a lie. The president began reiterating his charges. I mentioned that it seemed to me he had read our piece. He continued with his charges and showed no sign of breaking off what was becoming an increasingly uncomfortable conversation.
Surely, I thought, he will wheel on me and, as the sophisticates say, "cut" me. But, no, he continued to sputter and to whine.
This too was what Arkansans had told me to expect. There stood this large man surrounded by bodyguards. His presence, however, was completely without force. The president was angry. His voice was labored. Yet this was anger without force.
What came to mind was not the anger of a statesman, but rather Tinkerbell in a snit. I made my conges. Mrs. Clinton might join in, and I would be guilty of having placed young girls in harm's way.
The next day, when the press began inquiring about my presidential summit at the Jockey Club, I pooh-poohed the whole thing.
Tim Watters, the leading impersonator of Bill Clinton, was a friend of mine. I insisted that it was Watters whom I had encountered the night before. Surely the president of the United States does not accept champagne in a restaurant. The man I had met was an impostor, but a pretty good one.
By R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.
Regnery Publishing Inc.Washington D.C.
ARKANSAS STATE TROOPER L. D. Brown had just returned from a mission flown to Central America from Arkansas's Mena Airport in late December 1984. The flight was commanded by pilot Barry Seal, an operative with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and a contract employee with the Central Intelligence Agency.
Seal was also a legendary drug smuggler, known for having flown hundreds of drug-smuggling flights between 1977 and 1983 at low altitude and in complete darkness. (1)
Now, supposedly, he had gone straight. After parachuting arms into the jungle, Seal landed at a sleepy Central American airport. He picked up two duffel bags and flew back to Arkansas. Brown, seated behind him throughout the flight, was moonlighting as a CIA contract employee [see Appendix A, items A, B, and C]. His boss, Governor Bill Clinton, had encouraged and assisted him in his employment at the CIA.
Under the assumption that he was being trained for clandestine operations on this flight, Brown was following Seal's instructions. He was merely an observer, studying the activities of Seal and his crew.
But during this, his most recent flight, what Brown, a seasoned narcotics investigator, was to learn troubled him deeply. Seal was bringing drugs and money back in the duffel bags. Consequently, as soon as Brown returned to Little Rock he approached Clinton and asked, "Do you know what they're bringing back on those planes?" Clinton froze. "They're bringing back coke," Brown told him. In fact "they" were trafficking in cocaine, money, and arms, Clinton's response was blase.
He told Brown not to worry, adding "That's Lasater's deal. That's Lasater's deal.(2)
At the time Dan Lasater, an Arkansas "bond daddy" known for his wide-open parties, was a major Clinton supporter. Clinton's occasional attendance at Lasater's parties had presented his bodyguard, Brown, with problems; in addition to young girls, the parties also included plenty of cocaine.
Brown is unclear as to the rest of Clinton's reply. It was either "And your buddy Bush knows all about it," or "And your hero Bush knows about it." Brown admired President George Bush, having met him in Portland, Maine, while traveling with the governor. After that meeting the two Arkansans visited with the president at his Kennebunkport compound.
Clinton's references to Bush and Lasater added confusion to Brown's anger. Brown was angry after this last flight when Seat showed him cocaine and money that he had just flown into the country. Brown feared that he, a member of the governor's security, was being set up to be blackmailed. Now upon finding out that Clinton knew about the operation, the trooper felt betrayed and a bit stupid. He says that the moment he saw the drugs Lasater's involvement should have "dawned" on him. "I'd never seen the governor around coke," Brown says, "unless he was around Lasater." At Lasater's parties Brown would hustle the governor away when the drugs came out.
Though he had seen Clinton "stoned" he had never actually seen him using drugs. Others have, namely two of Clinton's lovers, Sally Perdue and Gennifer Flowers. Both have attested to Clinton's drug use during assignations.
Feeling angry, betrayed, and played for a fool, Brown left the governor and proceeded directly to a cottage on the mansion grounds where Becky McCoy, his future wife, lived. Listed on the mansion's payroll as a "courier," she was actually Chelsea's nanny. Eleven years after that day Becky remembers Brown's arriving in tears and complaining, "I've been betrayed.(3)
Over the next few months Brown would seek another assignment with the state troopers, but it would take him more than a decade to sort out his involvement and possible culpability as the governor's man on the Mena airport flights.
At the time, 1984, Brown was twenty-eight years old. He was not only Clinton's favorite bodyguard, but also a close friend. The other troopers called him Clinton's "fair-haired boy." He and Clinton shared an interest in books, ideas, and night life.
Brown still has books that Clinton gave him, one being a bar exam study book in which the politician made some ironic underlinings. One passage discussed the deductibility of charitable donations, and another the length of residency required in Washington before tax liability is incurred. Like Clinton, Brown passed through a radical stage when he attended the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville. Indeed, when Clinton was a law professor in Fayetteville, Brown was working on an off-campus magazine, the radical Grapevine.
In the autumn of i984, Brown made his first flight with Seal. It was on October 23 or very close to that date, and Brown found himself seated on a bench inside a cavernous C- 123 K cargo plane roaring over a Central American jungle. Seal, who piloted the plane, was one of the greatest daredevil flyers of the day. His C- 1 2 3 K also had a history [see Appendix A, items H and 11.
It was originally an Air Force transport plane. Seal dubbed it "the Fat Lady." He had purchased it from Doan Helicopter, Inc., of Daytona Beach, to which it would eventually be returned; both transactions appear suspicious. The plane would later be serviced and financed by Southern Air Transport, a CIA front company. It is the same C- I 2 3K that was eventually shot down over Nicaragua in a doomed supply effort to the Contras that left an American, Eugene Hasenfus, a prisoner of the Sandinistas and revealed the CIA link to the Contras. The plane's two pilots died.
On the morning of that first particular flight, Seal had told Brown to drive to Mena Intermountain Regional Airport in a remote area near the Oklahoma border. It is a tiny facility, infrequently used, and interesting only for an exceedingly long runway, the kind used by large planes with transcontinental ranges. Brown had expected to find, he says, a Baron or a King Air, small, twin-engined planes in which he had some training as a pilot. He had accompanied the governor on such planes, throughout the state. Instead, he says, he found this "huge military plane" that was not actually a military plane.
It was dark, almost black, and had only the minimal tail markings necessary for civilian operation. The C-123K is a military transport with twin engines, and Seal's had a tailgate at the end of its fuselage capable of loading such cargo as a small automobile.
Inside the plane, according to Brown, were another pilot and two "beaners"-common laborers who looked like Central American Indians. Later Brown would come to know them as "kickers," for they "kicked" cargo from the plane. All were wearing jeans, tshirts, and sneakers. Seal, Brown says, had prescribed the dress code and insisted that no one carry identification, not even keys or jewelry. To Brown's surprise Seal even asked about his shoes. They had to be untraceable.
When Brown got on the plane, Seal's co-pilot was at its controls fiddling with gauges and making notes. Then Seal started the engines, and Brown remembers, "This fuckin', excuse me, I mean just thunderous noise. Scared the shit out of me just taking off." Brown says that when the plane took off, he was sitting on a bench behind the two pilots. The "kickers" were seated far to the back of "this shell of a plane" where there were pallets on casters. On the pallets were stacked crates, partially covered by a tarpaulin.
After it left Mena, the plane made a refueling stop-"Nobody got off," Brown says-and then resumed flight. The stop was at Stennis Airfield in Gulfport, Mississippi, an airfield frequently used by the DEA.4 Once back in the air Brown recalls, Seal startled him by yelling, "Well, you all hang on." The plane dropped to what Brown calls "an altitude a hell of a lot lower than what you'd think you'd fly." He suspected Seal was trying to evade radar. Soon, he says, they regained altitude, but then they descended again and "that's when these two crazy bastards get these pallets and roll them on casters."
Parachutes opened from the cargo on the pallets. Later Seal confirmed Brown's suspicions: the pallets carried M- 16s for the Contras. It is unclear whether they ever got to the Contras. Seal seems to have had equally cordial relations with the Cali Cartel and the Sandinistas. He proved to be a very unreliable government employee.
Approximately thirty minutes later, Brown says, the C-123K landed in what he later thought was Tegucigalpa, Honduras, though my investigations leave me doubtful that this was their Central American landing site. After landing, the plane was refueled. While Seal and the kickers went to collect Seal's duffel bags, Brown and the co-pilot, who never exchanged more than a few words, remained on board. Then, Brown says, Seal and the kickers returned, carrying four bags. Brown says he never saw the bags again.
Once back on the ground at Mena, Brown says, he told Seal he had anticipated flying in a plane similar to those that he had been on with the governor. Seal, he says, laughed, and told Brown that all he had wanted him to do was "sit back for the ride." Then he paid Brown for the flight, handing him an envelope with $2,500 in cash-"not marked money, not banded money, just twenties, fifties, mostly twenties, used money, like you just went out and spent."
When Brown returned to the Governor's Mansion after this first flight he recalls, Clinton greeted him jovially, "You having any fun yet?" Clinton had been asking him variations of that question since the previous spring when he began encouraging Brown to apply for a job with the CIA. Indeed, Clinton had taken an active role in helping Brown.
He told Brown he had acquaintances in the CIA who could expedite his application. As part of the application process, Brown had written an essay: "Marxist Influence in Central America." Three early drafts of the essay contain interpolations in Clinton's handwriting, the authenticity of which has been verified. Clinton also suggested that Brown study Russian, a suggestion Brown took seriously enough to be in attending night classes at the University 91 of Arkansas at Little Rock. He began making entries in his daybook in Cyrillic. Clinton, Brown believed, was familiar with the CIA.
He occasionally spoke of a college classmate who had ended up working there. The governor also talked as though he knew of ongoing operations nearby. "When I got back from that first trip he knew I had been out doing something," although Brown had not had a chance to tell Clinton "anything about it. That's when he said, 'You having any fun yet?"'
The CIA does not talk about these things, so we may never know whether Brown was actually a CIA employee or being deceived into thinking that he was. Whatever the case, he had good reason to believe that he was in the CIA's employ. It may also never be known for sure whether CIA officials approved or knew of Seal's activities.
Some facts, however, are indisputable. Entries in Brown's daybook indicate his flights. A month before his October flight the Southwest personnel representative for the CIA, Ken Cargile, in a letter to Brown, wrote that "I am pleased to nominate you for employment with the Central Intelligence Agency." Another entry in Brown's daybook indicates that he had met with another CIA representative only a few days before.
Brown has identified him as Dan Magruder and says that he spoke admiringly of Clinton. Magruder, Brown says, asked him if he would be interested in paramilitary, counterintelligence, and narcotics." Brown, who had worked in narcotics enforcement as a police officer, said he was interested. He then, he says, signed a secrecy agreement and was told he would be contacted further.
Finally, there was a very suggestive call that Governor Clinton made to Becky (McCoy) Brown after she married Brown. It came a half year after Brown's last flight. It was summer, and Becky had announced that she was leaving the mansion staff. Clinton was livid. In this call he insisted that she stay, and then he reminded her of the help he had given Brown in "getting into the CIA."
In Dallas, Magruder told Brown that a contact would be made after he returned to Arkansas. Next Cargile sent him his letter of nomination. Then Seal called him at home and set up a meeting at Cajun's Wharf, a popular Little Rock watering hole. Bill McKuen, former secretary of state of Arkansas, has told Danny Harkins, senior criminal investigator for the state of Arkansas, that he remembers seeing Seal and Brown together at Cajun's wharf in 1984. Seal, according to Brown, was familiar with the biographical information Brown had given the agency, thus reassuring Brown that he was the CIA contact Magruder had told him to expect. Seal was not, however, what Brown was expecting from the CIA.
Magruder had been a "clean cut Ivy League-looking guy." Seal was "a very distinctive guy. I mean, a nut, big guy. And you never forget this kind of guy. Robust, devil-may-care, kind of, you know, dangerous."
If Seal's appearance and demeanor were not what Brown had come to expect from the "Ivy League" CIA, his conversation was reassuring. Brown says he talked knowledgeably about airplanes and spoke of an "operation" he was planning. He also referred to Clinton, familiarly, as "the guy." He talked as though "the guy" knew all about the CIA operation going on in Arkansas. Brown theorizes that Seal "needed all the help he could get."
Trafficking in drugs, weapons, and currency often attracts unwanted attention. The more people around Clinton whom Seal might compromise, the less likely Clinton and other Arkansas authorities might be to sacrifice Seal in time of danger. Brown believes that this is why Seal eventually showed him that kilo of cocaine.
Also, Brown would have made an excellent lieutenant for Seal who was always in need of competent hands. Brown adds that, "the more people close to Clinton that he [Seal] could get working with him, the more comfortable he'd feel." When Seal was sentenced for drug dealing in 1985 and again in early 1986 his activities at Mena were never mentioned.
Brown's break with Clinton came after Brown made what he says was his second flight from Mena to Central America on or about December 24, 1984. Becky Brown remembers the date of the flight vividly. Her brother, Read, was dying, and she was surprised Brown left town. He and her brother had been close.
During that second flight two duffel bags were put on board the plane at what Seal identified as Tegucigalpa. Back at Mena, Brown says, he and Seal walked to Brown's car, a Datsun hatchback, and Seal put one of the duffel bags under the hatchback. Then both men got into the front seat of the car, and Seal reached back into the duffel bag, and pulled out a manila envelope with $2,500 in it.
He said the money had been brought back from Tegucigalpa. Brown considered this a currency violation. The next thing Seal pulled from his duffel bag was an even graver breach of the law, that kilo of cocaine.
That was it for Brown. He got upset. He says he feared he was being set up-made a conspirator in an operation he despised. He told Seal he wanted no part of what was happening; then he left.
When he returned to Little Rock, he called his brother Dwayne. Dwayne Brown says his brother seemed "terribly upset." Dwayne immediately drove over to the Governor's Mansion to meet him. Like Becky, Dwayne Brown says he knew his brother had made some unexplained trips out of the country. He suspected a CIA involvement, although his brother did not confirm it. But when he asked his brother,
"Who's pushing this?" his brother, Dwayne, Brown says, "nodded over toward the Governor's Mansion." From then on, until he left Clinton's security detail in June, Dwayne Brown says, his brother was in "a high level of despair." He says he feared his brother might be suicidal.(5)
Meanwhile, Brown confronted Clinton, asking him if he knew that Seal was dealing in drugs and unreported currency. That was when Clinton told him not to worry-"That's Lasater's deal. That's Lasater's deal." Lasater was well known to Brown. As early as 1982, his firm had been censured by Arkansas's security commissioner for cheating customers, which did not end or even impair his relationship with Clinton.
By 1984-the time of the Seal flights-Lasater was contributing to Clinton's political campaigns. He was also providing Clinton with the use of a private airplane and entertaining him at various places, including his New Mexico resort, Angel Fire.
He hired Clinton's brother, Roger, and helped him pay off a $20,000 cocaine debt. Later Roger was imprisoned for his dealings with a cocaine ring. As for Lasater, he was sentenced to two years in jail for dealings with the same ring and lost his state securities license. After six months in prison he got out on probation.
Eventually Clinton pardoned him, claiming that the pardon was necessary to enable Lasater to renew his hunting license.(6)
Clinton's relationship with Lasater was obviously risky. It might still prove to be criminal. When Lasater went to prison his operations were taken over by an associate, Patsy Thomasson. She was a politically active Arkansan whose employment with Lasater was to last nearly a decade, despite his problems with the law and with drugs. DEA documents in my possession show her flying with him on one of his private planes to Belize on February 8, I 984, where he was interested in buying a ranch that was a known drug trafficking point [see Appendix A, item G].
In I993 she joined the White House where she has served as White House director of the Office of Administration and later deputy director of Presidential Personnel. The night of Deputy White House Counsel Vince Foster's death she was one of the trusted Clinton aides who entered Foster's office to spirit away documents.
As for Lasater, by the mid- 1980s he had become involved in several shaky savings and loans, at least one of which, First American Savings & Loan of Oak Brook, Illinois, had its difficulties with Lasater negotiated by the bank's legal team of Vince Foster, Webster Hubbell, and Hillary Rodham Clinton of Little Rock's Rose Law Firm, much to Lasater's satisfaction.
Apparently the thrift was unaware of the relationship its own legal team enjoyed with Lasater. Though the thrift had sought millions, it ended up settling for $200,000.(7)
Drug trafficking was linked to Arkansas throughout the 1980s, occasionally to Clinton's friends and supporters. An investigator wrote in the minutes of a Resolution Trust Corporation meeting held on June 29, 1994, that Lasater "may have been establishing depository accounts at Madison and other financial institutions and laundering drug money through them via brokered deposits and bond issues.(8)
Among the "other financial institutions" Lasater has been linked to is the Arkansas Development Finance Authority created by Governor Clinton. In 1994 when Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy resigned owing to allegations that he was accepting gifts from the Arkansas poultry tycoon, Don Tyson, London's Sunday Telegraph published a story based on numerous state and federal police documents showing that Tyson was "under suspicion of drug dealing from the early 1970s until the late 1980s" by such diverse organizations as the Arkansas State Police and the DEA.(9) No charges were ever filed.
Still the most serious information on drug trafficking in Clinton's Arkansas has come from Brown. His revelations were first published in the American Spectator in the summer Of 1995, and though objected to by President Clinton they have never been disproved. After splitting with Clinton, Brown spent the next few years investigating white-collar crime for the Arkansas State Police. He says that he became increasingly interested in going public with his knowledge of the Mena operation, but that he was mindful of the secrecy document that he had signed.
Moreover, with officials at both the state and federal level involved, he did not know whom to tell. Eventually, it was the Clintons' heavy-handed incompetence in trying to control another damaging story involving Brown that led Brown to tell his story to me.
In the April-May 1994 issue of the American Spectator, Brown was quoted as saying that Lieutenant Governor Jim Guy Tucker had asked him and trooper Larry Patterson for compromising information on Clinton's private life in 1990. When Tucker became aware of Brown's revelation, he retaliated against Brown by demoting him from white-collar investigations to highway patrol. "I don't want to be getting any more reports from Brown" is the statement by Tucker that Colonel Tommy Goodwin, the former head of the Arkansas State Police, quoted in explaining the demotion to me in an interview.(10)
Brown believed the demotion to be illegal because he was at the time working on a case that could have implicated Tucker.
An indignant Brown began toying with the idea of exposing the corruption of Arkansas politics. About this time, the special prosecutor investigating Whitewater subpoenaed Brown to disclose what he knew about Clinton' connections to a Whitewater figure, David L. Hale. Clinton was supposed to have pressured Hale, the head of an Arkansas lending agency, into making illegal loans to Susan McDougal, the Clintons' Whitewater real estate partner.
Brown's subpoena convinced him that "everything is going to come out." Nonetheless, he still seemed reluctant to disclose all he knew. The irony is that he might have remained silent about Mena had not Clinton's imprudent intervention provoked Brown into coming out into the open.
In the fall of 1994 ABC News interviewed Brown, principally about Hale. But the White House panicked, assuming that the interview was about Mena. And Clinton set out to malign Brown. White House officials, as well as Clinton's lawyer, David Kendall, who according to Time was "working very, very hard to keep Whitewater out of the headlines," (11) approached ABC with numerous false allegations against Brown.
Meanwhile, Betsey Wright, a Clinton political fixer and his former chief of staff, told ABC that Brown was a "pathological liar," even though his personnel file in Arkansas abounded with recommendations-some from Clinton and even one from Dr. Joycelyn Elders. ABC was also told that Brown had failed a psychological test. Goodwin assured me and ABC that Brown had passed it.(12) But of the charges leveled at Brown by the White House, the most unintentionally revealing was that Brown had flunked a CIA examination in the mid-1980s.
That charge could only have come from the man--then-Governor Clinton-- who knew that his former bodyguard had had dealings with the CIA a decade before.
An ABC producer told me at the time that "Brown is telling the truth. You can trust him." Nonetheless the network apparently yielded to White House pressure. The interview with Brown, in which he had spoken mostly about Hale and not about Mena, was killed. Brown's patience was now strained beyond endurance. He decided to talk to me about Mena.
Clinton's position has always been that he knew nothing substantial about Mena and that the "state really had next to nothing to do with it.... We had nothing-zero-to do with it, and everybody who's ever looked into it knows that."(13) Brown says he is lying. His daybook records one visit to Mena by Clinton on May 21, 1984, and he says that he accompanied Clinton to Mena on several other occasions.
Clinton claimed in a rare reference to Mena late in the 1980s that he was unaware of any problem at Mena until 1988. But a 1991 deposition by Betsey Wright reveals that the governor's office had in the early 1980s received repeated calls about drug trafficking there. In fact, in 1991 Governor Clinton revealed that a state police investigation had discovered drug "linkages to the federal government." He mentioned the CIA.(14)
Given the remoteness of Mena it is curious that the governor would be showing up there so frequently in the mid- 1980s. The airport is small and handles little traffic. The town itself is sleepy and extremely rural. Its voter turnout is, perhaps, the lowest in the state. Clinton could not have been stopping by the airport for political purposes. Since Clinton's election as president, moreover, others have come forward to implicate him in Mena. Arkansas State Trooper Bobby Walker has told me that "sometime in the mid1980s" he was at Mena with Clinton.
Walker said a "huge darkgreen military plane" was parked there and that when he expressed surprise at seeing a military plane at Mena, Clinton said it was not military; it served another purpose.
In March 1995, in a legally binding deposition, Trooper Larry Patterson also said that Clinton knew about Mena. Patterson said he had overheard conversations about "large quantities of drugs being flown into Mena airport, large quantities of guns, that there was an ongoing operation training foreign people in the area." When asked, "Were any of these conversations in the presence of Governor Bill Clinton?" he replied: "Yes, sir."
Patterson was being deposed in a legal suit filed against Buddy Young, the former head of Clinton's security detail, by Terry Reed, who says he trained Contra pilots, under Seal's supervision, at Nella, Arkansas.
In another deposition in the case, John Bender, a mechanic, says he saw Clinton at Mena three times in the summer of 1985. There were no local dignitaries present, Bender says, and Clinton did not seem to be taking part in any official function. Bender says that Clinton arrived in a Beech aircraft and was still there when Bender left for the day. Clinton's stays lasted for hours.
During his deposition Bender was shown a photograph of Buddy Young. He identified him as "Captain Buddy Young-that little beady-faced fellow," and said that Young was with Clinton at Mena. Young has since been made head of the Federal Emergency Management Administration in Denton, Texas. In another deposition in the Reed case, Russell Welch, an Arkansas state police investigator who has investigated Mena extensively, says that Young asked him in 1992 if Clinton's name had ever come up in connection with Mena.
Welch said it had not, but Young's concern is intriguing.
At this juncture, no one, including Brown, can say precisely what Clinton was doing at Mena. Brown's role, after all, was quite limited. In early 1985, after Brown told Seal-and Clinton-that he would no longer take part in the drug flights, Seal contacted Brown again. Encouraging Brown to continue working with him, Seal said, "There's good money to be had."
But Brown said he was out of that game for good. Brown was not going to have anything to do with drug shipments. He was not, however, done with the CIA.
In January 1985 while Brown was on duty at the Governor's Mansion he was paid a visit by a man he believed to be another contract employee of the CIA, Felix Rodriguez, alias Max Gomez. Before visiting Brown at the mansion, Rodriguez telephoned Brown while he was on duty there. Later he drove over, entering through the compound's back gate. His familiarity with the place surprised Brown.
In the following months Brown concluded that Rodriguez must have known Clinton and was in continuing contact with him. Eventually Clinton made it clear to Brown that he knew Rodriguez. On the occasion of this first meeting with Brown it seems that Rodriguezs mission was to placate Brown. He wanted Brown to work with him on clandestine operations, but he wanted to reassure Brown that no more "monkeying around with Seal would be involved." At Rodriguezs mention of Seal, Brown explained, "I have had some bad experiences." Rodriguez responded, "Don't worry about Barry....
We're going to take care of that." He also told Brown he would "take care of things" with Clinton. Apparently he did. Clinton never talked to Brown about Mena or Lasater again.
Rodriguez said he was beginning a new operation and wanted Brown with him. Aware of how Seal's drug trafficking had compromised him, Brown was uneasy. Rodriguez attempted to propitiate him. He offered to get Brown another meeting with Magruder. Rodriguez talked of his friendship with two men Brown admired from his training days in narcotics work, Nick Navarro and Raul Diaz.
The combination of Rodriguezs persuasiveness, Brown's continuing interest in a career in intelligence work, and the prospect of earning $1,000 for each mission convinced Brown to join Rodriguez in his new operation. It involved guarding the transshipment of weapons from the Caribbean to Central America'. From what he saw on these missions Brown believed the shipments included AK-47s and explosives meant for the Contras.
The missions took place in 1985. During that year Brown's contact with Rodriguez was sporadic and by telephone. But Brown was confident that Rodriguez was his CIA contact. His confidence was bolstered when Rodriguez suggested they enroll Brown in a medical school in Montserrat. The purpose, Brown thought, was to establish cover for his further intelligence operations. Rodriguez also talked with Brown about
Seal, saying Seal had gotten "out of hand." On one occasion Brown expressed apprehensions to Rodriguez about Seal's co-pilot on their flights out of Mena. Brown feared exposure. Rodriguez responded, "Don't worry about it. We're going to take care of him. We're going to take care of all of it." Brown did not know the pilot's identity or his whereabouts, but in 1986, on February ig, Seal was shot dead as he entered a halfway house in Louisiana. Three Colombians eventually were arrested and convicted of the murder.
The Louisiana attorney general has estimated to the Justice Department that Seal had "smuggled between $3 billion and $5 billion in drugs into the U.S."
In May of 1986, after Seal's death, Brown got another call from
Rodriguez. "You hear about our man?" he asked. Brown had indeed heard of Seal's murder in Baton Rouge. "Well, we know who was flying in the second seat." Brown interpreted this remark to mean, "It's like we're going to eliminate everybody." Brown went on to relate that Rodriguez "talked about Clinton... and gave me the impression they were going to do something to his ass."
His impression from this conversation with Rodriguez was that Rodriguez's employer had been embarrassed by the drug trafficking that Seal and perhaps Clinton had mixed into the Mena resupply operations. Now they were going to kill "anybody that apparently had anything to do with what happened over at Mena." Brown began to fear for Clinton's life-though critical of Clinton's character and reckless improprieties, Brown obviously still harbored affecdon for his friend from the exciting days of the early 1980s.
After Rodriguezs May telephone call, he sent Brown a manual for a light automatic rifle, a Belgian-made F.A.L. Brown still has the manual. The official title of the gun as referred to in the manual is "FN Light Automatic Rifle, caliber 7.62mm. NATO." The gun is usually known as the "F.A.L." Rodriguez told Brown to fly to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, where he would carry out a plan to kill the man he was led to believe was Seal's co-pilot.
With his wife, Becky, to serve as cover Brown flew to Puerto Vallarta on June 18, 1986, on American Airlines flights 537 and 535 [see Appendix A, item E]. A guard standing by the guard house of the port's naval installation gave Brown the F.A.L. It was disassembled in a straw bag which explains why Rodriguez sent Brown the manual.
Using the alias Michael Johnson, a name he had used in undercover work in Arkansas, Brown was to proceed to the Hotel Playa Conchas Chinas on the morning of June 21. There he was to identify himself as Johnson to the hotel clerk and give him $50. The clerk would direct him to his target. All went according to plan until the clerk pointed out Brown's prospective victim.
The victim did not look at all like Seal's co-pilot. Brown left the hotel, ditched the gun, and flew back on American Airlines flights 292 and 512. The man he had been set up to kill was, according to Rodriguez, Terry Reed, the very same man Seal had been working with in training the Contras and the man who in 1991 was to file the aforementioned lawsuit against Buddy Young alleging that Young had "manufactured, altered, tampered with and/or removed evidence, all in the pursuit of advancing a wrongful criminal indictment."
Reed believes that Young, the head of Governor Bill Clinton's security detail, set him up in 1987 to be killed. Young has admitted to authoring a national police profile saying that Reed was armed and dangerous and known to use a concealed weapon.
Brown did not know anything about Reed until 1995. Upon returning to Little Rock he received a call from Rodriguez who wanted to arrange an appointment. Rodriguez was en route to Washington but would fly down to Little Rock on his way home. Brown said no. He wanted nothing more to do with Rodriguez.
These last revelations of Brown's are now documented. His airplane tickets were purchased in late May. I have photocopies of them in my files. The date of purchase is May 27. I have seen the F.A.L. manual. Copies of Brown's map from Puerto Vallarta and copies of documents in which the Arkansas State Revenue Department lists Brown's alias, Michael Johnson, are also in my possession. Brown had used that alias in undercover police work and had an Arkansas driver's license under that name.
Reed too has inadvertently provided evidence supporting Brown's revelations. Without knowing anything about Brown, Reed wrote a book chronicling his misadventures with the CIA and with Arkansas officials while training Contras. The book implicates Clinton in Mena and places Reed in Puerto Vallarta. Oblivious of the fate that was awaiting him at the Hotel Playa Conchas Chinas, Reed reports that he was told to be at the hotel on June 21 to meet his new CIA handler. The man who ordered him there was Felix Rodriguez, known to Reed as Maximo Gomez.
Rodriguez somewhat imprudently has also written a book about his life, Shadow Warrior. In it he mentions Navarro and Diaz, saying he knew them as investigators in south Florida. He mentions traveling to Washington, at precisely the time Brown says he traveled there, June 1986. On June 25 he met with Ollie North. Of course, North was the National Security Council aide engaged in resupplying the Contras. (15), (16)
Brown has two more revelations. Though he left the govemor's security detail in June 1985, he obviously continued to have numerous encounters with Clinton. Just before he went down to Puerto Vallarta thinking he was being sent by the CIA to kill one of the last living figures associated with Mena, he told Clinton what their acquaintance Rodriguez had put him up to.
According to Brown, he encountered Clinton, probably at the Capitol, and told him, "I'm going to take care of that problem in Mexico." Clinton acted as though he were aware of the mission, saying, "Oh, that's good, that's good, L.D." Looking back on that exchange, Brown believes Clinton also knew the identity of Brown's quarry, Reed.
Brown's second revelation is that during the Iran-Contra hearings he discovered the real identity of Dan Magruder, the CIA official whom he met in Dallas on August 30, 1984, and whose name Rodriguez invoked in persuading Brown to undertake their Caribbean operation.
Brown says he was actually Donald P. Gregg, at the time Vice President George Bush's national security adviser. Brown explains that he became aware of Magruder's real identity during the television coverage of Iran-Contra. The Donald Gregg appearing on screen and being accused of associating with one Felix Rodriguez in the Contra resupply operation looked and sounded to Brown like Dan Magruder.
Corroborating evidence that Gregg was involved with arming the Contras has been mounting for years. The stories began when Iran-Contra broke. They continued when Gregg's nomination as ambassador to South Korea came before the Senate early in the Bush presidency. Of particular interest during those hearings was Gregg's relationship with a CIA operative long famed for his daring anticommunist operations, Rodriguez. Gregg did not deny their friendship.(17)
The Magruder whom Brown met in Dallas talked of his prior service in and extensive knowledge of Korea [see Appendix A, item D]. He told Brown that he was an "Asian expert." Gregg, it turns Out, was CIA station chief in Seoul in the 1970s. Now two intelligence agents have come forward and confirmed that Gregg used the name Magruder while assisting in arming the Contras in the early 1980s in Florida and California.
Finally, remember Clinton's remark after Brown's last flight with Seal, "and your buddy Bush knows all about it." Were Clinton and Bush both politically exposed on Mena? This might explain one of the mysteries of the 1992 campaign, the mildness of the famously competitive George Bush and his refusal to attack Clinton where the challenger was most vulnerable-character. Some political observers have speculated that Bush's Graves' disease explains his listless campaign.
Others have claimed that Bush lost his relish for political life.
An alternative explanation might be that both men had a tacit agreement not to get personal, owing to their exposure on Mena. But there is no evidence that Bush or one of his financial supporters was involved in drug trafficking at Mena. Clearly Clinton had more to fear from Mena than Bush, which suggests a tantalizing detail: Might Clinton have hoodwinked Bush into a tacit agreement that lost Bush the election?
Looking back on his years of service with Clinton, Brown recalls contacts between the two men that, given the Clintons' remoteness from Washington, were unusually frequent and cordial. Bush and Reagan were hated by Hillary, Brown says, but not by Clinton.
When Brown's revelations about Mena were published in the American Spectator in the summer of 1995 they met with mixed reaction. The Wall Street Journal's lead editorial pronounced: "Mena cries out for investigation. A congressional committee with resources, subpoena power and the perseverance displayed by some past chairmen should look into this. If some chips fall on the Republican side, so be it. Important questions need to be answered."(18)
Other Journalists for the most part ignored the story though they had previously vowed that if a Clinton bodyguard ever came forward with claims of serious wrongdoing by Clinton, as opposed to mere adultery and satyriasis, they would investigate to the utmost.
Finally, there was a handful of journalists who set out to expose Brown as a fraud. I have in my files a cocky letter from one on the letterhead of a major news organization ridiculing Brown's assertions about flying with Seal and, incidentally, erroneously observing that Seal died in January rather than February.
That Brown's story stands unimpeached must give him great satisfaction. For over a decade he had lived in fear. He feared that his flights with Seal implicated him in a conspiracy to import cocaine. As people whom he had known at Mena disappeared or died violently he began to fear for his life. And as mentioned a few paragraphs back, he even feared for Clinton's life.
While I was encouraging Brown to reveal his story to me and later while I was encouraging him to go public with it, I never quite understood the intensity of these fears until he revealed to me his dealings with Rodriguez.
In my journalistic life I have not had to deal with many desperate men. Documents revealing drug dealing, gun running, intelligence gathering cloak-and-dagger operations, and ultimately murder do not make amusing reading. As I have mentioned earlier, we might never know for sure what took place at Mena or who the principal players were.
Yet there is a serious policy issue involved when government intelligence services link up with unsavory types and lose control of their operation. Further research into Mena leads me to believe that Seal's drug dealing might have been going on independent of and perhaps even unknown to the CIA.
In fact it is possible that the CIAs dealings with him were not terribly close and that the guns that he dropped were going to the Sandinistas rather than the Contras, or perhaps even to Colombian drug tycoons. Possibly Rodriguez was not even working that closely with the CIA but with others, for instance with North and Gregg, who had really lost control of their operation.
I have gathered information that sketches several agencies working with varying degrees of responsibility at Mena. In the early 1980s it appears that to avoid prosecution for international drug trafficking, Seal approached the Drug Enforcement Administration, offering to serve as an informant. The DEA eventually used him on three counternarcotics operations.
Through a government register, the National Source Register, our intelligence agencies became aware of him. They knew of his easy aerial access to Central and South America. By 1983 Washington had become concerned about the possible presence of Soviet-made missiles in Nicaragua and even the possibility that the Soviet Union might have nuclear weapons there.
The National Security Agency (NSA), which monitors such foreign activity, needed low-flying airborne platforms like Seal's drug flights on which to place the sophisticated devices that would detect nuclear weapons in a place such as Nicaragua.
The CIA recruited Seal to undertake these flights. The CIA provided the front for dealing with Seal while the NSA equipped Seal's C- 123K with the required gadgetry. The plane was equipped with very sophisticated Nuclear Detection Devices manufactured by EG&G in Las Vegas, a highly classified Department of Defense contractor.
The NSA fabricated a TOP SECRET specially compartmented program for all electronic collection directed against the Sandinista government. The program was called "RAPPORT." When I filed a Freedom of Information request to the Pentagon it went immediately to NSA without any urging from me.
Owing to Seal's status as a CIA asset, Customs and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) could allow Seal to leave and enter the country without inspection. For security reasons the NSA barred Customs from inspecting Seal's plane. He was free to return from his flights south with small duffel bags of drugs. All the NSA wanted was its intelligence data tapes. Seal duped all these government agencies until someone put an end to his duplicity.
But to return to Brown's revelations about Clinton at Mena.
One might wonder why the governor of Arkansas would want one of his top security guards on the Mena flights. The answer seems obvious to anyone who has studied Clinton's behavior. Were the Mena operation exposed, Clinton could claim that he had a top state trooper with experience in narcotics investigations flying surveillance.
When Brown's story was published in the August 1995 issue of the American Spectator I was unable to get an official White House response. More surprising was the silence of all major news organization except for the Wall Street journal and the Arkansas Democrat Gazette. For years journalists, most notably on the Left, had been on to Mena. Now a conservative was validating at least some of what the Left had suspected. As for Brown, major news organizations had been after him for months, suspecting that he knew something portentous about Mena.
Once the story broke their calls to him petered out. Unlike the aftermath of the troopers' revelations about Clinton's sex life, when he found himself peppered with journalists' inquiries day after day, the president never had to face similar inquiries from the press about this far more serious matter.
Thus one can imagine my delight on the evening of July 17, a week after publication of the August Spectator, when the president entered the dining room of Washington's Jockey Club. I was seated a few feet away with my fourteen-year-old daughter, Annie, and her young friend, Zana Arafat. Finally I would get the official White House response to the L. D. Brown story and from the White House's top official-all in the comfort of Washington's finest eatery.
The president proceeded to a table in the back of the restaurant where fifteen old friends greeted him. Upon meticulous reflection and with the principia of Miss Manners in mind I asked the maitre d' to tell the president that "Mr. Tyrrell of the American Spectator" would like to send over a bottle of champagne.
The Secret Service, of course, had to be consulted, but apparently the president was pleased. A beaming maitre d' returned to tell me that "President Clinton" would like to thank me after my meal, but, she advised, there were fifteen people in the president's party. "Two bottles," I insisted. My generosity is the stuff of legends.
Frankly I was rather surprised by the president's response. Since late 1993 when the American Spectator's Troopergate stories began detailing the scortatory side of Clinton's life, I had personally overseen an investigative team of journalists that both in Arkansas and Washington had turned up reports of conflicts of interest and abuse of power (for instance, David Brock's piece on Travelgate), and campaign irregularities, such as using "walking around money" to buy votes and filing false financial papers. We had reported real estate shenanigans, banking scams, and sharp tax filings that revealed the Clintons taking deductions on such piffles as the president's underwear.
Yet I should not have been all that surprised. For over two years I had been doing research on the Clintons for this book.
Clinton is a very reckless man, and he has many quirks, one of which makes him a tireless schmoozer. Down in Arkansas it was known that if there was one person at a party who, he felt, disliked him he would spend the entire party heaving himself at the skeptic. The evening of July 17, 1995 was my turn.
As we were almost finished with our meal when I sent over the champagne, I soon notified the maitre d' that we were ready to accept the president's gratitude. Past a wall of security and through a corridor of flunkies we were lead. The Clintons were seated at one long table with their guests and fifteen tiny servings of champagne. Large and amiable, the president rose from his chair to greet us. He was all smiles; Mrs. Clinton, seated across from him, was less joyous.
"And so we meet," I said. He joked, shook my hand, and immediately turned the charm on my daughter and Zana. He asked the girls their ages. He spoke of Chelsea's- summer camp. Out of the corner of my eye I espied an increasingly uneasy Hillary.
Time might be running out. Her eyes put me in mind of a snake about to strike.
Quickly I made my move for the White House's official response to the L. D. Brown-Mena story. Reminding the president of my respect for the Clintons' characteristically 1960s trait of "talking and talking" and debating every issue, I briskly addressed the issue of the moment. "What did you think of the L. D. Brown story?" I asked.
He reddened. He ignited.
He denied that he had read the piece. He said I should be "ashamed" of publishing it. "Lies, lies," he intoned indignantly. The flunkies stiffened. The president's next charges were curiously familiar. He called Brown a "pathological liar" who had tried to destroy his own family. Those were precisely the lines that the White House's operatives had employed months before against Brown to kill ABCs interview with him.
I replied that the president's hometown paper, the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, had just described Brown as a very credible witness who had never yet been caught in a lie. The president began reiterating his charges. I mentioned that it seemed to me he had read our piece. He continued with his charges and showed no sign of breaking off what was becoming an increasingly uncomfortable conversation.
Surely, I thought, he will wheel on me and, as the sophisticates say, "cut" me. But, no, he continued to sputter and to whine.
This too was what Arkansans had told me to expect. There stood this large man surrounded by bodyguards. His presence, however, was completely without force. The president was angry. His voice was labored. Yet this was anger without force.
What came to mind was not the anger of a statesman, but rather Tinkerbell in a snit. I made my conges. Mrs. Clinton might join in, and I would be guilty of having placed young girls in harm's way.
The next day, when the press began inquiring about my presidential summit at the Jockey Club, I pooh-poohed the whole thing.
Tim Watters, the leading impersonator of Bill Clinton, was a friend of mine. I insisted that it was Watters whom I had encountered the night before. Surely the president of the United States does not accept champagne in a restaurant. The man I had met was an impostor, but a pretty good one.
Wednesday, December 26, 2007
FORCIBLE DECLINE OF CHRISTIANITY IN MIDDLE EAST
"Turkey, where Paul preached to the Ephesians and Galatians, once the seat of the Eastern Christianity known as Byzantium, has one of the smallest Christian minorities.
It is now home to less than 75,000 Christians, out of a population of 70 million.
The persecutions, even genocide, of the Assyrians, Pontic Greeks and Armenians, the population exchange with Greece and other mass Christian emigrations of the last century, all took their toll.
Things are quieter today for the Christians. To be sure the Orthodox Church is being slowly strangled by the state closure of its seminary, but the violence is no longer systematic or official.
It is more targeted, and carried out by zealous young men acting outside the law.
Last Sunday, Italian Catholic priest, Fr. Adriano Franchini, was stabbed after Mass at a church in Izmir. In April three evangelicals were mutilated and killed at their Christian publishing house. "
December 24, 2007, 0:00 a.m.
A Creche Without Christians
Christian Persecution in the Middle East.
By Nina Shea
In the two millennia since the child’s birth in a humble manger in Bethlehem, the good news of Christianity has spread to every continent, inspiring more followers than any other religion today.
But the lands that once were the cradle of Christianity have turned distinctively inhospitable to the faith.
Fiercely intolerant variants of Islam are taking hold in the region, many of them fueled with ideology and funds from Saudi and Iranian extremists.
From Morocco to the Persian Gulf, we are seeing the rapid erosion of Christian populations, thought to now number no more than 15 million. These are the communities that have disproportionately been the region’s modernizers, the mediators bridging east and west, its educators and academics, as the Lebanese Catholic scholar Habib Malik observes.
For empirical evidence he has to look no further than his own father, a principal drafter of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The loss of Middle Eastern Christianity has profound meaning for the Church. But it should not be a matter of concern to Christians only.
These Christian communities, along with a handful of other non-Muslim minority groups, such as the Bahais, Mandeans, Yizidis, Jews, together with the anti-Islamist Muslims, are the front-line in the terrible worldwide struggle taking place today between Islamist totalitarianism and individual rights and freedoms.
The extinction of these ancient church communities will lead to ever more extremism within the region and polarization from the non-Muslim world. This will hurt us all.
The new religious survey, Freedom in the World, produced by the Center for Religious Freedom shows that while some Muslim governments do respect religious freedom, none are to be found in the Middle East.
Israel is the only “free” country, and their Christian numbers are increasing. The survey ranks Jordan, Oman, Morocco, and Lebanon as “partly free.” Here the Christian populations are either miniscule and largely foreign, or, in the case of Lebanon, shrinking precipitously from majority to about a third of the population in recent decades.
The rest of the region is further down the freedom scale. In Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Algeria, and Tunisia there are virtually no indigenous Christian communities left, though some converts there carry out religious lives in the catacombs and expats quietly hold services.
In Saudi Arabia, religious intolerance is official state policy.
Over half of Iraq’s one million Christians have fled since a coordinated bombing of their churches in August 2004 was followed by sustained violence against them. A Catholic Chaldean bishop raised the possibility last month that we may now be witnessing “the end of Christianity in Iraq.”
Anglican Canon Andrew White, who leads a Baghdad ecumenical congregation, agrees: “All of my leadership were originally taken and killed — all dead,” he asserted in November.
Iraq’s Christian community, which dates from the Apostle Thomas, is not simply caught in the cross hairs of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis. It is targeted for its non-Muslim faith — a reality U.S. policy fails to acknowledge.
An extremist Sunni fatwa issued to Christians this year in a Baghdad neighborhood could not be clearer: “If you do not leave your home, your blood will be spilled. You and your family will be killed.'”
The Christian presence in Palestine may hold out no more than 15 years, according to Israeli human rights lawyer Justus Weiner, due to increasing Muslim persecution and maltreatment.
Amidst a Muslim population of 1.4 million, some 3,000 Greek Orthodox live in the Hamas-run Gaza strip. An extreme Wahhabi-style group wearing seventh-century robes recently emerged, calling them “Crusaders” and vowing to drive them out.
It has succeeded in killing several Christians in recent months, including a prominent member of the community, Rami Khader.
The West Bank is hardly better. “No one city in the Holy Land is more indicative of the great exodus of Christians than Bethlehem, which fell under full Palestinian control last decade as part of the Oslo Accords,” states Weiner.
This town of 30,000 is now less than 20-percent Christian, after centuries in which Christians were the majority. In the West Bank’s only all-Christian town, now called Taybeh and once known by the Biblical name Ephraim, a Muslim mob from a neighboring village torched 14 houses last September to avenge the honor of a Muslim woman allegedly impregnated by her Christian employer.
Demographic decline isn’t perfectly correlated with religious repression.
Lower birth rates, conversions, and some voluntary emigration also account for shrinking numbers of Christians. Israel’s barrier fence, erected relatively recently in its history in response to terrorist attacks, is a hardship and is commonly blamed for the Christian exodus from Palestine.
But when the decline is so dramatic, when only the Christian and other non-Muslim populations are dwindling and when this pattern holds in country after country, the facts on the ground deserve a closer look.
There we see a region-wide, steady, grinding economic, legal, and social discrimination, and political disempowerment punctuated by horrific acts of terror by social forces that governments are unable or unwilling to control. The smaller a minority in the brutally sectarian world of the Middle East, the more vulnerable it is and the more rapid its decline.
Egypt, with some ten million Copts, has the region’s largest Christian minority. The state systematically discriminates against them and frustrates their efforts to build and repair churches. Fanatical Islamist groups rise up periodically and threaten or kill priests and individual Christian believers, especially converts, and the state often fails to bring justice in such cases.
Earlier this month, an Islamist website urged a terrorist attack on the Cairo office of the Knights of Malta, a Catholic charitable group founded in 1087 to care for poor and sick pilgrims to the Holy Land.
Posting photos of the Malta office, it exhorted: “Do not stint on your attacks, Egyptians, either with car or truck bombs.”
Turkey, where Paul preached to the Ephesians and Galatians, once the seat of the Eastern Christianity known as Byzantium, has one of the smallest Christian minorities. It is now home to less than 75,000 Christians, out of a population of 70 million.
The persecutions, even genocide, of the Assyrians, Pontic Greeks and Armenians, the population exchange with Greece and other mass Christian emigrations of the last century, all took their toll. Things are quieter today for the Christians.
To be sure the Orthodox Church is being slowly strangled by the state closure of its seminary, but the violence is no longer systematic or official. It is more targeted, and carried out by zealous young men acting outside the law. Last Sunday, Italian Catholic priest, Fr. Adriano Franchini, was stabbed after Mass at a church in Izmir. In April three evangelicals were mutilated and killed at their Christian publishing house.
Last June, speaking of Iraq but in words applicable to the region, the pope told President Bush of his concerns that “the society that was evolving would not tolerate the Christian religion.”
Chaldean Bishop Audo elaborated: "This is very sad and very dangerous for the church, for Iraq and even for Muslim people, because it means the end of an old experience of living together.”
Christian hearts are filled with joy and wonder reflecting on the first Christmas. They should also make room in this season for the persecuted faithful of the Middle East.
It is now home to less than 75,000 Christians, out of a population of 70 million.
The persecutions, even genocide, of the Assyrians, Pontic Greeks and Armenians, the population exchange with Greece and other mass Christian emigrations of the last century, all took their toll.
Things are quieter today for the Christians. To be sure the Orthodox Church is being slowly strangled by the state closure of its seminary, but the violence is no longer systematic or official.
It is more targeted, and carried out by zealous young men acting outside the law.
Last Sunday, Italian Catholic priest, Fr. Adriano Franchini, was stabbed after Mass at a church in Izmir. In April three evangelicals were mutilated and killed at their Christian publishing house. "
December 24, 2007, 0:00 a.m.
A Creche Without Christians
Christian Persecution in the Middle East.
By Nina Shea
In the two millennia since the child’s birth in a humble manger in Bethlehem, the good news of Christianity has spread to every continent, inspiring more followers than any other religion today.
But the lands that once were the cradle of Christianity have turned distinctively inhospitable to the faith.
Fiercely intolerant variants of Islam are taking hold in the region, many of them fueled with ideology and funds from Saudi and Iranian extremists.
From Morocco to the Persian Gulf, we are seeing the rapid erosion of Christian populations, thought to now number no more than 15 million. These are the communities that have disproportionately been the region’s modernizers, the mediators bridging east and west, its educators and academics, as the Lebanese Catholic scholar Habib Malik observes.
For empirical evidence he has to look no further than his own father, a principal drafter of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The loss of Middle Eastern Christianity has profound meaning for the Church. But it should not be a matter of concern to Christians only.
These Christian communities, along with a handful of other non-Muslim minority groups, such as the Bahais, Mandeans, Yizidis, Jews, together with the anti-Islamist Muslims, are the front-line in the terrible worldwide struggle taking place today between Islamist totalitarianism and individual rights and freedoms.
The extinction of these ancient church communities will lead to ever more extremism within the region and polarization from the non-Muslim world. This will hurt us all.
The new religious survey, Freedom in the World, produced by the Center for Religious Freedom shows that while some Muslim governments do respect religious freedom, none are to be found in the Middle East.
Israel is the only “free” country, and their Christian numbers are increasing. The survey ranks Jordan, Oman, Morocco, and Lebanon as “partly free.” Here the Christian populations are either miniscule and largely foreign, or, in the case of Lebanon, shrinking precipitously from majority to about a third of the population in recent decades.
The rest of the region is further down the freedom scale. In Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Algeria, and Tunisia there are virtually no indigenous Christian communities left, though some converts there carry out religious lives in the catacombs and expats quietly hold services.
In Saudi Arabia, religious intolerance is official state policy.
Over half of Iraq’s one million Christians have fled since a coordinated bombing of their churches in August 2004 was followed by sustained violence against them. A Catholic Chaldean bishop raised the possibility last month that we may now be witnessing “the end of Christianity in Iraq.”
Anglican Canon Andrew White, who leads a Baghdad ecumenical congregation, agrees: “All of my leadership were originally taken and killed — all dead,” he asserted in November.
Iraq’s Christian community, which dates from the Apostle Thomas, is not simply caught in the cross hairs of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis. It is targeted for its non-Muslim faith — a reality U.S. policy fails to acknowledge.
An extremist Sunni fatwa issued to Christians this year in a Baghdad neighborhood could not be clearer: “If you do not leave your home, your blood will be spilled. You and your family will be killed.'”
The Christian presence in Palestine may hold out no more than 15 years, according to Israeli human rights lawyer Justus Weiner, due to increasing Muslim persecution and maltreatment.
Amidst a Muslim population of 1.4 million, some 3,000 Greek Orthodox live in the Hamas-run Gaza strip. An extreme Wahhabi-style group wearing seventh-century robes recently emerged, calling them “Crusaders” and vowing to drive them out.
It has succeeded in killing several Christians in recent months, including a prominent member of the community, Rami Khader.
The West Bank is hardly better. “No one city in the Holy Land is more indicative of the great exodus of Christians than Bethlehem, which fell under full Palestinian control last decade as part of the Oslo Accords,” states Weiner.
This town of 30,000 is now less than 20-percent Christian, after centuries in which Christians were the majority. In the West Bank’s only all-Christian town, now called Taybeh and once known by the Biblical name Ephraim, a Muslim mob from a neighboring village torched 14 houses last September to avenge the honor of a Muslim woman allegedly impregnated by her Christian employer.
Demographic decline isn’t perfectly correlated with religious repression.
Lower birth rates, conversions, and some voluntary emigration also account for shrinking numbers of Christians. Israel’s barrier fence, erected relatively recently in its history in response to terrorist attacks, is a hardship and is commonly blamed for the Christian exodus from Palestine.
But when the decline is so dramatic, when only the Christian and other non-Muslim populations are dwindling and when this pattern holds in country after country, the facts on the ground deserve a closer look.
There we see a region-wide, steady, grinding economic, legal, and social discrimination, and political disempowerment punctuated by horrific acts of terror by social forces that governments are unable or unwilling to control. The smaller a minority in the brutally sectarian world of the Middle East, the more vulnerable it is and the more rapid its decline.
Egypt, with some ten million Copts, has the region’s largest Christian minority. The state systematically discriminates against them and frustrates their efforts to build and repair churches. Fanatical Islamist groups rise up periodically and threaten or kill priests and individual Christian believers, especially converts, and the state often fails to bring justice in such cases.
Earlier this month, an Islamist website urged a terrorist attack on the Cairo office of the Knights of Malta, a Catholic charitable group founded in 1087 to care for poor and sick pilgrims to the Holy Land.
Posting photos of the Malta office, it exhorted: “Do not stint on your attacks, Egyptians, either with car or truck bombs.”
Turkey, where Paul preached to the Ephesians and Galatians, once the seat of the Eastern Christianity known as Byzantium, has one of the smallest Christian minorities. It is now home to less than 75,000 Christians, out of a population of 70 million.
The persecutions, even genocide, of the Assyrians, Pontic Greeks and Armenians, the population exchange with Greece and other mass Christian emigrations of the last century, all took their toll. Things are quieter today for the Christians.
To be sure the Orthodox Church is being slowly strangled by the state closure of its seminary, but the violence is no longer systematic or official. It is more targeted, and carried out by zealous young men acting outside the law. Last Sunday, Italian Catholic priest, Fr. Adriano Franchini, was stabbed after Mass at a church in Izmir. In April three evangelicals were mutilated and killed at their Christian publishing house.
Last June, speaking of Iraq but in words applicable to the region, the pope told President Bush of his concerns that “the society that was evolving would not tolerate the Christian religion.”
Chaldean Bishop Audo elaborated: "This is very sad and very dangerous for the church, for Iraq and even for Muslim people, because it means the end of an old experience of living together.”
Christian hearts are filled with joy and wonder reflecting on the first Christmas. They should also make room in this season for the persecuted faithful of the Middle East.
Thursday, December 20, 2007
WAZIRISTAN IN DEPTH
THE WAZIRISTAN ACCORD Evagoras C. Leventis*
The Waziristan Accord between Pakistan's government and tribal leaders in that country's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has failed not only to curb violence in the immediate region but also to restrict cross-border militant activity--including resurgent Taliban and al-Qa'ida cadres--between Pakistan's "tribal belt" and Afghanistan. The purpose of this article is to examine the Waziristan Accord and to indicate why agreements of this nature will continue to fail unless there is a substantial modification in Pakistan's internal and regional policies.
On September 5, 2006, in the town of Miranshah, on the football field of the Government Degree College, Maulana Syed Nek Zaman, a member of the National Assembly for the North Waziristan Agency and a tribal council member, read out an agreement between the Pakistani government and tribal elders that has since been known as the Waziristan Accord.
The agreement, witnessed by approximately 500 elders, parliamentarians, and government officials, was signed on behalf of the Pakistan government by Dr. Fakhr-i-Alam, a political agent of North Waziristan, tribal and militia leaders from the mainly Pashtun tribes and clans of the area, and seven militants representing the Taliban shura (advisory council).
The signing was witnessed by Major-General Azhar Ali Shah, the commanding officer of the Pakistani army in the region. The venue was heavily guarded by armed tribal militia members and allegedly also by armed Taliban members.[1]
The Treaty of Waziristan (or the Waziristan Accord) is considered by some to be the "unconditional surrender" of the government of Pakistan to the tribes of the area, the Taliban, and al-Qa'ida.[2] On the other hand, government representatives continuously reiterate that the treaty was signed only with the elders and leaders of the tribes inhabiting the region, who have in turn committed themselves to suppressing cross-border Taliban and al-Qa'ida activity and to eradicating the presence of foreign militants in the area.[3]
However, even a cursory monitoring of the situation since the September 2006 agreement indicates that the former is probably closer to the truth. Nevertheless, describing the Waziristan Accord as an "unconditional surrender" is probably too extreme a characterization, since the government of Pakistan hardly surrendered anything but rather reaffirmed the status quo--a state of affairs that certain segments of the Pakistani administration do not consider to be adverse but rather vital to Pakistan's greater strategic interests.[4]
This article is divided into two sections. The first will provide a brief background of the events that culminated in the signing of the Waziristan Accord, its main purpose being to situate this particular agreement in the wider context of regional history and politics, including Pakistan's role in the War on Terror. The second part will examine what little has been made public regarding the Waziristan Accord and juxtapose its terms to events on the ground in an attempt to provide an assessment of it. The overall intention of this article is not only to illustrate how this agreement, like its predecessors, has failed to solve the two main issues it was designed to settle--the cessation of violence in the immediate area and the termination of cross-border militant movement and activity against the nascent Afghan government and U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan--but perhaps more importantly to highlight the reasons why accords of this nature will continue to fail unless the Pakistani government (in its entirety) radically alters its policies in the area and substantially shifts its regional strategy (both with respect to Afghanistan as well as Kashmir).
BACKGROUND TO THE WAZIRISTAN ACCORDIn 2001-2002, as a result of successful U.S. operations in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) against the Taliban movement and al-Qa'ida elements, the former were ousted from power and the latter lost their state sanctuary, effectively destroying them as an organization. However, it is by now a widely accepted fact that many members of both groups, including their top-tier leadership, managed to escape and find refuge across the country's eastern border with Pakistan--a region known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)[5]--and have since (especially the Taliban)
"...established themselves in parts of south-western and south-eastern Afghanistan, control parts of FATA and have their main headquarters and support networks in Baluchistan."[6]
The FATA consist of 12 administratively autonomous regions[7] of western Pakistan. Together with the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) that lies to the north and the province of Balochistan (or Baluchistan) to the south, these three administrative divisions (two provinces and one territory) form the greater part of Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. The southern Afghan provinces (from west to east) of Nimruz, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabol, and Paktika border Balochistan to the south. Paktika also shares its eastern border with North and South Waziristan, the largest and southernmost agencies of Pakistan's FATA. The remainder of Afghanistan's eastern provinces (from south to north)--Khost, Paktia, Nangarhar, and Konar--border the FATA agencies of North Waziristan and Kurram (Khost); Kurram (Paktia); Kurram, Khyber and Mohmand (Nangarhar); as well as Mohmand and Bajaur (Konar). Konar also shares a border with the Dir Agency of the NWFP.
The northeastern provinces of Afghanistan (from south to north)--Nurestan and Badakhshan--border Pakistan's NWFP agencies of Dir and Chitral to the east (Badakhshan also shares a small strip of border with Pakistan's Northern Areas).
Characterized by mountainous terrain and a bewildering array of autonomous, mainly Pashtun tribes and clans, the FATA are ostensibly controlled by the federal government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, but in reality the government has never exercised any level of substantial control over the area.
Unlike Balochistan and the NWFP, the FATA have never been truly incorporated into the Pakistani state. Epigrammatically, the government controls the area indirectly through political agents (PA), who are federal or provincially recruited bureaucrats that wield considerable executive, judicial, and revenue power in each FATA agency. These PAs, which are appointed by the NWFP's provincial governor, essentially control access to political and financial privileges and have the authority to suspend them arbitrarily according to the interests of the state (in consultation with the governor).
The PAs are in turn supported by khasadars (irregulars drawn from the tribes in the area and employed and financed by the PA) and levies (tribal militias) as well as by paramilitary forces under the control of the army, whose task is to maintain law and order and suppress crime. For purposes of daily administration, however, the PAs--and by extension, the government of Pakistan--rely on the support and services of maliks or holders of lungi positions, titles of official recognition and privilege (including financial benefits) granted by the political administration to tribal elders and leaders in order to secure their cooperation. Essentially, the PAs, as proxies of the central government, control access to political and financial privileges that they use as incentives and control mechanisms in order to manage the tribes of the FATA upon which they depend for their manpower needs.
The administrative and legal structures that the Pakistani government uses to manage the FATA are codified in a framework known as the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) 1901, a colonial-era arrangement that has been variously described as "arbitrary," "draconian," "oppressive," and contrary to human rights.[8] A former chief justice of the Peshawar (NWFP provincial) High Court explained in an interview with the International Crisis Group (ICG) that:
The present system of administration embodied by the PA and the FCR is a mechanism of social control that suited the colonial needs of the British but cannot be justified by any standards of modern administration and even basic human rights.[9]
The FCR is a parallel legal system used by the Pakistani government in essentially the same way as it was used by the British Raj, to control a supposedly "unruly" population according to the best interests of the central administration. In cases where the interests of the state are not directly at stake, the tribes of the FATA are left to their own devices to settle criminal and civil disputes. This state of affairs creates perceptions of exclusion rather than inclusion. Unlike the rest of the country, which falls under the jurisdiction of the country's regular court system (district and sessions courts that can appeal to the provincial High Courts or the Supreme Court of Pakistan), the FCR, with its arbitrary provisions for collective punishment, discrimination against women, and no right of appeal (to mention but a few), is the only law of the land.
Thus, the FCR is not only an anachronism but also breeds clientelism[10] and "...strengthen[s] conservative and patriarchal values."[11] While the Pakistani state claims that governance in the FATA is based on Pashtun tribal customs, in reality it has...elected to govern [the region] through local proxies and draconian colonial-era administrative structures and laws, depriving locals of constitutionally guaranteed civil and political rights and protection of the courts.[12]
The conclusion that can thus be made is that
...poor governance, combined with a long history of official [state] support for Islamist Pashtun proxies in Afghanistan... explains the growth of militancy and extremism in Pakistan's Pashtun-majority tribal region.[13]
The aforementioned administrative and legal issues are to a large extent responsible for the current state of underdevelopment in the region, which is the least developed territory in Pakistan. Not only are literacy rates far below the national average (which is itself comparatively low internationally--49.9 percent),[14] but due to its lack of infrastructure, the FATA comprise one of the most inaccessible areas in the world. Thus, although the FATA are "...formally a part of Pakistan [the region] more closely resembles a colony whose population lives under laws and administrative arrangements that set it apart from the rest of the state."[15]
A further issue that complicates matters is the transnational character of the Pashtun tribes living in the area. The Pashtuns are probably the largest "stateless ethnic group" in the current Westphalian international system (a description usually reserved for the Kurds)[16] and inhabit large sections of Pakistan's western regions (the NWFP, the FATA, and Balochistan) and Afghanistan's eastern and southeastern provinces.
They are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and the second or third-largest in Pakistan (after the Punjabis and Sindhis, depending on which census data one chooses to use). They straddle the Durand line, an artificial, colonial demarcation that forms the border between the two countries.
As with the FCR mentioned previously, the Durand line is a product of the British Raj's Afghan policy, inherited by the state of Pakistan after independence in 1947, and was a further attempt by the British Empire to control the "unmanageable" territory and population to the northwest of and adjacent to British India.[17] Indeed, the Durand line can be perceived as an attempt to weaken the potential unifying strength of Pashtun tribes in the area (a variation of the British Empire's "divide and conquer" approach), since it essentially divided the Pashtun ethnic group in two. Although the demarcation has been upheld under the uti possidentis juris principle of international law--where agreements with or between colonial powers are "inherited" by and are considered binding upon successor independent states--successive governments of Afghanistan (including the administration of Hamid Karzai and, to Pakistan's chagrin, the Taliban during their time in power)[18] have not recognized the line as the official border.
On the other hand, governments of Pakistan, fearing Pashtun nationalist claims within Pakistan as well as irredentist claims from Afghanistan, have continuously expressed recognition of the Durand line and have attempted to solve the dispute through the subversion of Pakistani- and Afghan-Pashtun nationalist movements while supporting Pashtun groups that espouse a non-nationalist agenda.[19]
This approach can best be illustrated by the rule of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988). As part of a deliberate policy on the part of his regime, Afghan guerrilla groups that advocated Islamic (as opposed to purely nationalist) aims were supported in order to dampen Pashtun nationalist and Afghan irredentist claims on areas of the FATA, the NWFP, and Balochistan (a region claimed by Pashtun nationalists as part of "Pashtunistan"--the "homeland" of the Pashtuns straddling the Durand line).
Even the administration of General Pervez Musharraf, while paying lip-service to wide-ranging reforms and half-heartedly implementing a few (mainly to ease international pressure), "...is following the pattern of the country's previous military rulers in co-opting religious extremists to support his government's agenda and to neutralize his secular political opposition."[20]
It can thus be argued that the partnership between the Pakistani state and Afghan Islamist groups has been a direct result of successive regimes' simultaneous (and continuing) collaboration with Pakistani Islamists. In the case of the Zia regime, in an attempt to legitimize military rule, it pursued a program of "Islamization" of the country,[21] which in turn led it to support the jihad in Afghanistan and brought it into a strategic alliance with Pakistani Islamist parties and groups as a means to further this specific end. The aforementioned concomitant policies can also be considered as part of the larger regional strategy pursued by Pakistan since its independence in 1947--the provision, by Afghanistan, of "strategic depth" for Pakistan in the event of total war with India, Pakistan's arch-rival on the subcontinent; a situation that could only come about through the rise to power in Afghanistan of a regime that shared Islamabad's outlook.
The nexus then, among Pakistani governments, Pakistani and Afghan Islamists, and Pakistan's Afghan policy in general, thus becomes evident when the strands mentioned previously are considered concurrently. This was illustrated during the period of the jihad against the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan (1979-1989). Throughout the jihad, the border tribal regions of Pakistan (Balochistan, the NWFP, and the FATA--including North and South Waziristan) were at the forefront of the mujahidin resistance effort, providing staging posts for cross-border operations against the Soviets as well as sanctuaries from which prospective and returning mujahidin to and from the "Afghan front" could be housed, trained, armed, and indoctrinated.[22] Pakistani Islamist parties and their members, such as the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), and Maulana Fazlur Rehman, were instrumental in setting up madrasas (religious schools) and networks in support of the jihad against the Soviets.[23] The Maktab al-Khidmat lil Mujahidin al-Arab (Afghan Service Bureau, MAK), the forerunner to al-Qa'ida (as an organization), was formed in Peshawar, Pakistan (the capital city of both the NWFP and the FATA) in 1984 in order to facilitate the movement of mujahidin fighters to the jihad in Afghanistan. It was, however, just one of many such support structures on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.[24]
The Taliban themselves grew out of a movement based around Kandahar in Afghanistan and Balochistan[25] (specifically Quetta) in Pakistan in 1994 and were supported by individuals in the JUI, such as Samiul Haq (who "...has deep respect for Mullah Omar"[26]) and the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).[27] The sanctuaries, entry and exit routes, and support networks that were created as a result of the jihad and Pakistan's Islamist-tilted Afghan policy, as well as the ties established between the Taliban and al-Qa'ida movements and Pashtun tribes along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, never really ceased to exist and were reactivated[28] following the fall of the Taliban. Writing in 1996, Olivier Roy stated:
The triumph of the Taliban has virtually eliminated the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. On both sides, Pashtu tribes are simultaneously slipping towards fundamentalism and becoming increasingly implicated in drug trafficking. They are gaining autonomy; already small fundamentalist emirates are appearing on Pakistani soil.[29]
A more succinct analysis of the state of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region (including the FATA) is difficult to find. Roy's statement encapsulates not only the porous and transnational nature of the border and its population, but also indicates the effects that Pakistani government policies have had in the region.
Government support for Islamist movements--such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic Party)[30] and the Taliban--during the jihad and Afghanistan's civil wars (1989-2001) in pursuit of its Afghan and Pashtun policies in effect "...militarized and radicalized the border region."[31] Ahmed Rashid makes a similar point when he states that: "Tribal groups imitating the Taliban sprang up across the Pashtun belt in the NWFP and Baluchistan."[32]
Although this passage specifically refers to the emergence and consolidation of the Taliban movement during the period of 1994 to 1996, Rashid illustrates a number of the same points evident in Roy's aforementioned analysis. Additionally, he highlights the difficulty in distinguishing between Afghan- and Pakistani-based groups that refer to themselves as "Taliban," since the movement, far from being territorially confined to specific areas such as Kandahar in Afghanistan or Quetta or Peshawar in Pakistan, is as transnational as the population that spans both sides of the Durand line.
The reason is that the Taliban is a product of a system of "Islamization," created, operated, and supported by Pakistani and Afghan Islamist parties and movements. Despite the fact that "...there was mounting public concern about the Talibanization of Pakistan, the country's leaders ignored the growing internal chaos."[33]
The rise in militancy along the border regions and the weakness of the Pakistani government to confront it and decisively deal with it are not issues confined to Islamabad's past actions alone. Within the Pakistani political establishment itself there continue to exist powerbrokers that are either pro-Taliban or exhibit radical Islamist tendencies. The Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (United Council for Action, MMA)--an alliance of six major religious parties including the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam faction of Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F), the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam faction of Samiul Haq (JUI-S), the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), the Jamiat Ahle Hadith (JAH), and the Islami Tehrik Pakistan (ITP)--was explicitly formed in opposition to President Pervez Musharraf's decision to ally Pakistan with the United States in its Global War on Terror following the September 11 attacks.[34]
While the JI, one of the most organized political parties in Pakistan, is the prominent force behind this alliance, the MMA includes within its ranks both factions of the pro-Taliban Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (the Fazlur Rehman and Samiul Haq factions).[35]
The MMA's political platform aims at the Islamization of Pakistan through the introduction of the Shari'a, the end of coeducation, and the introduction of more Islamic texts into school and college curricula. Furthermore, it shares the outlook of the Pakistani military regarding India and Kashmir and Afghanistan's role as a provider of strategic depth against the former--this being one of the reasons for the lack of serious confrontation between the religious parties and the military. In the October 2002 general election, the MMA achieved considerable political successes, which enabled it to both become the ruling party in the NWFP and a major partner in Balochistan (in cooperation with Musharraf's Muslim League, Quaid-i-Azam, PML-Q) as well as to win control of 62 out of 342 seats in the National Assembly (making it the third largest party).[36] Constituent groups within the MMA and prominent personalities of the alliance (such as Rehman) have been instrumental in brokering the agreements reached with pro-Taliban tribes in the FATA (including the Waziristan Accord).[37]
The transnational relationships between the inhabitants on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and its porous nature are also reflected in one of the key judgments made in a 1985 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report regarding Afghanistan, which stated that "...as long as the insurgents have access to strong external support and open borders,"[38] the Soviets would find it difficult to control much of the countryside. Although this conclusion was made in reference to CIA estimates of the number of Soviet troops that could be used to reinforce the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' (USSR) commitment in Afghanistan, the previously quoted extract crystallizes the two main difficulties faced by Soviet counterinsurgency efforts to defeat the mujahidin resistance--external support and a porous border.
Additionally, while the "external support" portion of the quotation undoubtedly refers to the various types of aid provided by third parties to the mujahidin (for instance, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United States), for the purposes of this article, it is enough to make the connection that any form of external support to insurgent or terrorist elements across the Durand line (given the transnational nature of the population and the difficulty of policing the border) would make it difficult for a stabilizing force (on either side) to establish control effectively. Without wanting to draw too much of a parallel between the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the current situation, what does become evident from a comparison of the two is the role that cross-border networks can have in sustaining insurgencies (or for that matter terrorist activity) on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.[39]
Thus, in order to deal with Taliban and al-Qa'ida members fleeing across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and because of the potentially negative political fallout of stationing foreign troops on Pakistani soil or of conducting large-scale, highly visible "hot pursuit" cross-border actions, the United States was forced to enlist the assistance of the Musharraf government in order to suppress Taliban and al-Qa'ida movement and action between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2001-2002. As a result, in July 2002, the federal government dispatched approximately 80,000 troops to sensitive border areas of the FATA for the first time since 1947, in search of Taliban and al-Qa'ida members.[40]
Almost immediately, a violent and increasingly expanding resistance against this perceived incursion by the Pakistani military surfaced. Although this outbreak of violence can be directly attributed to the military's (regular army and paramilitary units--for instance, the Frontier Corps) indiscriminate use of force and human rights violations,[41] it is also the product of Islamabad's previously outlined policies.
The perception among certain tribes and clans of the central government (and by extension its armed forces) as an opponent to be resisted; the history of the FATA; the similar ethnic composition of populations on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border; the transnational social networks straddling the Durand line; Islamabad's unfulfilled development and political promises towards the region; and its oscillating policy of repression and appeasement towards militias and armed tribes all coalesced to fuel the violence that was observed following government operations in mid-2002.[42]
According to Pakistani security authorities, in December 2003 two assassination attempts against President Pervez Musharraf were traced to militants in the region comprising the agencies of North and South Waziristan.[43] In early 2004, a general insurgency developed against the central government of Pakistan, marking the beginning of what has come to be known as the Waziristan conflict. Despite the fact that a number of combatants battling Pakistani troops came from the numerous tribes of the area, the insurgency generally involved militants belonging to pro-Taliban tribes as well as members of the Taliban and al-Qa'ida movements.[44]
As a result of the inherent political chaos in the FATA and the resistance of the population due to this latest military crackdown, the Taliban movement and al-Qa'ida members were provided with an environment in which they could regroup, rearm, recruit, and rebuild their training infrastructure through alliances developed with certain tribes and clans in the region.[45] It is estimated that in the period from 2004 to 2006, as a direct result of the "war in Waziristan," the Pakistani army lost approximately 1,000 to 3,000 men.[46]
The possibility of an extreme deterioration of the situation and a spillover of the violence into agencies and provinces neighboring the Waziristans (North and South) and the FATA in general (mainly areas of the NWFP and Balochistan) led the Musharraf government to agree to a ceasefire with the tribes and militants inhabiting North Waziristan on September 5, 2006.
It is worth mentioning that this particular agreement between the Pakistani government and tribal and militia leaders (including pro-Taliban elements) is the third of its kind since 2004.[47] The "Shakai deal" (April 24, 2004) in South Waziristan was the first, wherein five tribal elders of the Zalikhel tribe--Nek Muhammad, Haji Sharif, Maulana Abd al-Aziz, Maulvi Abbas, and Haji Noorul Islam--accused of harboring al-Qa'ida members "surrendered" to the Pakistani military and reportedly "pledged loyalty" to the government in return for leniency. As part of the same agreement, the government released 155 of the 163 tribesmen captured in March 2004 as a result of military operations and gave "foreign terrorists" until the end of the month (April 30, 2004) to surrender and receive a pardon. The then interior minister, Faysal Saleh Hayat, announced that this general amnesty was open to all except top-tier leaders of al-Qa'ida and the Taliban.
The amnesty date was extended twice, and the tribal forces that were created to hunt down al-Qa'ida and Taliban members apparently failed to locate any foreign terrorists in South Waziristan.[48]
Following the Shakai deal, violence in the Waziristans continued both from tribal militias as well as from government troops, and although some successes were announced, the deal failed to stem cross-border movement. By June 9, 2004, a militant group led by Nek Muhammad allegedly took responsibility for an attack that killed 25 people (including 17 security personnel) and wounded 11 in the Tiyarza area of South Waziristan. (Nek Muhammad was subsequently killed when a precision-guided missile hit the house he was staying at in the village of Dhok, near Wana, South Waziristan on June 17, 2004.)[49]
The second agreement between the Pakistani government and pro-Taliban militants was signed on February 7, 2005, in Sararogha, South Waziristan. Baitullah Mehsud, a pro-Taliban mujahidin commander belonging to the Mehsud tribe, allegedly "surrendered" and "laid down his arms" at a ceremony held in an open field surrounded by Taliban cadres.[50] Abdallah Mehsud (who has ties to the JUI-run Jamiat-ul Uloomi Islamiyya seminary in Binori, Karachi, which sent at least 600 students to fight for the Taliban in 1997),[51] an associate of Baitullah and a member of the same tribe, never signed the aforementioned agreement, denounced it, and continued his attacks against military personnel and locals accused of spying for Pakistan or the United States.[52]
The terms of this second agreement were similar to the ones included in the Shakai deal, in that the six provisions of the agreement included clauses whereby Baitullah and his supporters would not support "foreign terrorists" in their area, would cease their attacks against government personnel and installations, and would be given official pardons in return. In the event of violations to the agreement, cases would be adjudicated under the FCR.[53] However, violence from both government forces and militants (including members of the Mehsud tribe) continued, and by July 27, 2005, Baitullah Mehsud declared the agreement void, resumed attacks, and blamed the government, stating that: "The government has not kept the agreement with us. It is not holding anymore.... They have violated the agreement by arresting our Mujahideen."[54]
The third agreement, the Waziristan Accord, has (unsurprisingly perhaps) gone the way of its predecessors. Although violence directed against government troops on the Pakistani side of the border did decrease somewhat in the immediate aftermath of the signing, extra-judicial killings continued, and insurgent and terrorist actions within Afghanistan increased dramatically. Talat Masood, a defense analyst and former Pakistani army general stated that "...it would take at least six months to see if the truce is effective, or whether militants use it to consolidate their positions."[55] As of 2007, more than a year after the signing of the Waziristan Accord, it appears that the latter is the case. Militant elements (including the Taliban and al-Qa'ida) are consolidating (or have consolidated) their positions and are expanding their influence along both sides of the Durand line. Like previous "peace deals," the Waziristan Accord was just as inconclusive and lacked definite guarantees and effective monitoring provisions. The former secretary of security of the FATA, Brigadier Mehmood Shah (now retired), who had been personally involved in the previous two agreements, described the Waziristan Accord as "weaker" than previous ones, stating that: "The Taliban's pledges are no more than a general statement that they will not do this and that." [56]
It can thus be summarized that the government of Pakistan entered into the aforementioned agreements due to its inability to impose its control on a particular region (or regions)--as a result of both its fractured stance regarding radical Islam within the country and its chronic mismanagement of the area(s) under consideration (namely the FATA as well as the NWFP and Balochistan). Given Pakistan's categorization as a failed or failing state,[57] a feature of which is a lack of capacity to control certain portions of their territorial expanse--thus providing space for opponents to their authority to surface--it is perhaps predictable that "peace deals" such as the Waziristan Accord would be sought by the central government. Generally speaking, in the case of "weak states," governments adopt one of two, or both, strategies--appeasement and/or repression vis-Ã -vis regional challengers. Pakistan has implemented both responses; Waziristan-style agreements provide an example of the former (appeasement), usually after the failure of the latter (repression).
This oscillating approach has resulted in an increase and entrenchment of armed opposition to the Musharraf regime in most areas of the FATA, wherein future agreements are perceived not as genuine attempts at some sort of conflict resolution, but rather as opportunities to recuperate, extend influence, solidify gains, and prepare for the next round of hostilities.
ASSESSMENTAlthough little has been published regarding the terms of the Waziristan Accord, from the information available in the public domain and according to various reports dealing specifically with the agreement, the Waziristan Accord is a three-page document that contains 16 clauses and four subclauses and follows the format of previous "peace deals" between militants and Pakistani forces in the FATA. The terms of the agreement include the following:
There shall be no cross-border movement for militant activity in Afghanistan. On its part, the Government pledged not to undertake any ground or air operations against the militants and to resolve issues through local customs and traditions.
The agreement will come into force with the relocation of the Army from checkpoints in the region. The Khasadar force [a local tribal force] and Levy personnel [tribal militias] will take over the check-posts.
Foreigners living in North Waziristan will have to leave Pakistan, but those who cannot leave will be allowed to live peacefully, respecting the law of the land and the agreement.
Both parties will return each other's weapons, vehicles and communication equipment seized during various operations.
Tribal elders, mujahidin and the Utmanzai tribe would ensure that no-one attacked security force personnel and state property.
There will be no target killing and no parallel administration in the agency.Militants would not enter the settled districts adjacent to North Waziristan.Government would release prisoners held in military operations and would not arrest them again.
Tribesmen's "incentives" would be restored. The administration is to resolve disputes in accordance with local customs and traditions.
Government would pay compensation for the loss of life and property of innocent tribesmen during recent operations.
There is no ban on display of arms. However, tribesmen will not carry heavy weapons.
A 10-member committee--comprising elders, members of political administration and ulema [religious scholars]--is to monitor progress of the accord and ensure its implementation.[58]
It is evident from the aforementioned that the government of Pakistan has made quite a number of important concessions to the militants in North Waziristan. In return for vague guarantees of cessation of attack against government personnel and installations, the state has not only allowed the existence of armed groups within its borders, but has so far also released militants arrested during operations, provided them with some sort of amnesty, and withdrawn from certain areas, handing their control over to questionable armed groups.[59]
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, the Musharraf government has no real means of monitoring militant pledges and imposing its will in the event that tribal and militia promises made are not kept, short of a return to violence. The Mujahidin Shura Council (the 10-member committee that is supposed to monitor the progress of the accord and ensure its implementation) has no real power but exhibits the potential of circumscribing and acting as a "check" on government decisions to impose its will. In effect, should the government of Pakistan decide to act in response to violations of the accord without the support of the ten-member committee, it will find itself not only acting unilaterally, but also in contravention of said agreement (thus exposing itself to accusations of not honoring its own pacts).
Additionally, the Pakistani government has, through the terms of the Waziristan Accord, turned over checkpoints to militias composed of fighters against whom it had been battling since 2002. Although it is true that the government retains some form of control (either directly or indirectly) over certain checkpoints and border-crossings, it does not maintain the kind of direct presence needed to manage North Waziristan and the border with Afghanistan effectively. In withdrawing army units to their barracks and removing visible signs of military presence from the area, the Musharraf administration appears to believe that by appeasing pro-Taliban elements it can remain in power, while retaining the option of violence through proxies.[60]
Indeed, it can be argued that the government has left the difficult and hazardous task of combating pro-Taliban tribes and members of the Taliban and al-Qa'ida to local militias that it perceives can be controlled through financial incentives and the occasional, limited operational assistance. Recent actions by the military, ostensibly in support and at the request of pro-government tribes during their clashes with Taliban and al-Qa'ida members and their local allies appear to corroborate this change in strategy.[61] However, this approach carries the risk of drawing the military into local "score-settling" among tribes who will be given the opportunity to denounce rivals as pro-Taliban or al-Qa'ida, thus eliciting financial and/or military support from the government in their parochial struggles. The polarizing effect of such a scenario risks making the situation worse rather than better. Additionally, a "proxy war" presupposes that the proxies in question have the ability (with a certain amount of support) to attain predetermined goals.
In the case of North Waziristan (and other areas of the FATA, the NWFP, and Balochistan) this means that pro-government tribes are strong and capable enough to carry out independently (to a certain degree) the eradication of Taliban and al-Qa'ida elements from the aforementioned regions and to stem cross-border activity. However, Mehmood Shah has commented that the Taliban "...are too strong to be controlled by the tribes"[62] since they have "...shattered the tribes' authority, killing hundreds of pro-government tribal leaders."[63] Similar arguments can be made regarding the effectiveness of the government's paramilitary forces in the area, namely the Frontier Corps (FC NWFP and FC Balochistan).
Despite ongoing material assistance from the United States (especially for FC NWFP units),[64] the Frontier Corps' operational value remains questionable. Although FC NWFP (comprised mainly of ethnic Pashtuns from the region) "...has a comparatively better reputation among people of the province,"[65] FC Balochistan (whose members are largely non-Baloch) "...is not popular in Balochistan and is seen as an outside force that is widely believed to be involved in human rights violations and is known for the disproportionate use of force."[66] Irrespective of the "better reputation" of FC NWFP as compared to FC Balochistan, both branches stand accused of indiscriminate and disproportional use of force, extrajudicial killings, and human rights violations generally attributable to the Frontier Corps' poor discipline, training, and coordination.[67]
This state of affairs (pro-government tribal weakness and paramilitary unit excesses) has not only assisted pro-Taliban, Taliban, and al-Qa'ida groups in consolidating their presence but has enabled such groups to create parallel administrations in areas of South and North Waziristan.
Apparently, more recently, in the Bajaur Agency of the FATA, an agreement similar to the Waziristan Accord has been reached with Faqir Muhammad, who has been described as "al-Zawahiri's Pakistani Ally."[68] Whether or not the federal government can still use pro-government tribes against pro-Taliban and al-Qa'ida elements remains to be seen. While it can be argued that more effective and efficient support and empowerment of pro-government tribal forces may yet yield positive, tangible results, the fact remains that events in the wider region during the 1980s and 1990s have tended to have a detrimental effect on "traditional" tribal authority (on both sides of the Durand line).
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the civil wars that followed it, the steady flow of refugees across the border, the marginalization of tribal leaders in favor of religious ones and the madrasa education provided to generations of tribal Afghans and Pashtuns have generally had negative effects on tribal social structures and the ability of tribal leaders to assert their control.[69]
A further complication to agreements such as the Waziristan Accord is the existence and status of so-called "foreigners" in the tribal areas and the opposing definitions that the tribes themselves and the government of Pakistan ascribe to these individuals. It is a generally accepted fact that the "foreigners" in the FATA are comprised (mainly) of five "groups": Afghan Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Chechens, Uighurs, and Arabs (mostly Yemenis, Saudis, and Egyptians).[70]
All the "peace agreements" that the government of Pakistan has entered into with militants in the tribal areas included tribal promises to expel "foreigners" from the region, or in situations where this is not possible, "...those who cannot leave will be allowed to live peacefully, respecting the law of the land and the agreement."[71] Given the intermarriages between "foreigners" and local women (wherein the former are considered to be members of the latter's tribe),[72] as well as the Pashtunwali norms of melmastia (hospitality) and nanawati (defense of a guest),[73] it is perhaps unsurprising that in all cases, signatories to the "peace deals" have been unable to locate foreign militants since, according to the aforementioned sociocultural factors, there are no (or few) "foreigners" in the FATA per se (although there appears to be some tension between the locals and Uzbek fighters).[74]
In tandem to the developments in Pakistan's FATA (and it is reasonable to argue as a result of them), pro-Taliban and Taliban forces have increased their activity in neighboring Afghanistan. According to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), attacks against members of the NATO alliance and the National Army of Afghanistan have increased by 62 percent since 2005,[75] suicide attacks have increased five-fold from 25 in 2005 to 139 in 2006,[76] and large-scale Taliban operations (involving 50 fighters or more) have increased significantly.[77] According to Reuters, "since the [Waziristan Accord] was clinched, attacks against U.S.-led NATO troops and Afghan government forces have tripled in eastern Afghanistan, especially in areas bordering North Waziristan."[78]
As a result, NATO has been requesting that its members both increase their troop contributions and (to those countries that refuse to do so) allow their troops to engage in combat operations in order to counter resurgent Taliban and al-Qa'ida forces operating across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
In addition to the external effects of the Waziristan Accord, the "deal" has also had internal consequences for the state of Pakistan. While it is certainly the case that the accord is a result of the Pakistani government's ambivalent and oscillating attitude towards radical Islamist tendencies within its territory, it is also a cause for further violent action by other groups. The siege of the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in the capital Islamabad from July 3-10, 2007, is an indication of this parallel process. On the one hand, the violent showdown can be perceived as the culmination of a year-long struggle between radical Islamist elements of this particular establishment and the Musharraf government. On the other, it can be argued with equal validity that "peace-deals" in the FATA (such as the Waziristan Accord) emboldened activists of the Red Mosque (who share links to radical Islamic groups in the Waziristans and the FATA) into asserting themselves more forcefully, since they perceived the Musharraf government as weak and ineffective (because of Waziristan Accord-style agreements).
Although in the case of the Lal Masjid siege it can be concluded that the Islamists "over-reached" and misread the situation (since Islamabad and the FATA exhibit different political and social trends), there nevertheless appears to be a connection between government appeasement of militants (such as the Waziristan Accord) and further violence elsewhere. Unsurprisingly perhaps, in the same way that militants have used government actions to extricate themselves from past agreements (labeling them "violations"), the Lal Masjid incident provided armed elements in the FATA with an excuse--intended primarily for local consumption--to withdraw from the Waziristan Accord, thus leading to its collapse. This is not said to imply that the Red Mosque incident was staged specifically to provide militants in the FATA with a pretext for renouncing the accord, but rather to illustrate how agreements of this nature have strengthened militants in the tribal areas both militarily and politically and to demonstrate their "spillover" effect.
CONCLUSIONA pattern is clearly emerging. Waziristan Accord-style agreements have, to date, occurred in at least three (if not four) areas of the FATA. These "deals," while alleviating the Pakistani military somewhat, have not resulted in a cessation of attacks against it and its local allies and have emboldened pro-Taliban militants both in these particular areas and in neighboring ones; territory that is crucial in the War on Terror and Afghanistan's reconstruction. Indeed, the effects of the Waziristan Accord and similar agreements have already manifested themselves beyond the Waziristans (the events of the Lal Masjid siege providing a poignant example). Not only are Taliban and pro-Taliban elements consolidating their position in the FATA, but it appears that their influence has spread to areas of the NWFP, Balochistan, and possibly Kashmir. It is estimated that one of the reasons for the increase of Taliban attacks against NATO and Afghan forces in areas that were hitherto considered "safe," such as the northern and western provinces of Afghanistan,[79] is the fact that crossing-points have been established in areas of the FATA, the NWFP, and Balochistan. Withdrawal of Pakistani army units has generally resulted in an increase of extrajudicial killings by pro-Taliban elements against pro-government tribal leaders, the opening of offices run by Taliban-affiliated groups claiming to be responsible for the maintenance of law and order, and the distribution of leaflets to that effect.[80] Something similar has been observed in certain areas of Afghanistan.[81] Given these developments, it is possible to conclude that "Pakistan is now paying the price by... losing control of much of the frontier area to groups it has supported, groups that exploit their ties in Afghanistan just as the Taliban exploit their ties in Pakistan"[82] and that "...Pakistan [is] providing strategic depth to the Taliban."[83] Additionally, it has become possible to describe the Waziristan Accord and agreements like it as the effective "ceding of territory to the Taliban."[84]
In conclusion, although the Waziristan Accord and its predecessors did indeed offer the Musharraf government some degree of respite and (temporarily) decreased the "hot-spots" of violence and areas of contention with which the administration has had to deal, they proved to be short-term solutions that provided the opportunity for radical and militant elements to regroup and consolidate their positions.
Given the escalating popular resentment against the government of General Pervez Musharraf in increasingly varied areas of governance--including amplifying levels of violence in the province of Balochistan[85] and vocal opposition by pro-democracy elements--it can be argued that the regime's choice of this particular method (Waziristan-style accords) for dealing with the "Islamic component" of the turmoil plaguing Pakistan was perceived as offering the most politically expedient (and promising) approach to keep the Musharraf regime in power and to decrease the "problem-spots" in the country.[86]
The military's traditionally close ties with Islamic elements and the electoral collaboration between Musharraf's PML(Q) and the MMA in the October 2002 elections suggest that, after government failures to deal unilaterally with the situation in the FATA, mediation through the use of Islamist allies was a political option that seemed to carry the least risk. However, continued instability and negative "spillover," both violent and political, indicates not only the shortcomings of this policy, but also underscores the inability (or unwillingness) of certain groups (Islamic, political, or otherwise) in the country to influence, "rein-in," or control particular Islamic militant elements in Pakistan's tribal areas. It is perhaps the realization by Musharraf of the limitations of continued association with the MMA that a limited rapprochement with Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) has been initiated.
As a final point, although radical Islamist groups have increased their power in the FATA, NWFP, and areas of Balochistan, and violence has moved beyond the boundaries of the Waziristans to a degree that threatens the viability of the Pakistani state, it is unlikely that Taliban or militant elements (and/or their political/military allies) can use their power in the tribal belt to take over the government. While it is true that some circles within Pakistan see no reason to end the strategic alliance with movements such as the Taliban and their domestic backers, the religious right[87]--since they are considered to be more reliable allies in the pursuit of "traditional" Pakistani policies (especially given improving U.S.-Indian relations)[88]--and that the Pakistani military has traditionally adopted a stronger Islamic stance when perceiving its domestic position as being undermined,[89] there is a growing realization among the country's elites (including the military) that Taliban and similarly inspired groups pose a serious threat to the continued existence of the Pakistani state.[90] This is not meant to imply that the threat to Pakistan posed by increased radicalization and violence in the FATA, NWFP, and Balochistan and their propensity to spread is trivial, since a "failed" (as opposed to "weak") Pakistan carries significant regional implications, not least for the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan.
Yet the argument that a Taliban-style, nuclear weapons-toting Pakistan is considered to be unlikely must be emphasized.
Islamic parties have usually relied on the military's support to increase their electoral appeal, which reached a record high in the October 2002 elections.[91]
Given this reliance, it is improbable that, for instance, the JI (the largest, most organized constituent member of the MMA alliance) will willingly dissolve this partnership in favor of the more radical Islamic approaches (as espoused by the JUI-F and JUI-S factions). Furthermore, the MMA is less than the monolithic Islamic alliance than it is usually portrayed as being. Although their ethnic, doctrinal, and policy differences are downplayed by representatives of the alliance, the MMA represents an uneasy coalition of Islamic parties with widely different constituencies.[92]
Illustrative of this is the fact that the JI draws most of its support from Punjabi and muhajir (migrant) communities in the Punjab and urban areas of Sindh, whose interests do not coincide with the more tribally based JUI, which caters to a Pashtun electorate located in the FATA, the NWFP, and areas of Balochistan (although it does have limited support in Sindh).[93]
The point is that in the event of a consistent, popularly endorsed government response to radical Islamic elements, the MMA is likely to face internal pressures threatening its cohesion, making it possible to surmise that more moderate Islamists might opt for accommodation rather than confrontation with the government (provided of course that this does not damage their relationship with the electorate).
Thus, it is worth noting that although the threat from radical Islam in Pakistan persists and radical Islamists "...have managed to exert a political and ideological influence in excess of their numbers..."[94] their potency "stems less from [their strength] than from the weakness of their opponents."[95] This implies that a more stable government with a clear strategy for dealing with a variety of sociopolitical issues stands a chance of combating the radicalization evident in Pakistan.
The kind of government response that is required to reverse the "Talibanization" of the FATA and parts of the NWFP and Balochistan will obviously not be an easy task. Continued governmental mismanagement (at all levels but particularly at the regional level), widespread corruption, uneven development, the fact that both Pakistani political parties and successive governments have "...failed lamentably to develop Pakistan or improve the living conditions of its people, thus making the radical option seem all the more attractive,"[96] and an obsession with India mean that substantial shifts in the country's internal and external policies will be necessary. Waziristan-style agreements are thus a symptom of the multifaceted problems afflicting Pakistan.
Despite offering vague, short-term solutions, they only serve to further weaken the central government while strengthening opponents who perceive violence as the only method that can achieve results.
*Evagoras C. Leventis holds a Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) in International Relations from the University of Indianapolis and a Master of Letters (M.Litt.) in International Security Studies from the University of St. Andrews, Scotland.
The Waziristan Accord between Pakistan's government and tribal leaders in that country's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has failed not only to curb violence in the immediate region but also to restrict cross-border militant activity--including resurgent Taliban and al-Qa'ida cadres--between Pakistan's "tribal belt" and Afghanistan. The purpose of this article is to examine the Waziristan Accord and to indicate why agreements of this nature will continue to fail unless there is a substantial modification in Pakistan's internal and regional policies.
On September 5, 2006, in the town of Miranshah, on the football field of the Government Degree College, Maulana Syed Nek Zaman, a member of the National Assembly for the North Waziristan Agency and a tribal council member, read out an agreement between the Pakistani government and tribal elders that has since been known as the Waziristan Accord.
The agreement, witnessed by approximately 500 elders, parliamentarians, and government officials, was signed on behalf of the Pakistan government by Dr. Fakhr-i-Alam, a political agent of North Waziristan, tribal and militia leaders from the mainly Pashtun tribes and clans of the area, and seven militants representing the Taliban shura (advisory council).
The signing was witnessed by Major-General Azhar Ali Shah, the commanding officer of the Pakistani army in the region. The venue was heavily guarded by armed tribal militia members and allegedly also by armed Taliban members.[1]
The Treaty of Waziristan (or the Waziristan Accord) is considered by some to be the "unconditional surrender" of the government of Pakistan to the tribes of the area, the Taliban, and al-Qa'ida.[2] On the other hand, government representatives continuously reiterate that the treaty was signed only with the elders and leaders of the tribes inhabiting the region, who have in turn committed themselves to suppressing cross-border Taliban and al-Qa'ida activity and to eradicating the presence of foreign militants in the area.[3]
However, even a cursory monitoring of the situation since the September 2006 agreement indicates that the former is probably closer to the truth. Nevertheless, describing the Waziristan Accord as an "unconditional surrender" is probably too extreme a characterization, since the government of Pakistan hardly surrendered anything but rather reaffirmed the status quo--a state of affairs that certain segments of the Pakistani administration do not consider to be adverse but rather vital to Pakistan's greater strategic interests.[4]
This article is divided into two sections. The first will provide a brief background of the events that culminated in the signing of the Waziristan Accord, its main purpose being to situate this particular agreement in the wider context of regional history and politics, including Pakistan's role in the War on Terror. The second part will examine what little has been made public regarding the Waziristan Accord and juxtapose its terms to events on the ground in an attempt to provide an assessment of it. The overall intention of this article is not only to illustrate how this agreement, like its predecessors, has failed to solve the two main issues it was designed to settle--the cessation of violence in the immediate area and the termination of cross-border militant movement and activity against the nascent Afghan government and U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan--but perhaps more importantly to highlight the reasons why accords of this nature will continue to fail unless the Pakistani government (in its entirety) radically alters its policies in the area and substantially shifts its regional strategy (both with respect to Afghanistan as well as Kashmir).
BACKGROUND TO THE WAZIRISTAN ACCORDIn 2001-2002, as a result of successful U.S. operations in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) against the Taliban movement and al-Qa'ida elements, the former were ousted from power and the latter lost their state sanctuary, effectively destroying them as an organization. However, it is by now a widely accepted fact that many members of both groups, including their top-tier leadership, managed to escape and find refuge across the country's eastern border with Pakistan--a region known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)[5]--and have since (especially the Taliban)
"...established themselves in parts of south-western and south-eastern Afghanistan, control parts of FATA and have their main headquarters and support networks in Baluchistan."[6]
The FATA consist of 12 administratively autonomous regions[7] of western Pakistan. Together with the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) that lies to the north and the province of Balochistan (or Baluchistan) to the south, these three administrative divisions (two provinces and one territory) form the greater part of Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. The southern Afghan provinces (from west to east) of Nimruz, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabol, and Paktika border Balochistan to the south. Paktika also shares its eastern border with North and South Waziristan, the largest and southernmost agencies of Pakistan's FATA. The remainder of Afghanistan's eastern provinces (from south to north)--Khost, Paktia, Nangarhar, and Konar--border the FATA agencies of North Waziristan and Kurram (Khost); Kurram (Paktia); Kurram, Khyber and Mohmand (Nangarhar); as well as Mohmand and Bajaur (Konar). Konar also shares a border with the Dir Agency of the NWFP.
The northeastern provinces of Afghanistan (from south to north)--Nurestan and Badakhshan--border Pakistan's NWFP agencies of Dir and Chitral to the east (Badakhshan also shares a small strip of border with Pakistan's Northern Areas).
Characterized by mountainous terrain and a bewildering array of autonomous, mainly Pashtun tribes and clans, the FATA are ostensibly controlled by the federal government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, but in reality the government has never exercised any level of substantial control over the area.
Unlike Balochistan and the NWFP, the FATA have never been truly incorporated into the Pakistani state. Epigrammatically, the government controls the area indirectly through political agents (PA), who are federal or provincially recruited bureaucrats that wield considerable executive, judicial, and revenue power in each FATA agency. These PAs, which are appointed by the NWFP's provincial governor, essentially control access to political and financial privileges and have the authority to suspend them arbitrarily according to the interests of the state (in consultation with the governor).
The PAs are in turn supported by khasadars (irregulars drawn from the tribes in the area and employed and financed by the PA) and levies (tribal militias) as well as by paramilitary forces under the control of the army, whose task is to maintain law and order and suppress crime. For purposes of daily administration, however, the PAs--and by extension, the government of Pakistan--rely on the support and services of maliks or holders of lungi positions, titles of official recognition and privilege (including financial benefits) granted by the political administration to tribal elders and leaders in order to secure their cooperation. Essentially, the PAs, as proxies of the central government, control access to political and financial privileges that they use as incentives and control mechanisms in order to manage the tribes of the FATA upon which they depend for their manpower needs.
The administrative and legal structures that the Pakistani government uses to manage the FATA are codified in a framework known as the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) 1901, a colonial-era arrangement that has been variously described as "arbitrary," "draconian," "oppressive," and contrary to human rights.[8] A former chief justice of the Peshawar (NWFP provincial) High Court explained in an interview with the International Crisis Group (ICG) that:
The present system of administration embodied by the PA and the FCR is a mechanism of social control that suited the colonial needs of the British but cannot be justified by any standards of modern administration and even basic human rights.[9]
The FCR is a parallel legal system used by the Pakistani government in essentially the same way as it was used by the British Raj, to control a supposedly "unruly" population according to the best interests of the central administration. In cases where the interests of the state are not directly at stake, the tribes of the FATA are left to their own devices to settle criminal and civil disputes. This state of affairs creates perceptions of exclusion rather than inclusion. Unlike the rest of the country, which falls under the jurisdiction of the country's regular court system (district and sessions courts that can appeal to the provincial High Courts or the Supreme Court of Pakistan), the FCR, with its arbitrary provisions for collective punishment, discrimination against women, and no right of appeal (to mention but a few), is the only law of the land.
Thus, the FCR is not only an anachronism but also breeds clientelism[10] and "...strengthen[s] conservative and patriarchal values."[11] While the Pakistani state claims that governance in the FATA is based on Pashtun tribal customs, in reality it has...elected to govern [the region] through local proxies and draconian colonial-era administrative structures and laws, depriving locals of constitutionally guaranteed civil and political rights and protection of the courts.[12]
The conclusion that can thus be made is that
...poor governance, combined with a long history of official [state] support for Islamist Pashtun proxies in Afghanistan... explains the growth of militancy and extremism in Pakistan's Pashtun-majority tribal region.[13]
The aforementioned administrative and legal issues are to a large extent responsible for the current state of underdevelopment in the region, which is the least developed territory in Pakistan. Not only are literacy rates far below the national average (which is itself comparatively low internationally--49.9 percent),[14] but due to its lack of infrastructure, the FATA comprise one of the most inaccessible areas in the world. Thus, although the FATA are "...formally a part of Pakistan [the region] more closely resembles a colony whose population lives under laws and administrative arrangements that set it apart from the rest of the state."[15]
A further issue that complicates matters is the transnational character of the Pashtun tribes living in the area. The Pashtuns are probably the largest "stateless ethnic group" in the current Westphalian international system (a description usually reserved for the Kurds)[16] and inhabit large sections of Pakistan's western regions (the NWFP, the FATA, and Balochistan) and Afghanistan's eastern and southeastern provinces.
They are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and the second or third-largest in Pakistan (after the Punjabis and Sindhis, depending on which census data one chooses to use). They straddle the Durand line, an artificial, colonial demarcation that forms the border between the two countries.
As with the FCR mentioned previously, the Durand line is a product of the British Raj's Afghan policy, inherited by the state of Pakistan after independence in 1947, and was a further attempt by the British Empire to control the "unmanageable" territory and population to the northwest of and adjacent to British India.[17] Indeed, the Durand line can be perceived as an attempt to weaken the potential unifying strength of Pashtun tribes in the area (a variation of the British Empire's "divide and conquer" approach), since it essentially divided the Pashtun ethnic group in two. Although the demarcation has been upheld under the uti possidentis juris principle of international law--where agreements with or between colonial powers are "inherited" by and are considered binding upon successor independent states--successive governments of Afghanistan (including the administration of Hamid Karzai and, to Pakistan's chagrin, the Taliban during their time in power)[18] have not recognized the line as the official border.
On the other hand, governments of Pakistan, fearing Pashtun nationalist claims within Pakistan as well as irredentist claims from Afghanistan, have continuously expressed recognition of the Durand line and have attempted to solve the dispute through the subversion of Pakistani- and Afghan-Pashtun nationalist movements while supporting Pashtun groups that espouse a non-nationalist agenda.[19]
This approach can best be illustrated by the rule of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988). As part of a deliberate policy on the part of his regime, Afghan guerrilla groups that advocated Islamic (as opposed to purely nationalist) aims were supported in order to dampen Pashtun nationalist and Afghan irredentist claims on areas of the FATA, the NWFP, and Balochistan (a region claimed by Pashtun nationalists as part of "Pashtunistan"--the "homeland" of the Pashtuns straddling the Durand line).
Even the administration of General Pervez Musharraf, while paying lip-service to wide-ranging reforms and half-heartedly implementing a few (mainly to ease international pressure), "...is following the pattern of the country's previous military rulers in co-opting religious extremists to support his government's agenda and to neutralize his secular political opposition."[20]
It can thus be argued that the partnership between the Pakistani state and Afghan Islamist groups has been a direct result of successive regimes' simultaneous (and continuing) collaboration with Pakistani Islamists. In the case of the Zia regime, in an attempt to legitimize military rule, it pursued a program of "Islamization" of the country,[21] which in turn led it to support the jihad in Afghanistan and brought it into a strategic alliance with Pakistani Islamist parties and groups as a means to further this specific end. The aforementioned concomitant policies can also be considered as part of the larger regional strategy pursued by Pakistan since its independence in 1947--the provision, by Afghanistan, of "strategic depth" for Pakistan in the event of total war with India, Pakistan's arch-rival on the subcontinent; a situation that could only come about through the rise to power in Afghanistan of a regime that shared Islamabad's outlook.
The nexus then, among Pakistani governments, Pakistani and Afghan Islamists, and Pakistan's Afghan policy in general, thus becomes evident when the strands mentioned previously are considered concurrently. This was illustrated during the period of the jihad against the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan (1979-1989). Throughout the jihad, the border tribal regions of Pakistan (Balochistan, the NWFP, and the FATA--including North and South Waziristan) were at the forefront of the mujahidin resistance effort, providing staging posts for cross-border operations against the Soviets as well as sanctuaries from which prospective and returning mujahidin to and from the "Afghan front" could be housed, trained, armed, and indoctrinated.[22] Pakistani Islamist parties and their members, such as the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), and Maulana Fazlur Rehman, were instrumental in setting up madrasas (religious schools) and networks in support of the jihad against the Soviets.[23] The Maktab al-Khidmat lil Mujahidin al-Arab (Afghan Service Bureau, MAK), the forerunner to al-Qa'ida (as an organization), was formed in Peshawar, Pakistan (the capital city of both the NWFP and the FATA) in 1984 in order to facilitate the movement of mujahidin fighters to the jihad in Afghanistan. It was, however, just one of many such support structures on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.[24]
The Taliban themselves grew out of a movement based around Kandahar in Afghanistan and Balochistan[25] (specifically Quetta) in Pakistan in 1994 and were supported by individuals in the JUI, such as Samiul Haq (who "...has deep respect for Mullah Omar"[26]) and the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).[27] The sanctuaries, entry and exit routes, and support networks that were created as a result of the jihad and Pakistan's Islamist-tilted Afghan policy, as well as the ties established between the Taliban and al-Qa'ida movements and Pashtun tribes along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, never really ceased to exist and were reactivated[28] following the fall of the Taliban. Writing in 1996, Olivier Roy stated:
The triumph of the Taliban has virtually eliminated the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. On both sides, Pashtu tribes are simultaneously slipping towards fundamentalism and becoming increasingly implicated in drug trafficking. They are gaining autonomy; already small fundamentalist emirates are appearing on Pakistani soil.[29]
A more succinct analysis of the state of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region (including the FATA) is difficult to find. Roy's statement encapsulates not only the porous and transnational nature of the border and its population, but also indicates the effects that Pakistani government policies have had in the region.
Government support for Islamist movements--such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic Party)[30] and the Taliban--during the jihad and Afghanistan's civil wars (1989-2001) in pursuit of its Afghan and Pashtun policies in effect "...militarized and radicalized the border region."[31] Ahmed Rashid makes a similar point when he states that: "Tribal groups imitating the Taliban sprang up across the Pashtun belt in the NWFP and Baluchistan."[32]
Although this passage specifically refers to the emergence and consolidation of the Taliban movement during the period of 1994 to 1996, Rashid illustrates a number of the same points evident in Roy's aforementioned analysis. Additionally, he highlights the difficulty in distinguishing between Afghan- and Pakistani-based groups that refer to themselves as "Taliban," since the movement, far from being territorially confined to specific areas such as Kandahar in Afghanistan or Quetta or Peshawar in Pakistan, is as transnational as the population that spans both sides of the Durand line.
The reason is that the Taliban is a product of a system of "Islamization," created, operated, and supported by Pakistani and Afghan Islamist parties and movements. Despite the fact that "...there was mounting public concern about the Talibanization of Pakistan, the country's leaders ignored the growing internal chaos."[33]
The rise in militancy along the border regions and the weakness of the Pakistani government to confront it and decisively deal with it are not issues confined to Islamabad's past actions alone. Within the Pakistani political establishment itself there continue to exist powerbrokers that are either pro-Taliban or exhibit radical Islamist tendencies. The Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (United Council for Action, MMA)--an alliance of six major religious parties including the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam faction of Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F), the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam faction of Samiul Haq (JUI-S), the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), the Jamiat Ahle Hadith (JAH), and the Islami Tehrik Pakistan (ITP)--was explicitly formed in opposition to President Pervez Musharraf's decision to ally Pakistan with the United States in its Global War on Terror following the September 11 attacks.[34]
While the JI, one of the most organized political parties in Pakistan, is the prominent force behind this alliance, the MMA includes within its ranks both factions of the pro-Taliban Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (the Fazlur Rehman and Samiul Haq factions).[35]
The MMA's political platform aims at the Islamization of Pakistan through the introduction of the Shari'a, the end of coeducation, and the introduction of more Islamic texts into school and college curricula. Furthermore, it shares the outlook of the Pakistani military regarding India and Kashmir and Afghanistan's role as a provider of strategic depth against the former--this being one of the reasons for the lack of serious confrontation between the religious parties and the military. In the October 2002 general election, the MMA achieved considerable political successes, which enabled it to both become the ruling party in the NWFP and a major partner in Balochistan (in cooperation with Musharraf's Muslim League, Quaid-i-Azam, PML-Q) as well as to win control of 62 out of 342 seats in the National Assembly (making it the third largest party).[36] Constituent groups within the MMA and prominent personalities of the alliance (such as Rehman) have been instrumental in brokering the agreements reached with pro-Taliban tribes in the FATA (including the Waziristan Accord).[37]
The transnational relationships between the inhabitants on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and its porous nature are also reflected in one of the key judgments made in a 1985 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report regarding Afghanistan, which stated that "...as long as the insurgents have access to strong external support and open borders,"[38] the Soviets would find it difficult to control much of the countryside. Although this conclusion was made in reference to CIA estimates of the number of Soviet troops that could be used to reinforce the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' (USSR) commitment in Afghanistan, the previously quoted extract crystallizes the two main difficulties faced by Soviet counterinsurgency efforts to defeat the mujahidin resistance--external support and a porous border.
Additionally, while the "external support" portion of the quotation undoubtedly refers to the various types of aid provided by third parties to the mujahidin (for instance, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United States), for the purposes of this article, it is enough to make the connection that any form of external support to insurgent or terrorist elements across the Durand line (given the transnational nature of the population and the difficulty of policing the border) would make it difficult for a stabilizing force (on either side) to establish control effectively. Without wanting to draw too much of a parallel between the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the current situation, what does become evident from a comparison of the two is the role that cross-border networks can have in sustaining insurgencies (or for that matter terrorist activity) on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.[39]
Thus, in order to deal with Taliban and al-Qa'ida members fleeing across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and because of the potentially negative political fallout of stationing foreign troops on Pakistani soil or of conducting large-scale, highly visible "hot pursuit" cross-border actions, the United States was forced to enlist the assistance of the Musharraf government in order to suppress Taliban and al-Qa'ida movement and action between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2001-2002. As a result, in July 2002, the federal government dispatched approximately 80,000 troops to sensitive border areas of the FATA for the first time since 1947, in search of Taliban and al-Qa'ida members.[40]
Almost immediately, a violent and increasingly expanding resistance against this perceived incursion by the Pakistani military surfaced. Although this outbreak of violence can be directly attributed to the military's (regular army and paramilitary units--for instance, the Frontier Corps) indiscriminate use of force and human rights violations,[41] it is also the product of Islamabad's previously outlined policies.
The perception among certain tribes and clans of the central government (and by extension its armed forces) as an opponent to be resisted; the history of the FATA; the similar ethnic composition of populations on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border; the transnational social networks straddling the Durand line; Islamabad's unfulfilled development and political promises towards the region; and its oscillating policy of repression and appeasement towards militias and armed tribes all coalesced to fuel the violence that was observed following government operations in mid-2002.[42]
According to Pakistani security authorities, in December 2003 two assassination attempts against President Pervez Musharraf were traced to militants in the region comprising the agencies of North and South Waziristan.[43] In early 2004, a general insurgency developed against the central government of Pakistan, marking the beginning of what has come to be known as the Waziristan conflict. Despite the fact that a number of combatants battling Pakistani troops came from the numerous tribes of the area, the insurgency generally involved militants belonging to pro-Taliban tribes as well as members of the Taliban and al-Qa'ida movements.[44]
As a result of the inherent political chaos in the FATA and the resistance of the population due to this latest military crackdown, the Taliban movement and al-Qa'ida members were provided with an environment in which they could regroup, rearm, recruit, and rebuild their training infrastructure through alliances developed with certain tribes and clans in the region.[45] It is estimated that in the period from 2004 to 2006, as a direct result of the "war in Waziristan," the Pakistani army lost approximately 1,000 to 3,000 men.[46]
The possibility of an extreme deterioration of the situation and a spillover of the violence into agencies and provinces neighboring the Waziristans (North and South) and the FATA in general (mainly areas of the NWFP and Balochistan) led the Musharraf government to agree to a ceasefire with the tribes and militants inhabiting North Waziristan on September 5, 2006.
It is worth mentioning that this particular agreement between the Pakistani government and tribal and militia leaders (including pro-Taliban elements) is the third of its kind since 2004.[47] The "Shakai deal" (April 24, 2004) in South Waziristan was the first, wherein five tribal elders of the Zalikhel tribe--Nek Muhammad, Haji Sharif, Maulana Abd al-Aziz, Maulvi Abbas, and Haji Noorul Islam--accused of harboring al-Qa'ida members "surrendered" to the Pakistani military and reportedly "pledged loyalty" to the government in return for leniency. As part of the same agreement, the government released 155 of the 163 tribesmen captured in March 2004 as a result of military operations and gave "foreign terrorists" until the end of the month (April 30, 2004) to surrender and receive a pardon. The then interior minister, Faysal Saleh Hayat, announced that this general amnesty was open to all except top-tier leaders of al-Qa'ida and the Taliban.
The amnesty date was extended twice, and the tribal forces that were created to hunt down al-Qa'ida and Taliban members apparently failed to locate any foreign terrorists in South Waziristan.[48]
Following the Shakai deal, violence in the Waziristans continued both from tribal militias as well as from government troops, and although some successes were announced, the deal failed to stem cross-border movement. By June 9, 2004, a militant group led by Nek Muhammad allegedly took responsibility for an attack that killed 25 people (including 17 security personnel) and wounded 11 in the Tiyarza area of South Waziristan. (Nek Muhammad was subsequently killed when a precision-guided missile hit the house he was staying at in the village of Dhok, near Wana, South Waziristan on June 17, 2004.)[49]
The second agreement between the Pakistani government and pro-Taliban militants was signed on February 7, 2005, in Sararogha, South Waziristan. Baitullah Mehsud, a pro-Taliban mujahidin commander belonging to the Mehsud tribe, allegedly "surrendered" and "laid down his arms" at a ceremony held in an open field surrounded by Taliban cadres.[50] Abdallah Mehsud (who has ties to the JUI-run Jamiat-ul Uloomi Islamiyya seminary in Binori, Karachi, which sent at least 600 students to fight for the Taliban in 1997),[51] an associate of Baitullah and a member of the same tribe, never signed the aforementioned agreement, denounced it, and continued his attacks against military personnel and locals accused of spying for Pakistan or the United States.[52]
The terms of this second agreement were similar to the ones included in the Shakai deal, in that the six provisions of the agreement included clauses whereby Baitullah and his supporters would not support "foreign terrorists" in their area, would cease their attacks against government personnel and installations, and would be given official pardons in return. In the event of violations to the agreement, cases would be adjudicated under the FCR.[53] However, violence from both government forces and militants (including members of the Mehsud tribe) continued, and by July 27, 2005, Baitullah Mehsud declared the agreement void, resumed attacks, and blamed the government, stating that: "The government has not kept the agreement with us. It is not holding anymore.... They have violated the agreement by arresting our Mujahideen."[54]
The third agreement, the Waziristan Accord, has (unsurprisingly perhaps) gone the way of its predecessors. Although violence directed against government troops on the Pakistani side of the border did decrease somewhat in the immediate aftermath of the signing, extra-judicial killings continued, and insurgent and terrorist actions within Afghanistan increased dramatically. Talat Masood, a defense analyst and former Pakistani army general stated that "...it would take at least six months to see if the truce is effective, or whether militants use it to consolidate their positions."[55] As of 2007, more than a year after the signing of the Waziristan Accord, it appears that the latter is the case. Militant elements (including the Taliban and al-Qa'ida) are consolidating (or have consolidated) their positions and are expanding their influence along both sides of the Durand line. Like previous "peace deals," the Waziristan Accord was just as inconclusive and lacked definite guarantees and effective monitoring provisions. The former secretary of security of the FATA, Brigadier Mehmood Shah (now retired), who had been personally involved in the previous two agreements, described the Waziristan Accord as "weaker" than previous ones, stating that: "The Taliban's pledges are no more than a general statement that they will not do this and that." [56]
It can thus be summarized that the government of Pakistan entered into the aforementioned agreements due to its inability to impose its control on a particular region (or regions)--as a result of both its fractured stance regarding radical Islam within the country and its chronic mismanagement of the area(s) under consideration (namely the FATA as well as the NWFP and Balochistan). Given Pakistan's categorization as a failed or failing state,[57] a feature of which is a lack of capacity to control certain portions of their territorial expanse--thus providing space for opponents to their authority to surface--it is perhaps predictable that "peace deals" such as the Waziristan Accord would be sought by the central government. Generally speaking, in the case of "weak states," governments adopt one of two, or both, strategies--appeasement and/or repression vis-Ã -vis regional challengers. Pakistan has implemented both responses; Waziristan-style agreements provide an example of the former (appeasement), usually after the failure of the latter (repression).
This oscillating approach has resulted in an increase and entrenchment of armed opposition to the Musharraf regime in most areas of the FATA, wherein future agreements are perceived not as genuine attempts at some sort of conflict resolution, but rather as opportunities to recuperate, extend influence, solidify gains, and prepare for the next round of hostilities.
ASSESSMENTAlthough little has been published regarding the terms of the Waziristan Accord, from the information available in the public domain and according to various reports dealing specifically with the agreement, the Waziristan Accord is a three-page document that contains 16 clauses and four subclauses and follows the format of previous "peace deals" between militants and Pakistani forces in the FATA. The terms of the agreement include the following:
There shall be no cross-border movement for militant activity in Afghanistan. On its part, the Government pledged not to undertake any ground or air operations against the militants and to resolve issues through local customs and traditions.
The agreement will come into force with the relocation of the Army from checkpoints in the region. The Khasadar force [a local tribal force] and Levy personnel [tribal militias] will take over the check-posts.
Foreigners living in North Waziristan will have to leave Pakistan, but those who cannot leave will be allowed to live peacefully, respecting the law of the land and the agreement.
Both parties will return each other's weapons, vehicles and communication equipment seized during various operations.
Tribal elders, mujahidin and the Utmanzai tribe would ensure that no-one attacked security force personnel and state property.
There will be no target killing and no parallel administration in the agency.Militants would not enter the settled districts adjacent to North Waziristan.Government would release prisoners held in military operations and would not arrest them again.
Tribesmen's "incentives" would be restored. The administration is to resolve disputes in accordance with local customs and traditions.
Government would pay compensation for the loss of life and property of innocent tribesmen during recent operations.
There is no ban on display of arms. However, tribesmen will not carry heavy weapons.
A 10-member committee--comprising elders, members of political administration and ulema [religious scholars]--is to monitor progress of the accord and ensure its implementation.[58]
It is evident from the aforementioned that the government of Pakistan has made quite a number of important concessions to the militants in North Waziristan. In return for vague guarantees of cessation of attack against government personnel and installations, the state has not only allowed the existence of armed groups within its borders, but has so far also released militants arrested during operations, provided them with some sort of amnesty, and withdrawn from certain areas, handing their control over to questionable armed groups.[59]
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, the Musharraf government has no real means of monitoring militant pledges and imposing its will in the event that tribal and militia promises made are not kept, short of a return to violence. The Mujahidin Shura Council (the 10-member committee that is supposed to monitor the progress of the accord and ensure its implementation) has no real power but exhibits the potential of circumscribing and acting as a "check" on government decisions to impose its will. In effect, should the government of Pakistan decide to act in response to violations of the accord without the support of the ten-member committee, it will find itself not only acting unilaterally, but also in contravention of said agreement (thus exposing itself to accusations of not honoring its own pacts).
Additionally, the Pakistani government has, through the terms of the Waziristan Accord, turned over checkpoints to militias composed of fighters against whom it had been battling since 2002. Although it is true that the government retains some form of control (either directly or indirectly) over certain checkpoints and border-crossings, it does not maintain the kind of direct presence needed to manage North Waziristan and the border with Afghanistan effectively. In withdrawing army units to their barracks and removing visible signs of military presence from the area, the Musharraf administration appears to believe that by appeasing pro-Taliban elements it can remain in power, while retaining the option of violence through proxies.[60]
Indeed, it can be argued that the government has left the difficult and hazardous task of combating pro-Taliban tribes and members of the Taliban and al-Qa'ida to local militias that it perceives can be controlled through financial incentives and the occasional, limited operational assistance. Recent actions by the military, ostensibly in support and at the request of pro-government tribes during their clashes with Taliban and al-Qa'ida members and their local allies appear to corroborate this change in strategy.[61] However, this approach carries the risk of drawing the military into local "score-settling" among tribes who will be given the opportunity to denounce rivals as pro-Taliban or al-Qa'ida, thus eliciting financial and/or military support from the government in their parochial struggles. The polarizing effect of such a scenario risks making the situation worse rather than better. Additionally, a "proxy war" presupposes that the proxies in question have the ability (with a certain amount of support) to attain predetermined goals.
In the case of North Waziristan (and other areas of the FATA, the NWFP, and Balochistan) this means that pro-government tribes are strong and capable enough to carry out independently (to a certain degree) the eradication of Taliban and al-Qa'ida elements from the aforementioned regions and to stem cross-border activity. However, Mehmood Shah has commented that the Taliban "...are too strong to be controlled by the tribes"[62] since they have "...shattered the tribes' authority, killing hundreds of pro-government tribal leaders."[63] Similar arguments can be made regarding the effectiveness of the government's paramilitary forces in the area, namely the Frontier Corps (FC NWFP and FC Balochistan).
Despite ongoing material assistance from the United States (especially for FC NWFP units),[64] the Frontier Corps' operational value remains questionable. Although FC NWFP (comprised mainly of ethnic Pashtuns from the region) "...has a comparatively better reputation among people of the province,"[65] FC Balochistan (whose members are largely non-Baloch) "...is not popular in Balochistan and is seen as an outside force that is widely believed to be involved in human rights violations and is known for the disproportionate use of force."[66] Irrespective of the "better reputation" of FC NWFP as compared to FC Balochistan, both branches stand accused of indiscriminate and disproportional use of force, extrajudicial killings, and human rights violations generally attributable to the Frontier Corps' poor discipline, training, and coordination.[67]
This state of affairs (pro-government tribal weakness and paramilitary unit excesses) has not only assisted pro-Taliban, Taliban, and al-Qa'ida groups in consolidating their presence but has enabled such groups to create parallel administrations in areas of South and North Waziristan.
Apparently, more recently, in the Bajaur Agency of the FATA, an agreement similar to the Waziristan Accord has been reached with Faqir Muhammad, who has been described as "al-Zawahiri's Pakistani Ally."[68] Whether or not the federal government can still use pro-government tribes against pro-Taliban and al-Qa'ida elements remains to be seen. While it can be argued that more effective and efficient support and empowerment of pro-government tribal forces may yet yield positive, tangible results, the fact remains that events in the wider region during the 1980s and 1990s have tended to have a detrimental effect on "traditional" tribal authority (on both sides of the Durand line).
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the civil wars that followed it, the steady flow of refugees across the border, the marginalization of tribal leaders in favor of religious ones and the madrasa education provided to generations of tribal Afghans and Pashtuns have generally had negative effects on tribal social structures and the ability of tribal leaders to assert their control.[69]
A further complication to agreements such as the Waziristan Accord is the existence and status of so-called "foreigners" in the tribal areas and the opposing definitions that the tribes themselves and the government of Pakistan ascribe to these individuals. It is a generally accepted fact that the "foreigners" in the FATA are comprised (mainly) of five "groups": Afghan Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Chechens, Uighurs, and Arabs (mostly Yemenis, Saudis, and Egyptians).[70]
All the "peace agreements" that the government of Pakistan has entered into with militants in the tribal areas included tribal promises to expel "foreigners" from the region, or in situations where this is not possible, "...those who cannot leave will be allowed to live peacefully, respecting the law of the land and the agreement."[71] Given the intermarriages between "foreigners" and local women (wherein the former are considered to be members of the latter's tribe),[72] as well as the Pashtunwali norms of melmastia (hospitality) and nanawati (defense of a guest),[73] it is perhaps unsurprising that in all cases, signatories to the "peace deals" have been unable to locate foreign militants since, according to the aforementioned sociocultural factors, there are no (or few) "foreigners" in the FATA per se (although there appears to be some tension between the locals and Uzbek fighters).[74]
In tandem to the developments in Pakistan's FATA (and it is reasonable to argue as a result of them), pro-Taliban and Taliban forces have increased their activity in neighboring Afghanistan. According to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), attacks against members of the NATO alliance and the National Army of Afghanistan have increased by 62 percent since 2005,[75] suicide attacks have increased five-fold from 25 in 2005 to 139 in 2006,[76] and large-scale Taliban operations (involving 50 fighters or more) have increased significantly.[77] According to Reuters, "since the [Waziristan Accord] was clinched, attacks against U.S.-led NATO troops and Afghan government forces have tripled in eastern Afghanistan, especially in areas bordering North Waziristan."[78]
As a result, NATO has been requesting that its members both increase their troop contributions and (to those countries that refuse to do so) allow their troops to engage in combat operations in order to counter resurgent Taliban and al-Qa'ida forces operating across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
In addition to the external effects of the Waziristan Accord, the "deal" has also had internal consequences for the state of Pakistan. While it is certainly the case that the accord is a result of the Pakistani government's ambivalent and oscillating attitude towards radical Islamist tendencies within its territory, it is also a cause for further violent action by other groups. The siege of the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in the capital Islamabad from July 3-10, 2007, is an indication of this parallel process. On the one hand, the violent showdown can be perceived as the culmination of a year-long struggle between radical Islamist elements of this particular establishment and the Musharraf government. On the other, it can be argued with equal validity that "peace-deals" in the FATA (such as the Waziristan Accord) emboldened activists of the Red Mosque (who share links to radical Islamic groups in the Waziristans and the FATA) into asserting themselves more forcefully, since they perceived the Musharraf government as weak and ineffective (because of Waziristan Accord-style agreements).
Although in the case of the Lal Masjid siege it can be concluded that the Islamists "over-reached" and misread the situation (since Islamabad and the FATA exhibit different political and social trends), there nevertheless appears to be a connection between government appeasement of militants (such as the Waziristan Accord) and further violence elsewhere. Unsurprisingly perhaps, in the same way that militants have used government actions to extricate themselves from past agreements (labeling them "violations"), the Lal Masjid incident provided armed elements in the FATA with an excuse--intended primarily for local consumption--to withdraw from the Waziristan Accord, thus leading to its collapse. This is not said to imply that the Red Mosque incident was staged specifically to provide militants in the FATA with a pretext for renouncing the accord, but rather to illustrate how agreements of this nature have strengthened militants in the tribal areas both militarily and politically and to demonstrate their "spillover" effect.
CONCLUSIONA pattern is clearly emerging. Waziristan Accord-style agreements have, to date, occurred in at least three (if not four) areas of the FATA. These "deals," while alleviating the Pakistani military somewhat, have not resulted in a cessation of attacks against it and its local allies and have emboldened pro-Taliban militants both in these particular areas and in neighboring ones; territory that is crucial in the War on Terror and Afghanistan's reconstruction. Indeed, the effects of the Waziristan Accord and similar agreements have already manifested themselves beyond the Waziristans (the events of the Lal Masjid siege providing a poignant example). Not only are Taliban and pro-Taliban elements consolidating their position in the FATA, but it appears that their influence has spread to areas of the NWFP, Balochistan, and possibly Kashmir. It is estimated that one of the reasons for the increase of Taliban attacks against NATO and Afghan forces in areas that were hitherto considered "safe," such as the northern and western provinces of Afghanistan,[79] is the fact that crossing-points have been established in areas of the FATA, the NWFP, and Balochistan. Withdrawal of Pakistani army units has generally resulted in an increase of extrajudicial killings by pro-Taliban elements against pro-government tribal leaders, the opening of offices run by Taliban-affiliated groups claiming to be responsible for the maintenance of law and order, and the distribution of leaflets to that effect.[80] Something similar has been observed in certain areas of Afghanistan.[81] Given these developments, it is possible to conclude that "Pakistan is now paying the price by... losing control of much of the frontier area to groups it has supported, groups that exploit their ties in Afghanistan just as the Taliban exploit their ties in Pakistan"[82] and that "...Pakistan [is] providing strategic depth to the Taliban."[83] Additionally, it has become possible to describe the Waziristan Accord and agreements like it as the effective "ceding of territory to the Taliban."[84]
In conclusion, although the Waziristan Accord and its predecessors did indeed offer the Musharraf government some degree of respite and (temporarily) decreased the "hot-spots" of violence and areas of contention with which the administration has had to deal, they proved to be short-term solutions that provided the opportunity for radical and militant elements to regroup and consolidate their positions.
Given the escalating popular resentment against the government of General Pervez Musharraf in increasingly varied areas of governance--including amplifying levels of violence in the province of Balochistan[85] and vocal opposition by pro-democracy elements--it can be argued that the regime's choice of this particular method (Waziristan-style accords) for dealing with the "Islamic component" of the turmoil plaguing Pakistan was perceived as offering the most politically expedient (and promising) approach to keep the Musharraf regime in power and to decrease the "problem-spots" in the country.[86]
The military's traditionally close ties with Islamic elements and the electoral collaboration between Musharraf's PML(Q) and the MMA in the October 2002 elections suggest that, after government failures to deal unilaterally with the situation in the FATA, mediation through the use of Islamist allies was a political option that seemed to carry the least risk. However, continued instability and negative "spillover," both violent and political, indicates not only the shortcomings of this policy, but also underscores the inability (or unwillingness) of certain groups (Islamic, political, or otherwise) in the country to influence, "rein-in," or control particular Islamic militant elements in Pakistan's tribal areas. It is perhaps the realization by Musharraf of the limitations of continued association with the MMA that a limited rapprochement with Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) has been initiated.
As a final point, although radical Islamist groups have increased their power in the FATA, NWFP, and areas of Balochistan, and violence has moved beyond the boundaries of the Waziristans to a degree that threatens the viability of the Pakistani state, it is unlikely that Taliban or militant elements (and/or their political/military allies) can use their power in the tribal belt to take over the government. While it is true that some circles within Pakistan see no reason to end the strategic alliance with movements such as the Taliban and their domestic backers, the religious right[87]--since they are considered to be more reliable allies in the pursuit of "traditional" Pakistani policies (especially given improving U.S.-Indian relations)[88]--and that the Pakistani military has traditionally adopted a stronger Islamic stance when perceiving its domestic position as being undermined,[89] there is a growing realization among the country's elites (including the military) that Taliban and similarly inspired groups pose a serious threat to the continued existence of the Pakistani state.[90] This is not meant to imply that the threat to Pakistan posed by increased radicalization and violence in the FATA, NWFP, and Balochistan and their propensity to spread is trivial, since a "failed" (as opposed to "weak") Pakistan carries significant regional implications, not least for the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan.
Yet the argument that a Taliban-style, nuclear weapons-toting Pakistan is considered to be unlikely must be emphasized.
Islamic parties have usually relied on the military's support to increase their electoral appeal, which reached a record high in the October 2002 elections.[91]
Given this reliance, it is improbable that, for instance, the JI (the largest, most organized constituent member of the MMA alliance) will willingly dissolve this partnership in favor of the more radical Islamic approaches (as espoused by the JUI-F and JUI-S factions). Furthermore, the MMA is less than the monolithic Islamic alliance than it is usually portrayed as being. Although their ethnic, doctrinal, and policy differences are downplayed by representatives of the alliance, the MMA represents an uneasy coalition of Islamic parties with widely different constituencies.[92]
Illustrative of this is the fact that the JI draws most of its support from Punjabi and muhajir (migrant) communities in the Punjab and urban areas of Sindh, whose interests do not coincide with the more tribally based JUI, which caters to a Pashtun electorate located in the FATA, the NWFP, and areas of Balochistan (although it does have limited support in Sindh).[93]
The point is that in the event of a consistent, popularly endorsed government response to radical Islamic elements, the MMA is likely to face internal pressures threatening its cohesion, making it possible to surmise that more moderate Islamists might opt for accommodation rather than confrontation with the government (provided of course that this does not damage their relationship with the electorate).
Thus, it is worth noting that although the threat from radical Islam in Pakistan persists and radical Islamists "...have managed to exert a political and ideological influence in excess of their numbers..."[94] their potency "stems less from [their strength] than from the weakness of their opponents."[95] This implies that a more stable government with a clear strategy for dealing with a variety of sociopolitical issues stands a chance of combating the radicalization evident in Pakistan.
The kind of government response that is required to reverse the "Talibanization" of the FATA and parts of the NWFP and Balochistan will obviously not be an easy task. Continued governmental mismanagement (at all levels but particularly at the regional level), widespread corruption, uneven development, the fact that both Pakistani political parties and successive governments have "...failed lamentably to develop Pakistan or improve the living conditions of its people, thus making the radical option seem all the more attractive,"[96] and an obsession with India mean that substantial shifts in the country's internal and external policies will be necessary. Waziristan-style agreements are thus a symptom of the multifaceted problems afflicting Pakistan.
Despite offering vague, short-term solutions, they only serve to further weaken the central government while strengthening opponents who perceive violence as the only method that can achieve results.
*Evagoras C. Leventis holds a Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) in International Relations from the University of Indianapolis and a Master of Letters (M.Litt.) in International Security Studies from the University of St. Andrews, Scotland.
"SOVIET" PUTIN NOW OVER $40 BILLION RICH!!
Luke Harding in Moscow
Friday December 21, 2007
The Guardian Russian president Vladimir Putin, whose alleged accumulated wealth of $40bn would make him Europe's richest man.
An unprecedented battle is taking place inside the Kremlin in advance of Vladimir Putin's departure from office, the Guardian has learned, with claims that the president presides over a secret multibillion-dollar fortune.
Rival clans inside the Kremlin are embroiled in a struggle for the control of assets as Putin prepares to transfer power to his hand-picked successor, Dmitry Medvedev, in May, well-placed political observers and other sources have revealed.
At stake are billions of dollars in assets belonging to Russian state-run corporations. Additionally, details of Putin's own personal fortune, reportedly hidden in Switzerland and Liechtenstein, are being discussed for the first time.
The claims over the president's assets surfaced last month when the Russian political expert Stanislav Belkovsky gave an interview to the German newspaper Die Welt. They have since been repeated in the Washington Post and the Moscow Times, with speculation over the fortune appearing on the internet.
Citing sources inside the president's administration, Belkovsky claims that after eight years in power Putin has secretly accumulated more than $40bn (£20bn). The sum would make him Russia's - and Europe's - richest man.
In an interview with the Guardian, Belkovsky repeated his claims that Putin owns vast holdings in three Russian oil and gas companies, concealed behind a "non-transparent network of offshore trusts".
Putin "effectively" controls 37% of the shares of Surgutneftegaz, an oil exploration company and Russia's third biggest oil producer, worth $20bn, he says. He also owns 4.5% of Gazprom, and "at least 75%" of Gunvor, a mysterious Swiss-based oil trader, founded by Gennady Timchenko, a friend of the president's, Belkovsky alleges.
Asked how much Putin was worth, Belkovsky said: "At least $40bn. Maximum we cannot know. I suspect there are some businesses I know nothing about." He added: "It may be more. It may be much more.
"Putin's name doesn't appear on any shareholders' register, of course. There is a non-transparent scheme of successive ownership of offshore companies and funds. The final point is in Zug [in Switzerland] and Liechtenstein. Vladimir Putin should be the beneficiary owner."
Putin has not commented on Belkovsky's claims. The Guardian put the allegations to the Kremlin but was told Putin's chief spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, was not available.
Discussion of Putin's wealth has previously been taboo. But the claims have leaked out against the backdrop of a fight inside the Kremlin between a group led by Igor Sechin, Putin's influential deputy chief of staff, and a "liberal" clan that includes Medvedev.
The Sechin group is made up of siloviki - Kremlin officials with security/military backgrounds. It is said to include Nikolai Patrushev, the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Russia's KGB successor agency, his deputy Alexander Bortnikov, and Putin's aide Viktor Ivanov.
Those associated with the liberal camp include Roman Abramovich, the Russian oligarch and owner of Chelsea football club who is close to Putin and the Yeltsin family. Other members are Viktor Cherkesov, the head of the federal drug control service, and Alisher Usmanov, an Uzbek-born billionaire.
Insiders say the struggle has little to do with ideology. They characterise it as a war between business competitors. Putin's decision to endorse as president Medvedev - who has no links with the secret services - dealt a severe blow to the hardline Sechin clan, they add.
Some analysts have said Putin would like to retire but has been forced to carry on to shield Medvedev from siloviki plotting. Others disagree and say Putin wants to stay in power. On Monday Putin confirmed he intends next year to become Russia's prime minister.
"The siloviki are not at all nice," Yulia Latynina, a Russian political commentator said. Latynina, who hosts a political talkshow on the liberal radio station Ekho Moskvy, was one of the first journalists to draw attention last month to Putin's reported links with Gunvor.
The company is based in Zug, a picturesque Swiss canton known as a bolthole for publicity-shy international businessmen. Gunvor has neither a website nor a Moscow office - but in 2007 posted profits of $8bn on a turnover of $43bn, an astronomic figure, according to industry experts. Like Putin, its reclusive owner, Timchenko, worked in the KGB's foreign affairs directorate. He is said to have met Russia's president in the late 1980s through KGB circles.
Gunvor, which has its head office in Geneva, failed to comment.
Critics say the wave of renationalisations under Putin has transformed Putin's associates into multimillionaires. The dilemma now facing the Kremlin's elite is how to hang on to its wealth if Putin leaves power, experts say. Most of its money is located in the west, they add. The pressing problem is how to protect these funds from any future administration that may seek to reclaim them.
"There's no point in having all this money if you can't travel to the Maldives or Paris and spend it," Elena Panfilova, the director of Transparency International in Russia said.
The first hints of the intra-clan warfare gripping the Kremlin emerged last month, when the FSB arrested General Alexander Bulbov, the deputy head of the federal drug agency, and part of the liberal group. His arrest saw a surreal standoff, with his bodyguards and FSB agents pointing machine guns at each other.
Earlier this month Russia's deputy finance minister, Sergei Storchak - another "liberal" - was also arrested and charged with embezzling $43.4m. He is currently in prison. His boss, Russia's finance minister, Alexei Kudrin, part of the liberal clan, says he is innocent.
But the liberal group - one of several competing factions inside the Kremlin - has struck back. Earlier this month Oleg Shvartsman, a previously obscure businessman, gave an interview to Kommersant newspaper claiming he secretly managed the finances of a group of FSB officers. Their assets were worth £1.6bn, he revealed.
The officers were involved in "velvet reprivatisations", Shvartsman, a fund manager, said - in effect forcibly acquiring private companies at below-market value and transforming them into state-owned firms. These assets were redistributed via offshore companies, he said.
According to Panfilova, the "randomised" corruption of the 1990s has given way to the "systemic and institutionalised corruption" of the Putin era. Members of Putin's cabinet personally control the most important sectors of the economy - oil, gas and defence. Medvedev is chairman of Gazprom; Sechin runs Rosneft; other ministers are chairmen of Russian railways, Aeroflot, a nuclear fuel giant and an energy transport enterprise.
Putin has created a new, more streamlined oligarchy, his critics say. "The crown jewels of the country's wealth have ended up in the hands of Putin's inner circle," Vladimir Rzyhkov - a former independent MP - wrote in Monday's Moscow Times.
Belkovsky - who published a book about Putin's finances last year, and who is the director of the National Strategic Institute, a Moscow thinktank - claims he is confident of his assessment of Putin's hidden wealth.
"It's not a secret among the elites,' he said. "But please pay attention that Vladimir Vladimirovich [Putin] has never sued me."
Belkovsky adds that the west has misunderstood Putin and has been distracted by his "neo-Soviet" image. Putin, Belkovsky claims, is ultimately a "classic" businessman who believes money can solve any problem, and whose psychology was shaped by his experiences working in the St Petersburg mayor's office in Russia's crime-ridden early 1990s.
"He is quite sure of this.
A problem that can't be resolved with $1bn can be resolved with $10bn, and if not with $10bn then $20bn, and so on," Belkovsky said.
In an interview on Wednesday with Time magazine, which named Putin its person of the year, the president vehemently denied that those inside the Kremlin were corrupt.
Asked whether "some of the people closest to you are getting rich", Putin said: "Then you know who and how. Write to us, to the foreign ministry, if you are so confident. I presume you know the names, you know the systems and the tools.
"I can assure you and everyone who would listen to us, watch us and read us, that the reaction would be swift, immediate, [and] within the prevailing law."
Friday December 21, 2007
The Guardian Russian president Vladimir Putin, whose alleged accumulated wealth of $40bn would make him Europe's richest man.
An unprecedented battle is taking place inside the Kremlin in advance of Vladimir Putin's departure from office, the Guardian has learned, with claims that the president presides over a secret multibillion-dollar fortune.
Rival clans inside the Kremlin are embroiled in a struggle for the control of assets as Putin prepares to transfer power to his hand-picked successor, Dmitry Medvedev, in May, well-placed political observers and other sources have revealed.
At stake are billions of dollars in assets belonging to Russian state-run corporations. Additionally, details of Putin's own personal fortune, reportedly hidden in Switzerland and Liechtenstein, are being discussed for the first time.
The claims over the president's assets surfaced last month when the Russian political expert Stanislav Belkovsky gave an interview to the German newspaper Die Welt. They have since been repeated in the Washington Post and the Moscow Times, with speculation over the fortune appearing on the internet.
Citing sources inside the president's administration, Belkovsky claims that after eight years in power Putin has secretly accumulated more than $40bn (£20bn). The sum would make him Russia's - and Europe's - richest man.
In an interview with the Guardian, Belkovsky repeated his claims that Putin owns vast holdings in three Russian oil and gas companies, concealed behind a "non-transparent network of offshore trusts".
Putin "effectively" controls 37% of the shares of Surgutneftegaz, an oil exploration company and Russia's third biggest oil producer, worth $20bn, he says. He also owns 4.5% of Gazprom, and "at least 75%" of Gunvor, a mysterious Swiss-based oil trader, founded by Gennady Timchenko, a friend of the president's, Belkovsky alleges.
Asked how much Putin was worth, Belkovsky said: "At least $40bn. Maximum we cannot know. I suspect there are some businesses I know nothing about." He added: "It may be more. It may be much more.
"Putin's name doesn't appear on any shareholders' register, of course. There is a non-transparent scheme of successive ownership of offshore companies and funds. The final point is in Zug [in Switzerland] and Liechtenstein. Vladimir Putin should be the beneficiary owner."
Putin has not commented on Belkovsky's claims. The Guardian put the allegations to the Kremlin but was told Putin's chief spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, was not available.
Discussion of Putin's wealth has previously been taboo. But the claims have leaked out against the backdrop of a fight inside the Kremlin between a group led by Igor Sechin, Putin's influential deputy chief of staff, and a "liberal" clan that includes Medvedev.
The Sechin group is made up of siloviki - Kremlin officials with security/military backgrounds. It is said to include Nikolai Patrushev, the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Russia's KGB successor agency, his deputy Alexander Bortnikov, and Putin's aide Viktor Ivanov.
Those associated with the liberal camp include Roman Abramovich, the Russian oligarch and owner of Chelsea football club who is close to Putin and the Yeltsin family. Other members are Viktor Cherkesov, the head of the federal drug control service, and Alisher Usmanov, an Uzbek-born billionaire.
Insiders say the struggle has little to do with ideology. They characterise it as a war between business competitors. Putin's decision to endorse as president Medvedev - who has no links with the secret services - dealt a severe blow to the hardline Sechin clan, they add.
Some analysts have said Putin would like to retire but has been forced to carry on to shield Medvedev from siloviki plotting. Others disagree and say Putin wants to stay in power. On Monday Putin confirmed he intends next year to become Russia's prime minister.
"The siloviki are not at all nice," Yulia Latynina, a Russian political commentator said. Latynina, who hosts a political talkshow on the liberal radio station Ekho Moskvy, was one of the first journalists to draw attention last month to Putin's reported links with Gunvor.
The company is based in Zug, a picturesque Swiss canton known as a bolthole for publicity-shy international businessmen. Gunvor has neither a website nor a Moscow office - but in 2007 posted profits of $8bn on a turnover of $43bn, an astronomic figure, according to industry experts. Like Putin, its reclusive owner, Timchenko, worked in the KGB's foreign affairs directorate. He is said to have met Russia's president in the late 1980s through KGB circles.
Gunvor, which has its head office in Geneva, failed to comment.
Critics say the wave of renationalisations under Putin has transformed Putin's associates into multimillionaires. The dilemma now facing the Kremlin's elite is how to hang on to its wealth if Putin leaves power, experts say. Most of its money is located in the west, they add. The pressing problem is how to protect these funds from any future administration that may seek to reclaim them.
"There's no point in having all this money if you can't travel to the Maldives or Paris and spend it," Elena Panfilova, the director of Transparency International in Russia said.
The first hints of the intra-clan warfare gripping the Kremlin emerged last month, when the FSB arrested General Alexander Bulbov, the deputy head of the federal drug agency, and part of the liberal group. His arrest saw a surreal standoff, with his bodyguards and FSB agents pointing machine guns at each other.
Earlier this month Russia's deputy finance minister, Sergei Storchak - another "liberal" - was also arrested and charged with embezzling $43.4m. He is currently in prison. His boss, Russia's finance minister, Alexei Kudrin, part of the liberal clan, says he is innocent.
But the liberal group - one of several competing factions inside the Kremlin - has struck back. Earlier this month Oleg Shvartsman, a previously obscure businessman, gave an interview to Kommersant newspaper claiming he secretly managed the finances of a group of FSB officers. Their assets were worth £1.6bn, he revealed.
The officers were involved in "velvet reprivatisations", Shvartsman, a fund manager, said - in effect forcibly acquiring private companies at below-market value and transforming them into state-owned firms. These assets were redistributed via offshore companies, he said.
According to Panfilova, the "randomised" corruption of the 1990s has given way to the "systemic and institutionalised corruption" of the Putin era. Members of Putin's cabinet personally control the most important sectors of the economy - oil, gas and defence. Medvedev is chairman of Gazprom; Sechin runs Rosneft; other ministers are chairmen of Russian railways, Aeroflot, a nuclear fuel giant and an energy transport enterprise.
Putin has created a new, more streamlined oligarchy, his critics say. "The crown jewels of the country's wealth have ended up in the hands of Putin's inner circle," Vladimir Rzyhkov - a former independent MP - wrote in Monday's Moscow Times.
Belkovsky - who published a book about Putin's finances last year, and who is the director of the National Strategic Institute, a Moscow thinktank - claims he is confident of his assessment of Putin's hidden wealth.
"It's not a secret among the elites,' he said. "But please pay attention that Vladimir Vladimirovich [Putin] has never sued me."
Belkovsky adds that the west has misunderstood Putin and has been distracted by his "neo-Soviet" image. Putin, Belkovsky claims, is ultimately a "classic" businessman who believes money can solve any problem, and whose psychology was shaped by his experiences working in the St Petersburg mayor's office in Russia's crime-ridden early 1990s.
"He is quite sure of this.
A problem that can't be resolved with $1bn can be resolved with $10bn, and if not with $10bn then $20bn, and so on," Belkovsky said.
In an interview on Wednesday with Time magazine, which named Putin its person of the year, the president vehemently denied that those inside the Kremlin were corrupt.
Asked whether "some of the people closest to you are getting rich", Putin said: "Then you know who and how. Write to us, to the foreign ministry, if you are so confident. I presume you know the names, you know the systems and the tools.
"I can assure you and everyone who would listen to us, watch us and read us, that the reaction would be swift, immediate, [and] within the prevailing law."
Tuesday, December 18, 2007
HISH & THE IRAN NUKES & SYRIA IRAQ adventures
Iran's Nuclear and Syria's Iraq Adventures
by Barry Rubin
The two main areas where the alliance of radical forces in the Middle East confront Western interests and pose a danger of major instability are Iran's drive for nuclear weapons and Syria's efforts to destabilize Iraq. This article considers these two issues. First, it examines what effect Iran's obtaining nuclear weapons would have on Middle East politics, with an emphasis on scenarios that would occur even if Iran never actually uses them. Second, it asks why it is that the interests of Iran's ally, Syria, compel it to destabilize Iraq.
A Nuclear Iran and Middle East Politics
If Iran gets nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them to targets, what impact would it have on the Arab world? While this is necessarily speculative, an analysis of the strategic effect of Tehran having nuclear weapons is the most important piece of contingency planning in the world today. One can make some very educated guesses as to what would happen.
Public statements by Arab leaders, journalists, and others of indifference or even Muslim solidarity with Iran are more than matched by private remarks showing fear and hope that Tehran will be stopped. As so often happens, however, the Arab regimes and intellectuals will do almost nothing to help achieve the outcome they want. It is left in the hands of the West, the United States, or even Israel to block Iran's progress.
However, an outcome with Iran having nuclear weapons is more likely than the alternative.
A great deal of attention has rightly been paid to the possibility that Tehran might use nuclear weapons against Israel--especially given the threatening statements of Iranian leaders, which do not stop short of advocating genocide. If Iran had nuclear bombs it might well use them to attack Israel, a situation that would produce hundreds of thousands of deaths--especially if a nuclear exchange followed--and provoke the biggest crisis in the region's history. This is a terrifying possibility no matter how low one assesses its chances of happening. This threat is sufficient in itself as a reason to stop Iran from obtaining such terrible weapons, all the more since it is an extremist, aggressive government that has voiced its readiness to use them and has shown its willingness to employ terrorism.
While this is important, however, there are other elements of the issue that deserve fuller consideration. There are other outcomes that--compared to the actual firing of nuclear-tipped missiles or giving such arms to terrorist groups--are a 100 percent certainty given a nuclear-armed Iran. These strategic concerns are of the highest importance for the entire world.
This point would be true even if there were no oil and natural gas in the Persian Gulf area, but given the great concentration of these vital resources (and the systems for transporting them elsewhere) there, it becomes arguably the globe's most compelling issue.
Thus, given the premise that Iran were to obtain nuclear weapons and the missiles capable of delivering them, even in small numbers, how would politics and policies in the Arabic-speaking world be changed?
The Search for a Defensive Shield
Clearly, one step that Arab states would take--especially Saudi Arabia and the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)--would be to seek a nuclear umbrella from the West, especially from the United States. These governments would ask Washington for assurances of defense against any Iranian threat or attack, especially a stated willingness by the United States to strike at Iran with nuclear weapons in the event of their being used against any of Iran's neighbors.
It should be noted that the European Union would not play a central role here, being unwilling and unable to provide such a guarantee. Nevertheless, the position taken by the EU would be important, for any sign of doubt or opposition to such an umbrella would be interpreted both by Tehran and its neighbors as implying that no one can provide the ultimate defense against Iran.
There would also likely be other conventional military components to such a defensive umbrella. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) could be involved; the GCC might seek to buy anti-missile defenses or warplanes capable of striking at Iran from Western states. Western forces might be placed in the Gulf as tripwires to deter Iran from attacking, since then a nuclear strike against, say, Saudi Arabia, would be an attack on the whole Western world.
Yet there is a major problem with the idea of direct military aid or involvement that would give Arab states, especially those in the Gulf, a greater sense of security vis-Ã -vis Iran. For one of Tehran's demands--supported by domestic opinion in Arab states as well as Iran's own threat--would surely be not to engage in such activities (see below). Furthermore, most or all Arab states would probably comply at least up to a point with this attempt to deny them a strong defensive alliance.
Nukes of Their Own
Another potential response of at least some Arab states would be to seek their own nuclear weapons and delivery systems. It is easy to underestimate what a big undertaking this would be. After all, it is not just a matter of purchasing some nuclear technology. Either the country has to be capable of building both workable weapons and missiles capable of carrying them or of purchasing them readymade.
Yet only the Saudis among Gulf Arab states are likely to be willing and able to undertake such an effort. It is most unlikely that Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq, Oman, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, or others would either seek or have much prospect of obtaining nuclear weapons or sophisticated, comprehensive anti-missile defenses.
Moreover, even if Arab countries do obtain such weapons, they must be maintained properly, amply protected, and carefully managed in deciding under what conditions they might be used, who would control them, and many other difficult questions. The dangers are enormous, including the possibility of provoking a stronger Iran, thus weakening rather than strengthening deterrence. It is likely that all Arab countries, even Saudi Arabia, would reach the conclusion that seeking an independent nuclear capability is more trouble than benefit.
One factor here is that having nuclear weapons is a risky matter in several strategic respects. This is especially true for a country whose stability and technical skills are not assured, as well one where dissident elements or opposition terrorists might seek to seize such arms or facilities. Taking these points into account, aside from their own anti-proliferation stance, Western states, including the United States, are not going to help Arab countries get nuclear weapons or missiles capable of carrying them.
Consequently, simply saying that countries would respond to an Iranian nuclear capability by getting their own weapons is no answer to the new situation created by Tehran's having atomic weapons.
Appeasement
In connection with seeking an American umbrella, the most attractive strategy for Arab states is appeasement of Iran. The fact that most or all European countries would move in a parallel direction would only reinforce this trend.
The key question here is: What would Iran demand and Arab states be willing to give in order to achieve this goal? One possibility is a lack of cooperation with the United States in combating Iranian ambitions and threatening its nuclear arsenal, which might also include pressure not to grant basing rights to American forces--at least any new ones--as well as not taking part in any campaign to isolate or impose sanctions on Iran. Other demands might include no peace agreements with Israel, acceding to Iranian demands for high oil prices, non-interference with Iranian influence in Iraq, and minimizing verbal criticism of Iran, its system, interests, and allies.
Somewhat harder to swallow would be acceptance of Iran's leading role in Gulf security. Tehran's position has been that security arrangements should involve only the local states, thus minimizing outside defensive support for Gulf Arab states and further enhancing Iranian goals. This may also involve a more positive attitude toward Iran's allies. This could include friendlier policies toward Syria, not opposing Hizballah's efforts to gain veto power or hegemony over Lebanon's government, and accepting the primacy of Hamas over Fatah in the Palestinian arena.
These concessions taken together would further weaken Arab resistance to Iranian regional (or at least Gulf) hegemony and undermine Western (or at least American) efforts to construct an anti-Iranian alliance. If Arab states are too frightened to admit they fear Iran having nuclear arms before it has even obtained them--much less being willing to act to avoid this outcome--how will they react when Tehran actually does have such weapons of mass destruction?
HISH Power
The central issue in the Middle East today is the conflict between the radical HISH alliance (Hamas-Iran-Syria-Hizballah) and the Arab nationalist Sunni regimes. HISH projects its power through a variety of means, including radical Islamist ideology, sponsorship of terrorism, covert or overt backing for revolutionary clients, and the direct power of Iran and Syria.
What would happen to Arab politics in a situation in which Iran had nuclear weapons must be considered in this context.
At present, the main battlefronts are in Iraq and Lebanon, and for control of the Palestinian leadership. Moreover, in every Arabic-speaking country (except for in Syria itself, where they have been largely though perhaps temporarily coopted) radical Islamist forces are the main opposition to the existing governments.
Historically, of course, Iran faced serious problems in projecting its influence into the Arabic-speaking world. There were three barriers in particular, and all of them have eroded. First, Iran is a non-Arab state, directed by ethnic Persians. Though it also includes other ethnic elements, few of them are Arabs. Arab nationalism has thus been antagonistic toward Iran, a factor manipulated by its Arab rivals and accepted by their people. (A notable example was Iraq's use of anti-Persian propaganda during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War.)
Through the HISH alliance, however, Iran has passed through this barricade by having three major Arab allies--Palestinian Hamas, Lebanese Hizballah, and Syria--as well as considerable assets among Iraq's Shi'a Arabs. In addition, the appeal of Iran's line using Islamism, anti-Westernism, total opposition to Israel's existence, and revolutionary passion has appealed to many Arabs.
On the Arab-Persian issue, many Arabs are still totally opposed to any power by Tehran over "their" region. The GCC countries view Iran as a direct threat. Egypt sees it as an unwanted rival for leadership. Fatah is suspicious of Iran's sponsorship for Hamas and plays the "anti-Persian" card, as does the governing coalition in Lebanon. Still, many Arabs are no longer persuaded that they must oppose Iran as a non-Arab force.
Second, Iran is a predominantly Shi'a Muslim country, and the "Islamic" regime is very much a Shi'a and not a Sunni one. The majority of the Arabic-speaking world is Sunni and has certainly been ruled by Sunnis even when they are in the minority (Iraq, Bahrain, and in a sense Lebanon).
Through the HISH alliance, though, Iran has also passed this barricade. Hamas is Sunni, and Syria has a Sunni Muslim majority that supports the regime even if it does not comprise it. Using the methods discussed above, Iran can claim more appeal than ever before on the basis of Islamism, even with Sunni forces. However, many Sunnis--including Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood--and especially the Saudis are still mobilized by hatred and fear of the Shi'a.
Third, leadership in the Arabic-speaking world was dominated by the battle among the strongest Arab states (Egypt, Iraq, and Syria), leaving no room for an outside contender. Today, however, there is a leadership vacuum in the Arab world. Iraq will be in too much disorder to be concerned with regional issues for some years to come. The leadership bid by its ruler, Saddam Hussein, not only failed but contributed greatly to the regime's downfall. A weaker Syria has hitched itself to Iranian leadership while Egypt has turned very much inward, unable to project any influence outside its own borders. Even Jordan's King Hussein, who ruled a small country but cast a giant shadow, is no more. The door is open to Iran's bid for hegemony.
Iran's success is by no means complete. Still, it is hovering on the verge of serious success. Its clients are close to power in Iraq, Lebanon, and among the Palestinians. Its popularity among Arabs and Sunnis is at an all-time high. One can understand if leaders in Tehran believe that the future belongs to them, even though this might be a major miscalculation. Indeed, making such a misestimate of the balance of force might produce a giant crisis, especially if Iran has nuclear weapons.
Springtime for Tehran
In this context, then, it is possible to analyze the tremendous boost that possessing nuclear weapons would give to Iran, its allies, and its ideology.
Islamism
Buoyed by having a "superpower-type" sponsor and the "proof" of how effective an Islamist government is, radical Islamist forces around the region would grow rapidly in numbers and boldness. They would argue that Iran can stand up to America, subvert the existing Arab regimes, and destroy Israel.
The rush to Islamism would parallel the growth of radical Arab nationalism after such "successes" as Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and survival of an international assault in the 1950s. A tidal wave of recruitment to radical Islamist movements throughout the Arab world would take place, and these groups would be more aggressive in fighting regimes (notably in Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt), including the use of violence. The appeal of Arab nationalism could collapse, at least in specific countries, and several more Islamist regimes might very well take power.
Syria
Under the protection of Iran's nuclear umbrella, Damascus would be more aggressive toward Israel, in subverting the Lebanese government, and in promoting insurgency in Iraq. Such adventurism could lead to direct war with Israel, even if that is not the Syrian regime's conscious intention.
Lebanon
Hizballah and Syria's politician clients might succeed in either forming their own government there or at least in getting veto power over the regime's decisionmaking process. With control over the country ensured, Hizballah would be more likely to launch a campaign that would lead to another war with Israel.
Iraq
Iran's influence among Iraqi Shi'as would skyrocket. Tehran could and probably would use this to force out any U.S. presence and move Iraq in the direction of being a satellite state (even if it did not succeed completely). Even an independent-minded Iraqi government would feel that a strong, neighboring Iran was a more important factor to please than a distant and fickle United States.
Arab-Israeli Conflict
The chance of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict diplomatically would be zero, as the growing numbers of radicals would believe they could win completely, and the relatively moderate would be too scared to take any action that might be defined as treasonous. With Hamas winning even more over Fatah--and Fatah pushed toward a harder line, perhaps even a deal with Iran--no Palestinian leader would negotiate seriously. This is already true, and it would be even more so.
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
The Saudis and other Gulf countries would be very intimidated by Iran's growing power. They would try to survive by propitiating Iran and by ensuring Western support, but their priority would swing toward the former factor. Internal revolutionary and terrorist movements would probably increase and be disruptive, even if they did not come into power. Oil and natural gas prices would skyrocket in view of the market's fear of regional instability.
Conclusions
All in all, the outcome would be incredibly damaging for Western interests. The kind of postwar interventionism that took place in Kuwait in 1991 and Iraq in 2003 would be impossible, since now Iran--in place of the USSR--would hold the balance. The type of hopeful diplomacy contained in the 1990s peace process would be impossible since the Arab side would be held in thrall to Iranian and radical Islamist pressures.
Western attempts to conciliate Iran would be tougher since Tehran could maintain that it achieved nuclear weapons despite opposition from the West. Since it is so powerful, why should it make any concessions at all to a side it sees as frightened and in historic decline? That idea--that Iran is on the winning side of history--would have enormous appeal in the Arabic-speaking world.
This is a very gloomy assessment, but it is hard to see how a different one is more likely. To reiterate, even assuming that Iran never uses nuclear weapons, the possession of them alone is likely to create an enormous, earthquake-like strategic shift in the region and in Arab politics.
SYRIA AND IRAQ: THE STRUGGLE FOR ARAB HEGEMONY
Syria has been a major exporter of instability to Iraq, and thus the Damascus regime. It is a major promoter of disorder there and clearly does not fear the radical Islamists it is helping as either a force in Iraq or as a threat to Syria itself. Some Western observers have argued that Syrian interests are parallel to those of their own countries. If this is true at all it is due only to the fact that parallel lines never meet.
American and Iraqi officials have consistently made this point in no uncertain words, and in increasingly specific terms. In November 2005, then Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari explained, "We demand that [Syria] control [its] borders, prevent infiltration and terrorism. We want good relations with Syria, but this cannot be achieved when such violations exist."
In September 2006, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salah said that Iraq wanted to "get our Syrian neighbors to behave more responsibly... and to clamp down on the presence and activity of some of the former regime leaders" there "as well as some of the terrorists that are going across the borders."
A few months later, the deputy governor of Mosul, Khasro Goran, added that Syria could easily control terrorism from its territory since it had thrown out the Kurdish PKK leaders in 1998, responding to a threat from Turkey.
The U.S. military spokesman in Iraq, Major General William Caldwell, estimated that between 70 and 100 foreign fighters, one-fifth of whom were Syrian, were caught crossing the Syrian border into Iraq every month throughout 2005 and 2006.
In late 2006, Syria added to its strategy by opening diplomatic relations with Iraq, a relationship broken more than two decades earlier, though the two countries had worked together closely in the years before Saddam Hussein's overthrow. Syria's foreign minister visited Baghdad, and Iraq's President Jalal Talabani made a January 2007 week-long return visit to Damascus, where he had lived in exile during the Saddam era. Syria and Iraq signed several accords and made public statements pledging to work together on all sorts of security, political, and economic matters of mutual interest.
The problem, however, was that Syria did not fulfill those pledges, particularly on the all-important security issue. In February 2007, Iraqi government spokesman Ali Dabbagh could still assert that "50 percent of murders and bombings are by extremists coming from Syria... and we have evidence to prove it." Equally striking was the March 2007 statement by State Department Iraq Coordinator Ambassador David Satterfield that at least 80 percent of suicide bombers in Iraq had transited through Syria.
To some extent, both Iraq and the U.S. government might well be exaggerating the high proportion of the terrorism coming from Syria. Nevertheless, this factor is clearly both important and continuing, showing Syria's effort to maintain a high state of instability in Iraq and drive out U.S. forces.
By being willing to play this role, Syria shows that it does not fear all-out civil war in Iraq (it merely wants its side to win). Similarly, the Syrian regime does not seem to take seriously the possibility of partition or large-scale Turkish intervention. Moreover, it certainly does not worry about large-scale Iranian influence, since that country is its close ally.
In fact, this strategy closely follows Syrian interests, which are quite different than those of the United States and run along the following lines: The regime of President Bashar al-Asad would prefer an Iraq that was under Syrian control or one under Iranian influence as long as Tehran did not forget about the needs of its Syrian ally. This means an Iraq that is Arab nationalist, anti-American, ready to pursue the conflict against Israel actively, and a sponsor of international terrorism (especially if this means backing Syrian clients such as Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad).
In the words of Syrian Vice-President Faruq al-Shar'a on March 7, 2007, Syria "supports any solution that leads to... the establishment of a new Iraq that is Arab in affiliation and that... is a brother of Syria...."
It may seem paradoxical on the surface, but makes it perfect sense that Syria does not care so much whether or not the Sunni or Shi'a rule in Iraq as long as they fulfill its agenda.
Naturally, Syria would prefer that the type of Sunni communalists or Islamists who have been its direct clients come into power, but it would certainly be happy with Iranian-influenced Shi'a who would follow the kind of policies it seeks.
In this context, it should be noted that Syria has excellent relations with radical Shi'a leader Muqtada Sadr, as well as with a wild variety of Sunni insurgents--ex-Saddam backers, al-Qa'ida supporters, and Sunni communalists. As Asad himself stated in a little-noticed interview with French television on March 21, 2007, as reported by the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), "What we are doing is to start dialogue with all parties, whether they are supporting the political process or opposing it" in Iraq.
In the absence of this preferred outcome, Syria will pursue that kind of solution to the Iraq issue through its present policies. This means ensuring that Iraq remains unstable and that U.S. influence is under attack there. A U.S. withdrawal would please Damascus as a sign of a retreating American role on its border. Yet violence and disorder within Iraq should clearly be seen as in Syria's interest, not something that frightens Damascus with the threat of chaos on its frontier.
What Syria does fear is a stable Iraq under a U.S.-allied regime that defeats the insurgency. Whether or not Sunnis are offered more or reconciled with the existing Iraqi government is not of interest to Syria in and of itself, since Damascus cares nothing about Sunni rights within Iraq.
The real issue for Damascus is to avoid any stable, moderate outcome in Iraq for five reasons. First, a U.S. client state on its border is in itself a strategic danger to Syria, given the clashes between the two countries' goals and interests. The battle over Iraq is whether that country will be part of the Iran-Syria or of the U.S.-oriented Saudi-Egyptian-Jordanian bloc.
Second, a success for democracy in Iraq sends a dangerous message to its own citizens, who might view this system as preferable to their existing dictatorship. Third, a victory for U.S. policy in Iraq is also an obstacle in the way of the Iran-Syria alliance and the "resistance" strategy Asad advocates in the region. Fourth, an end to the insurgency would free up U.S. assets to be used against Syria itself and its ally Iran. As long as the United States is tied down in Iraq, America has little power to spare to use against Syria directly. It should be noted, however, that a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq could to some degree have the same effect. Finally, an end to ethnic strife in Iraq would remove a Syrian argument against internal reform that any change could lead to anarchy and civil war.
All of these points must be understood before any "spillover" or impact of Iraq on Syria can be evaluated. What is most essential to comprehend is that factors that seem negative to the United States, Egypt, Europe, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the smaller Gulf Arab states are in fact positive from the Syrian perspective. In general, Syrian interests (along with those of Iran) are the exact opposite of all the other countries.
The Insurgency
An intensive, bloody insurgency has wracked Iraq since it started after Saddam's overthrow in 2003. There are several ways this instability could spread to other Arab countries. The terrorists using Iraq as a base or a battlefront could attack elsewhere, buoyed by their success. Alternatively, they could leave Iraq, in victory or defeat, just as their ideological "ancestors" spread out from Afghanistan after the war ended there. Another option is that the same forces that supported the insurgency could sponsor or inspire similar efforts in other countries. However, these issues do not scare Syria much at all.
After all, it is the main outside sponsor of the Sunni insurgency.
This problem was the centerpiece--to no apparent avail--of the highest-level U.S.-Syrian meeting in Damascus since Bashar al-Asad inherited power in 2000. Lame-duck Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage visited Damascus in January 2005. This was followed in summer 2005 by a very public spat between U.S., Iraqi, and Syrian officials about the role of Syria in Iraq's insurgency. Syrian officials variously claimed to have posted 4,500, 6,000, or even 10,000 soldiers to patrol that border, demanding that other "should appreciate" that effort.
By early 2007, Syrian Deputy Prime Minister Abdallah al-Dardari raised that claim to 12,000 troops. U.S. and Iraqi officials retorted that far too many insurgents were still coming across into Iraq. In January 2007, President Bush again accused Syria of supporting cross-border "networks" of those killing American soldiers and Iraqi civilians inside Iraq.
A Syrian spokesman made a quite transparently false response in claiming:
There is not a single Iraqi or American soldier there to secure the border. We have asked the Americans and the Iraqis to work together with us to secure the border, but they turned down our request. Maybe they want a scapegoat to explain their failure in Iraq.
In March 2007, President Asad offered Diane Sawyer an equally poor excuse, saying, "You cannot control your border with Mexico, can you? You're the greatest power in the world, you cannot control it with Mexico, so how do you want Syria to control its border with Iraq?" As disingenuous as this riposte may be, it does reflect Asad's genuine lack of concern about any potential "spillover" back into Syria from the insurgents in Iraq. The terrorists are not going to target their paymaster, and the ones who would be attacked are Syria's enemies or rivals.
Who is going to imitate the insurgents within Syria itself?
The answer to that question, in theory, is that Sunni Muslim Islamists inside Syria might copy their co-communalists by rising up against a regime dominated by someone else, in this case Alawites, a purportedly Shi'a but actually non-Muslim minority of only 12 percent ruling over a 60 percent Sunni majority. Yet Syria's support for the insurgency has consolidated its reputation--among its own Sunni majority as well as abroad--as a fighter for Sunni and Islamist causes. By supporting the insurgency, Syria has made itself less liable to face such an insurgency of its own.
Jihadi Terrorism and Blowback
According to the U.S. and Iraqi governments, as well as others, Syria has played a major role in supporting and inspiring not just "communal nationalist" Sunni insurgents--who merely want to return to the historic situation of their own supremacy--but also jihadi ones--who want a radical Islamist state in Iraq.
This help includes housing headquarters, leaders, and large amounts of funds, as well as allowing Islamist volunteers for the insurgency to enter, transit, receive arms, and get training in Syria. These people are mainly radical Islamists who would like to overthrow all existing Arab governments and install Islamist states.
In theory, Syria could fear similar treatment. In reality, however, Syria has reinvented itself as the main Arab sponsor of radical Islamist movements. True, the Ba'thist regime there was long a secular one in orientation, but this has not been true for a number of years, certainly not since Bashar al-Asad became president in 2000. Within Syria, mosques have been built and restrictions loosened (for example, on women wearing veils and on soldiers praying on bases), and government propaganda often sounds like variations or clones of radical Islamist arguments. Syria is in no way an Islamist regime, but it often talks and acts as if it is one.
Syria's Relationship with Iran and Saudi Arabia
A very intriguing and ironic outcome of Syria's support for Sunni insurgents and jihadists in Iraq is the apparent--but not substantive--contradiction with another key aspect of Syria's foreign policy: its alliance with Iran, which is not only the major Shi'a power in the world today but also actively supports Shi'a government officials and sectarian militias inside Iraq.
On the surface, Iran backs the current Iraqi government, which Syria is so energetically subverting. In fact, though, Iran's main priorities are to push out the U.S. forces and establish a pro-Iranian regime in Iraq that would be part of the existing Hamas-Iran-Syria-Hizballah alliance. Both Iran and Syria also support Sadr, who represents one of the main forces that might produce such an outcome. Of course, Iran's influence with Shi'a factions within the government coalition is far more extensive than anything Syria possesses, yet that in itself is not a problem for Syria.
Thus, the seemingly amazing point that the two allies, Syria and Iran, are backing opposite sides in a war--two groups that are murdering each other--is reconciled in strategic terms.
Another factor here is that Syria continues to maintain it is the best of all Arab nationalists while abandoning the camp of Arab states for an alliance with Iran. Asad's insulting talk toward Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia has not been defused by talks with leaders of those countries. These regimes oppose Syria's posture but--it is important to note--they, too, are sympathetic toward the insurgency and want to maintain Sunni rule in Iraq. At any rate, they are not taking substantive anti-Syrian action, so the cost to Damascus is minimal.
Sectarian Conflict
Aside from foreign policy and the profitable alliance with Iran, there are ample domestic reasons for Syria's behavior. By supporting Sunni Islam with the Iraqi insurgency and Hamas--and even by its backing for Shi'a (but Islamist) Hizballah in Lebanon--the regime has increased its support among Syria's Sunni Muslim majority as the champion and defender of their community, Sunnis abroad, and Islamism. At a time when the Syrian economy is in terrible shape, freedoms are limited, and the minority (and non-Muslim or at least pseudo-Shi'a) nature of the regime might be otherwise controversial, Bashar is at the peak of his popularity. Anti-American and anti-Israeli policies and rhetoric intensify this populist, demagogic success.
What is particularly notable is that the main and potentially most effective opposition group, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, has been undercut. For instance, at a meeting of Muslim Brotherhood cadre in Amman, Jordan, Jordanian Muslim Brothers criticized their Syrian counterparts, saying it was forbidden to fight the Syrian regime since it was doing such a good job of promoting Islamism.
Yet at precisely the same time, the regime effectively uses the Islamist--which in Syria also means Sunni sectarian--threat at home to solidify support among those who fear such a danger. Those who might otherwise become liberal critics of the regime are afraid to speak, or even back Asad, because they fear that the alternative is a Sunni Islamist regime. This is true not only among Alawites and intellectuals and educated urban women (who might themselves be Sunni), but also among the sizeable Christian population. It might also be a factor among the Druze minority too.
Thus, rather than threaten to spill over, sectarian strife in Iraq contributes to Syrian regime maintenance. Those Syrians who support the insurgency count it to Syria's credit; those who are horrified at the bloodshed support the regime to ensure that it does not spill over and that Syria does not face the perils of democracy.
Exception Number One: Kurdish Ethnic Spillover
In March 2004, during a soccer game in Qamishili, Syria, Kurds in the crowd shouted slogans about Iraq's new constitution, which gave their counterparts there autonomy. Syrian Arabs, including police, responded with chants backing Shi'a hardliners in the neighboring country. The security forces fired at the Kurds, killing several people. Police again opened fire during the funeral, setting off two days of riots. Many Kurds were arrested, beaten, and tortured. Kurdish groups have aligned themselves with the pro-democratic opposition.
Clearly, the Kurdish autonomy in Iraq does inspire Syrian Kurds to demand more. Still, however, the situation largely seems under control by the Syrian authorities. Moreover, some Iraqi Kurdish leaders, including President Talabani, are sympathetic to Syria for hosting them in exile, while foreign Kurdish militants in Iraq are focused on Turkey or Iran rather than Syria. Finally, Syrian Kurds are only one-quarter proportionately as many as their counterparts in Iraq or Turkey.
Exception Number Two: Refugees
The only actual cost Syria is facing due to the instability in Iraq is the flow of many refugees into Syria. This has a real financial cost to the regime. At the same time, though, even this has advantages by giving Syria an opportunity to show humanitarian credentials and serving as a first-hand warning to its own citizens as to the cost of putting faith in America, trying out democracy, and overthrowing a dictatorial regime.
As of early 2007, according to one Syrian official, Syria was hosting well over one million Iraqi "visitors," at a high financial cost:
No economy can simply absorb so many. In Damascus alone 25,000 children are attending our elementary schools--free of charge, it goes without saying. For us that means that we have to build dozens of new schools. One must emphasize that the U.S. in particular has a moral obligation in this matter.
In March 2007, in the highest-level direct contact since the February 2005 Hariri assassination, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Migration, and Refugees Ellen Sauerbrey journeyed to Damascus for a "useful exchange" focused "exclusively on Iraq refugee issues" with Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Faysal Maqdad. The United States apparently agreed to keep funding UNHCR aid to Iraqi refugees, while the Syrians expressed their willingness to continue hosting displaced Iraqis, although noting the burden that this does place on them and on their system.
Syrian Options
For Syria, instability in Iraq--or rather its own ability to promote or curtail it--is not a threatening crisis but a major asset for achieving leverage on other issues. The very deniability built into sponsoring terrorism allows Syria to continue backing the insurgency while claiming innocence and even that it deserves credit for countering it.
There are many media outlets, experts, and politicians in the West quite ready to credit Syrian statements about its alleged efforts for peace in Iraq or the high value of its efforts in ending the violence there, and to urge rewarding Damascus for what it claims to have already done or might do. There is a long list of benefits Syria hopes to get by promising or pretending to implement help on Iraq.
Engagement
Syria hopes that its ability to help resolve the Iraq issue will lead the West in general and the United States in particular to engage in a diplomatic process with itself. The purpose of this is not so much to reach an agreement, but to gain three other objectives.
First, if Western states are in negotiations with Syria, they are more likely not to attack it or to inflict other costs on it. Thus, a long-term process in effect gives Syria a license to do what it wants on such questions as supporting terrorist operations; backing its political clients such as Hamas, Hizballah, and Islamic Jihad; subverting Lebanon; sabotaging any Arab-Israeli peace efforts, and so on.
Second, Western states are more likely to make concessions to Syria in order to get it to engage, keep it engaged, and try to persuade it to reach some kind of agreement. This kind of argument is constantly being voiced.
Third, it sends a message to Syria's own people that their
government is strong and successful, giving them the impression that it will make big gains in future so they will ignore the current lack of rights and low living standards.
The model for this strategy is its experience with the United States in the 1990s. At that time, Syria supported the coalition against Iraq during the Kuwait crisis and then engaged in talks with Israel. As a result, Syria received huge amounts of aid from Saudi Arabia and a free pass on Lebanon and other issues. In the end, Syria gave nothing and reaped great benefits.
Lebanon
The number-one goal of Syrian policy is to revive its long domination over Lebanon. This occupation not only brought strategic advantages but also tremendous material ones. For wealthier Syrians and regime supporters--including army officers--there were the profitable areas of looting, smuggling, investing and real estate, counterfeiting, and drug production. For poorer Syrians, there were hundreds of thousands of jobs in Lebanon that paid far better than their counterparts in Syria (and certainly much better than the unemployment they would have suffered at home) and low-level participation in smuggling and other such enterprises.
Syria has tried to get back into control of Lebanon through terrorism (including assassinations) aimed to convince the Lebanese that without the Syrian presence they can know no security. Its assets include traditional pro-Syrian politicians, the Christian faction of Michel Aoun, some small Sunni Islamist groups, and first and foremost Hizballah. It has a wide variety of schemes to regain a pro-Syrian government.
If, the regime argues, the West were to give Lebanon back to Damascus, it would kill two insurgencies with one stone, so to speak. Syria would rein in both the Iraqi insurgency and Hizballah in attacking Israel. Not only is this the crudest form of terrorism as blackmail, but Syria would probably not deliver on its promises even as it swallowed its prizes.
The Hariri Investigation
If Lebanon is the regime's greatest desire, the Hariri investigation is its biggest fear. It is increasingly clear that the highest levels of the Syrian regime ordered the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2005. The UN investigation has been moving toward this conclusion. It is quite conceivable that if it continues as an honest and independent investigation, the process will end with the indictment of the Syrian regime. In this case, a joint international tribunal of Lebanese and foreign judges would be set up to try Syrian officials. If some start testifying about what they know in order to save themselves, higher-ups will be implicated.
The Syrian regime has been desperate to kill this tribunal. One way has been to take over Lebanon or to intimidate the Lebanese government into watering down or dispensing with the investigation. The other way is to get the West to drop it. The Iraq issue is seen as a way of saving the regime by doing a trade-off.
The Golan Heights
This issue is far more ambiguous than it might appear from the standpoint of Syrian interests. First, Syria does not want to pay anything for getting back the Golan Heights in terms of peace with Israel or other concessions because such a deal--as the following points show--has far more negatives than positives for the Syrian regime.
While these factors apply both to Hafiz--who, after all, turned down such a deal in 2000--and his successor, Bashar is simultaneously more insecure and more committed to a consistently radical strategy. In contrast to actually reaching a deal, however, being engaged in a protracted negotiating process is advantageous, as the analysis below will show.
Second, the Golan Heights are a poisoned prize for Syria. If the regime loses the excuse of the conflict with Israel, it has precious little otherwise to use to rationalize its continued rule.
A rational analysis of regime interest shows many more reasons for Syria to avoid rather than to make peace with Israel. Syria has a great deal to lose if diplomacy succeeds. It does not want to see an increase in regional stability, a greater U.S. role, or the normalization of Israel's position in the area. Extremely dissatisfied with the status quo, Syria's rulers have seen the Arab world's return to past militancy as a way to escape isolation and seize leadership. Otherwise, their hope of gaining, or keeping, influence over neighbors and becoming the area's dominant power would be lost forever. The existence of a Western-oriented Palestinian state that did not side with Syria's ambitions but whose existence might even reduce tensions or end the Arab-Israeli conflict would do nothing for them either.
An Israel-Syria peace treaty would be equally bad for the regime. Such a diplomatic achievement would open the door for most other Arab states to have relations with Israel and to work with it on matters of common interest. Yet Israel would remain determined--and be far more able--to oppose Syria's ambitions for sway over Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinians. The United States would also use its stronger influence to block Syrian goals. An Israel-Lebanon agreement would follow any Israel-Syria accord, reducing Damascus's leverage in that country and bringing international pressure for a Syrian withdrawal.
These strategic costs would not be matched by many economic or political gains for Syria, certainly not on the all-important domestic front. A Syrian agreement with Israel would not bring much Western aid or investment. More open access for foreigners to invest or do business directly in Syria and more open commercial opportunities for Syrian businesspeople would actually weaken the dictatorship's hold over its own subjects. Freer communications would give Syria more access to news and information, including ideas and facts the regime does not want them to know.
As a result of such changes, Syria would lose prestige, aid, and deferral to its interests, all the advantages that being a militant confrontation state had long given it. Today, these same factors make Syria a superpower in terms of the demagogic appeal used to keep its people in line, marching behind the regime.
In short, the existence of the Arab-Israeli conflict was and continues to be good for Syria. If it were to disappear, this would be worse than being defeated in a dozen battles against Israel. Syria would be relegated into permanent status as a secondary power in the Middle East. At home, the result could be the regime's overthrow and a devastating civil war or revolution. This was the meaning of the warning given by one pro-regime Syrian writer that Israel's proposal to give Syria the Golan Heights in exchange for real peace "is like a minefield; it conceals things that are not apparent on the surface."
A peace agreement would also advance U.S. influence in the region and against Syrian interests. It would promote moderation, undercut radicalism, introduce Israel as a normal political (and economic) factor, and promote a regional stability that would strengthen the status quo. On every aspect of its impact, a successful peace process runs counter to Syrian interests.
Consequently, the Syrians are not interested in "trading" Iraq for the Golan Heights. However, they are more interested in trading the pretense of being helpful for a long-term process, Lebanon, and an end to the Hariri investigation.
Material Benefits
Given the bad shape of its economy and the regime's refusal to make meaningful economic reforms, Syria is also interested in using Iraq to gain material benefits. In 2005, officially reported Syrian exports to Iraq totaled approximately $800 million, not far behind Iran's roughly $1 billion figure. Since diplomatic relations were restored in late 2006, Syrian officials have voiced greater interest in expanding formal economic ties with Iraq. In March 2007, to cite one example, their ministers of electricity signed an agreement to plan links between the two national grids so that Syria could sell electricity to Iraq.
If, however, obtaining such advantages would require concessions or compromises on Syria's part, the regime would rather give up the gains than pay for them. This is clear from the government's meager record in this regard.
At the same time, Syria might well offer cosmetic overtures to Iraq and pay lip service to good neighborly relations. For instance, in March 2007, Syrian Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Abdallah al-Dardari made the following declaration: "Stability, development, prosperity and unity in Iraq will be beneficial for Syria more than any other country. Our economic outlook depends on economic growth and development in Iraq."
After all, if Syria can have normal relations with the Iraqi government while still subverting it--a goal that is quite obtainable--it would be the best of all possible situations for the Damascus regime. Furthermore, in this context, the economic benefits are also an attraction for Iraq to ignore some of Syria's unfriendly, but covert, activities.
There is one more extremely important aspect of Syria's posture. In February 2007, President Asad asserted in Newsweek magazine that Syria is "the main player" in Iraq; his deputy prime minister echoed that line, telling Der Spiegel that "everyone who wants to bring peace to Iraq has to work closely with Syria."
This concept is an important element in the Syrian policy conception. Asad seeks to portray himself as the key player in the region who can pose far-reaching demands in exchange for his cooperation. Yet if Syria is so valuable an interlocutor, it can expect to receive unilateral concessions. Certainly, Asad seems to believe genuinely that he is operating from a position of strength. Every hint of the West's uncertainty or weakness--such as the visit of Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and others in April 2007--is portrayed in Syria as a major victory and proof that its strategy is working.
Always in the regime's thinking are its objectives beyond Iraq. Its aims include eliminating or rendering impotent the Hariri investigation, its removal from the U.S. terrorist list, reopening the Iraq oil pipeline through Syria (which the same regime used to violate the sanctions before Saddam Hussein was overthrown), completing a trade agreement with the European Union, and getting security equipment (in some cases, items it has previously given Hizballah and the Iraqi insurgency, such as night-vision goggles) to "patrol" the Syria-Iraq border.
Conclusions
The problem in analyzing Syria is misunderstanding the government's interests. At the top of the list is regime maintenance. In this vein, for example, peace with Israel in exchange for the Golan Heights would weaken the regime, and the same is true for democratization or economic reform, changes that are superficially thought to benefit the country.
Next on the regime's list is killing the Hariri investigation and reestablishing its domination of Lebanon. In this connection, continued backing for Hizballah and strengthening it are absolutely necessary, since it is Syria's main asset in Lebanon. Similarly, there is nothing the West can offer Syria in any realistic context that would make it worthwhile for Damascus to split from Tehran, which gives it so much geopolitical leverage, Islamist legitimacy, and material benefits.
The bottom line is that Syria likes the instability and insurgency in neighboring Iraq, preferring instability in its neighbor unless it can dominate that country itself--or in tandem with its ally Iran. The fact is that Syria's interests are diametrically opposed to the United States on this issue.
The Syrians would welcome a U.S. withdrawal, though they might worry it would free up U.S. assets to be used against itself. While they would not like to see Iran have a monopoly on influence in Iraq, the idea of an Iraq in Iran's orbit does not scare them. After all, it is a member of what would be the Iran-
Syria-Iraq alignment.
The regime in Damascus would like to use its ability to disrupt Iraq as a bargaining chip to make gains elsewhere. Yet even if in receipt of these gains, Syria would not be inclined to favor a moderate, pro-Western, stable, democratic Iraq.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary Center, and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs. His latest book is The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2007). He is editor of the recently published Political Islam (three volumes) and also of Iraq After Saddam and The Global Survey of Islamism.
by Barry Rubin
The two main areas where the alliance of radical forces in the Middle East confront Western interests and pose a danger of major instability are Iran's drive for nuclear weapons and Syria's efforts to destabilize Iraq. This article considers these two issues. First, it examines what effect Iran's obtaining nuclear weapons would have on Middle East politics, with an emphasis on scenarios that would occur even if Iran never actually uses them. Second, it asks why it is that the interests of Iran's ally, Syria, compel it to destabilize Iraq.
A Nuclear Iran and Middle East Politics
If Iran gets nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them to targets, what impact would it have on the Arab world? While this is necessarily speculative, an analysis of the strategic effect of Tehran having nuclear weapons is the most important piece of contingency planning in the world today. One can make some very educated guesses as to what would happen.
Public statements by Arab leaders, journalists, and others of indifference or even Muslim solidarity with Iran are more than matched by private remarks showing fear and hope that Tehran will be stopped. As so often happens, however, the Arab regimes and intellectuals will do almost nothing to help achieve the outcome they want. It is left in the hands of the West, the United States, or even Israel to block Iran's progress.
However, an outcome with Iran having nuclear weapons is more likely than the alternative.
A great deal of attention has rightly been paid to the possibility that Tehran might use nuclear weapons against Israel--especially given the threatening statements of Iranian leaders, which do not stop short of advocating genocide. If Iran had nuclear bombs it might well use them to attack Israel, a situation that would produce hundreds of thousands of deaths--especially if a nuclear exchange followed--and provoke the biggest crisis in the region's history. This is a terrifying possibility no matter how low one assesses its chances of happening. This threat is sufficient in itself as a reason to stop Iran from obtaining such terrible weapons, all the more since it is an extremist, aggressive government that has voiced its readiness to use them and has shown its willingness to employ terrorism.
While this is important, however, there are other elements of the issue that deserve fuller consideration. There are other outcomes that--compared to the actual firing of nuclear-tipped missiles or giving such arms to terrorist groups--are a 100 percent certainty given a nuclear-armed Iran. These strategic concerns are of the highest importance for the entire world.
This point would be true even if there were no oil and natural gas in the Persian Gulf area, but given the great concentration of these vital resources (and the systems for transporting them elsewhere) there, it becomes arguably the globe's most compelling issue.
Thus, given the premise that Iran were to obtain nuclear weapons and the missiles capable of delivering them, even in small numbers, how would politics and policies in the Arabic-speaking world be changed?
The Search for a Defensive Shield
Clearly, one step that Arab states would take--especially Saudi Arabia and the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)--would be to seek a nuclear umbrella from the West, especially from the United States. These governments would ask Washington for assurances of defense against any Iranian threat or attack, especially a stated willingness by the United States to strike at Iran with nuclear weapons in the event of their being used against any of Iran's neighbors.
It should be noted that the European Union would not play a central role here, being unwilling and unable to provide such a guarantee. Nevertheless, the position taken by the EU would be important, for any sign of doubt or opposition to such an umbrella would be interpreted both by Tehran and its neighbors as implying that no one can provide the ultimate defense against Iran.
There would also likely be other conventional military components to such a defensive umbrella. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) could be involved; the GCC might seek to buy anti-missile defenses or warplanes capable of striking at Iran from Western states. Western forces might be placed in the Gulf as tripwires to deter Iran from attacking, since then a nuclear strike against, say, Saudi Arabia, would be an attack on the whole Western world.
Yet there is a major problem with the idea of direct military aid or involvement that would give Arab states, especially those in the Gulf, a greater sense of security vis-Ã -vis Iran. For one of Tehran's demands--supported by domestic opinion in Arab states as well as Iran's own threat--would surely be not to engage in such activities (see below). Furthermore, most or all Arab states would probably comply at least up to a point with this attempt to deny them a strong defensive alliance.
Nukes of Their Own
Another potential response of at least some Arab states would be to seek their own nuclear weapons and delivery systems. It is easy to underestimate what a big undertaking this would be. After all, it is not just a matter of purchasing some nuclear technology. Either the country has to be capable of building both workable weapons and missiles capable of carrying them or of purchasing them readymade.
Yet only the Saudis among Gulf Arab states are likely to be willing and able to undertake such an effort. It is most unlikely that Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq, Oman, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, or others would either seek or have much prospect of obtaining nuclear weapons or sophisticated, comprehensive anti-missile defenses.
Moreover, even if Arab countries do obtain such weapons, they must be maintained properly, amply protected, and carefully managed in deciding under what conditions they might be used, who would control them, and many other difficult questions. The dangers are enormous, including the possibility of provoking a stronger Iran, thus weakening rather than strengthening deterrence. It is likely that all Arab countries, even Saudi Arabia, would reach the conclusion that seeking an independent nuclear capability is more trouble than benefit.
One factor here is that having nuclear weapons is a risky matter in several strategic respects. This is especially true for a country whose stability and technical skills are not assured, as well one where dissident elements or opposition terrorists might seek to seize such arms or facilities. Taking these points into account, aside from their own anti-proliferation stance, Western states, including the United States, are not going to help Arab countries get nuclear weapons or missiles capable of carrying them.
Consequently, simply saying that countries would respond to an Iranian nuclear capability by getting their own weapons is no answer to the new situation created by Tehran's having atomic weapons.
Appeasement
In connection with seeking an American umbrella, the most attractive strategy for Arab states is appeasement of Iran. The fact that most or all European countries would move in a parallel direction would only reinforce this trend.
The key question here is: What would Iran demand and Arab states be willing to give in order to achieve this goal? One possibility is a lack of cooperation with the United States in combating Iranian ambitions and threatening its nuclear arsenal, which might also include pressure not to grant basing rights to American forces--at least any new ones--as well as not taking part in any campaign to isolate or impose sanctions on Iran. Other demands might include no peace agreements with Israel, acceding to Iranian demands for high oil prices, non-interference with Iranian influence in Iraq, and minimizing verbal criticism of Iran, its system, interests, and allies.
Somewhat harder to swallow would be acceptance of Iran's leading role in Gulf security. Tehran's position has been that security arrangements should involve only the local states, thus minimizing outside defensive support for Gulf Arab states and further enhancing Iranian goals. This may also involve a more positive attitude toward Iran's allies. This could include friendlier policies toward Syria, not opposing Hizballah's efforts to gain veto power or hegemony over Lebanon's government, and accepting the primacy of Hamas over Fatah in the Palestinian arena.
These concessions taken together would further weaken Arab resistance to Iranian regional (or at least Gulf) hegemony and undermine Western (or at least American) efforts to construct an anti-Iranian alliance. If Arab states are too frightened to admit they fear Iran having nuclear arms before it has even obtained them--much less being willing to act to avoid this outcome--how will they react when Tehran actually does have such weapons of mass destruction?
HISH Power
The central issue in the Middle East today is the conflict between the radical HISH alliance (Hamas-Iran-Syria-Hizballah) and the Arab nationalist Sunni regimes. HISH projects its power through a variety of means, including radical Islamist ideology, sponsorship of terrorism, covert or overt backing for revolutionary clients, and the direct power of Iran and Syria.
What would happen to Arab politics in a situation in which Iran had nuclear weapons must be considered in this context.
At present, the main battlefronts are in Iraq and Lebanon, and for control of the Palestinian leadership. Moreover, in every Arabic-speaking country (except for in Syria itself, where they have been largely though perhaps temporarily coopted) radical Islamist forces are the main opposition to the existing governments.
Historically, of course, Iran faced serious problems in projecting its influence into the Arabic-speaking world. There were three barriers in particular, and all of them have eroded. First, Iran is a non-Arab state, directed by ethnic Persians. Though it also includes other ethnic elements, few of them are Arabs. Arab nationalism has thus been antagonistic toward Iran, a factor manipulated by its Arab rivals and accepted by their people. (A notable example was Iraq's use of anti-Persian propaganda during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War.)
Through the HISH alliance, however, Iran has passed through this barricade by having three major Arab allies--Palestinian Hamas, Lebanese Hizballah, and Syria--as well as considerable assets among Iraq's Shi'a Arabs. In addition, the appeal of Iran's line using Islamism, anti-Westernism, total opposition to Israel's existence, and revolutionary passion has appealed to many Arabs.
On the Arab-Persian issue, many Arabs are still totally opposed to any power by Tehran over "their" region. The GCC countries view Iran as a direct threat. Egypt sees it as an unwanted rival for leadership. Fatah is suspicious of Iran's sponsorship for Hamas and plays the "anti-Persian" card, as does the governing coalition in Lebanon. Still, many Arabs are no longer persuaded that they must oppose Iran as a non-Arab force.
Second, Iran is a predominantly Shi'a Muslim country, and the "Islamic" regime is very much a Shi'a and not a Sunni one. The majority of the Arabic-speaking world is Sunni and has certainly been ruled by Sunnis even when they are in the minority (Iraq, Bahrain, and in a sense Lebanon).
Through the HISH alliance, though, Iran has also passed this barricade. Hamas is Sunni, and Syria has a Sunni Muslim majority that supports the regime even if it does not comprise it. Using the methods discussed above, Iran can claim more appeal than ever before on the basis of Islamism, even with Sunni forces. However, many Sunnis--including Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood--and especially the Saudis are still mobilized by hatred and fear of the Shi'a.
Third, leadership in the Arabic-speaking world was dominated by the battle among the strongest Arab states (Egypt, Iraq, and Syria), leaving no room for an outside contender. Today, however, there is a leadership vacuum in the Arab world. Iraq will be in too much disorder to be concerned with regional issues for some years to come. The leadership bid by its ruler, Saddam Hussein, not only failed but contributed greatly to the regime's downfall. A weaker Syria has hitched itself to Iranian leadership while Egypt has turned very much inward, unable to project any influence outside its own borders. Even Jordan's King Hussein, who ruled a small country but cast a giant shadow, is no more. The door is open to Iran's bid for hegemony.
Iran's success is by no means complete. Still, it is hovering on the verge of serious success. Its clients are close to power in Iraq, Lebanon, and among the Palestinians. Its popularity among Arabs and Sunnis is at an all-time high. One can understand if leaders in Tehran believe that the future belongs to them, even though this might be a major miscalculation. Indeed, making such a misestimate of the balance of force might produce a giant crisis, especially if Iran has nuclear weapons.
Springtime for Tehran
In this context, then, it is possible to analyze the tremendous boost that possessing nuclear weapons would give to Iran, its allies, and its ideology.
Islamism
Buoyed by having a "superpower-type" sponsor and the "proof" of how effective an Islamist government is, radical Islamist forces around the region would grow rapidly in numbers and boldness. They would argue that Iran can stand up to America, subvert the existing Arab regimes, and destroy Israel.
The rush to Islamism would parallel the growth of radical Arab nationalism after such "successes" as Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and survival of an international assault in the 1950s. A tidal wave of recruitment to radical Islamist movements throughout the Arab world would take place, and these groups would be more aggressive in fighting regimes (notably in Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt), including the use of violence. The appeal of Arab nationalism could collapse, at least in specific countries, and several more Islamist regimes might very well take power.
Syria
Under the protection of Iran's nuclear umbrella, Damascus would be more aggressive toward Israel, in subverting the Lebanese government, and in promoting insurgency in Iraq. Such adventurism could lead to direct war with Israel, even if that is not the Syrian regime's conscious intention.
Lebanon
Hizballah and Syria's politician clients might succeed in either forming their own government there or at least in getting veto power over the regime's decisionmaking process. With control over the country ensured, Hizballah would be more likely to launch a campaign that would lead to another war with Israel.
Iraq
Iran's influence among Iraqi Shi'as would skyrocket. Tehran could and probably would use this to force out any U.S. presence and move Iraq in the direction of being a satellite state (even if it did not succeed completely). Even an independent-minded Iraqi government would feel that a strong, neighboring Iran was a more important factor to please than a distant and fickle United States.
Arab-Israeli Conflict
The chance of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict diplomatically would be zero, as the growing numbers of radicals would believe they could win completely, and the relatively moderate would be too scared to take any action that might be defined as treasonous. With Hamas winning even more over Fatah--and Fatah pushed toward a harder line, perhaps even a deal with Iran--no Palestinian leader would negotiate seriously. This is already true, and it would be even more so.
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
The Saudis and other Gulf countries would be very intimidated by Iran's growing power. They would try to survive by propitiating Iran and by ensuring Western support, but their priority would swing toward the former factor. Internal revolutionary and terrorist movements would probably increase and be disruptive, even if they did not come into power. Oil and natural gas prices would skyrocket in view of the market's fear of regional instability.
Conclusions
All in all, the outcome would be incredibly damaging for Western interests. The kind of postwar interventionism that took place in Kuwait in 1991 and Iraq in 2003 would be impossible, since now Iran--in place of the USSR--would hold the balance. The type of hopeful diplomacy contained in the 1990s peace process would be impossible since the Arab side would be held in thrall to Iranian and radical Islamist pressures.
Western attempts to conciliate Iran would be tougher since Tehran could maintain that it achieved nuclear weapons despite opposition from the West. Since it is so powerful, why should it make any concessions at all to a side it sees as frightened and in historic decline? That idea--that Iran is on the winning side of history--would have enormous appeal in the Arabic-speaking world.
This is a very gloomy assessment, but it is hard to see how a different one is more likely. To reiterate, even assuming that Iran never uses nuclear weapons, the possession of them alone is likely to create an enormous, earthquake-like strategic shift in the region and in Arab politics.
SYRIA AND IRAQ: THE STRUGGLE FOR ARAB HEGEMONY
Syria has been a major exporter of instability to Iraq, and thus the Damascus regime. It is a major promoter of disorder there and clearly does not fear the radical Islamists it is helping as either a force in Iraq or as a threat to Syria itself. Some Western observers have argued that Syrian interests are parallel to those of their own countries. If this is true at all it is due only to the fact that parallel lines never meet.
American and Iraqi officials have consistently made this point in no uncertain words, and in increasingly specific terms. In November 2005, then Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari explained, "We demand that [Syria] control [its] borders, prevent infiltration and terrorism. We want good relations with Syria, but this cannot be achieved when such violations exist."
In September 2006, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salah said that Iraq wanted to "get our Syrian neighbors to behave more responsibly... and to clamp down on the presence and activity of some of the former regime leaders" there "as well as some of the terrorists that are going across the borders."
A few months later, the deputy governor of Mosul, Khasro Goran, added that Syria could easily control terrorism from its territory since it had thrown out the Kurdish PKK leaders in 1998, responding to a threat from Turkey.
The U.S. military spokesman in Iraq, Major General William Caldwell, estimated that between 70 and 100 foreign fighters, one-fifth of whom were Syrian, were caught crossing the Syrian border into Iraq every month throughout 2005 and 2006.
In late 2006, Syria added to its strategy by opening diplomatic relations with Iraq, a relationship broken more than two decades earlier, though the two countries had worked together closely in the years before Saddam Hussein's overthrow. Syria's foreign minister visited Baghdad, and Iraq's President Jalal Talabani made a January 2007 week-long return visit to Damascus, where he had lived in exile during the Saddam era. Syria and Iraq signed several accords and made public statements pledging to work together on all sorts of security, political, and economic matters of mutual interest.
The problem, however, was that Syria did not fulfill those pledges, particularly on the all-important security issue. In February 2007, Iraqi government spokesman Ali Dabbagh could still assert that "50 percent of murders and bombings are by extremists coming from Syria... and we have evidence to prove it." Equally striking was the March 2007 statement by State Department Iraq Coordinator Ambassador David Satterfield that at least 80 percent of suicide bombers in Iraq had transited through Syria.
To some extent, both Iraq and the U.S. government might well be exaggerating the high proportion of the terrorism coming from Syria. Nevertheless, this factor is clearly both important and continuing, showing Syria's effort to maintain a high state of instability in Iraq and drive out U.S. forces.
By being willing to play this role, Syria shows that it does not fear all-out civil war in Iraq (it merely wants its side to win). Similarly, the Syrian regime does not seem to take seriously the possibility of partition or large-scale Turkish intervention. Moreover, it certainly does not worry about large-scale Iranian influence, since that country is its close ally.
In fact, this strategy closely follows Syrian interests, which are quite different than those of the United States and run along the following lines: The regime of President Bashar al-Asad would prefer an Iraq that was under Syrian control or one under Iranian influence as long as Tehran did not forget about the needs of its Syrian ally. This means an Iraq that is Arab nationalist, anti-American, ready to pursue the conflict against Israel actively, and a sponsor of international terrorism (especially if this means backing Syrian clients such as Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad).
In the words of Syrian Vice-President Faruq al-Shar'a on March 7, 2007, Syria "supports any solution that leads to... the establishment of a new Iraq that is Arab in affiliation and that... is a brother of Syria...."
It may seem paradoxical on the surface, but makes it perfect sense that Syria does not care so much whether or not the Sunni or Shi'a rule in Iraq as long as they fulfill its agenda.
Naturally, Syria would prefer that the type of Sunni communalists or Islamists who have been its direct clients come into power, but it would certainly be happy with Iranian-influenced Shi'a who would follow the kind of policies it seeks.
In this context, it should be noted that Syria has excellent relations with radical Shi'a leader Muqtada Sadr, as well as with a wild variety of Sunni insurgents--ex-Saddam backers, al-Qa'ida supporters, and Sunni communalists. As Asad himself stated in a little-noticed interview with French television on March 21, 2007, as reported by the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), "What we are doing is to start dialogue with all parties, whether they are supporting the political process or opposing it" in Iraq.
In the absence of this preferred outcome, Syria will pursue that kind of solution to the Iraq issue through its present policies. This means ensuring that Iraq remains unstable and that U.S. influence is under attack there. A U.S. withdrawal would please Damascus as a sign of a retreating American role on its border. Yet violence and disorder within Iraq should clearly be seen as in Syria's interest, not something that frightens Damascus with the threat of chaos on its frontier.
What Syria does fear is a stable Iraq under a U.S.-allied regime that defeats the insurgency. Whether or not Sunnis are offered more or reconciled with the existing Iraqi government is not of interest to Syria in and of itself, since Damascus cares nothing about Sunni rights within Iraq.
The real issue for Damascus is to avoid any stable, moderate outcome in Iraq for five reasons. First, a U.S. client state on its border is in itself a strategic danger to Syria, given the clashes between the two countries' goals and interests. The battle over Iraq is whether that country will be part of the Iran-Syria or of the U.S.-oriented Saudi-Egyptian-Jordanian bloc.
Second, a success for democracy in Iraq sends a dangerous message to its own citizens, who might view this system as preferable to their existing dictatorship. Third, a victory for U.S. policy in Iraq is also an obstacle in the way of the Iran-Syria alliance and the "resistance" strategy Asad advocates in the region. Fourth, an end to the insurgency would free up U.S. assets to be used against Syria itself and its ally Iran. As long as the United States is tied down in Iraq, America has little power to spare to use against Syria directly. It should be noted, however, that a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq could to some degree have the same effect. Finally, an end to ethnic strife in Iraq would remove a Syrian argument against internal reform that any change could lead to anarchy and civil war.
All of these points must be understood before any "spillover" or impact of Iraq on Syria can be evaluated. What is most essential to comprehend is that factors that seem negative to the United States, Egypt, Europe, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the smaller Gulf Arab states are in fact positive from the Syrian perspective. In general, Syrian interests (along with those of Iran) are the exact opposite of all the other countries.
The Insurgency
An intensive, bloody insurgency has wracked Iraq since it started after Saddam's overthrow in 2003. There are several ways this instability could spread to other Arab countries. The terrorists using Iraq as a base or a battlefront could attack elsewhere, buoyed by their success. Alternatively, they could leave Iraq, in victory or defeat, just as their ideological "ancestors" spread out from Afghanistan after the war ended there. Another option is that the same forces that supported the insurgency could sponsor or inspire similar efforts in other countries. However, these issues do not scare Syria much at all.
After all, it is the main outside sponsor of the Sunni insurgency.
This problem was the centerpiece--to no apparent avail--of the highest-level U.S.-Syrian meeting in Damascus since Bashar al-Asad inherited power in 2000. Lame-duck Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage visited Damascus in January 2005. This was followed in summer 2005 by a very public spat between U.S., Iraqi, and Syrian officials about the role of Syria in Iraq's insurgency. Syrian officials variously claimed to have posted 4,500, 6,000, or even 10,000 soldiers to patrol that border, demanding that other "should appreciate" that effort.
By early 2007, Syrian Deputy Prime Minister Abdallah al-Dardari raised that claim to 12,000 troops. U.S. and Iraqi officials retorted that far too many insurgents were still coming across into Iraq. In January 2007, President Bush again accused Syria of supporting cross-border "networks" of those killing American soldiers and Iraqi civilians inside Iraq.
A Syrian spokesman made a quite transparently false response in claiming:
There is not a single Iraqi or American soldier there to secure the border. We have asked the Americans and the Iraqis to work together with us to secure the border, but they turned down our request. Maybe they want a scapegoat to explain their failure in Iraq.
In March 2007, President Asad offered Diane Sawyer an equally poor excuse, saying, "You cannot control your border with Mexico, can you? You're the greatest power in the world, you cannot control it with Mexico, so how do you want Syria to control its border with Iraq?" As disingenuous as this riposte may be, it does reflect Asad's genuine lack of concern about any potential "spillover" back into Syria from the insurgents in Iraq. The terrorists are not going to target their paymaster, and the ones who would be attacked are Syria's enemies or rivals.
Who is going to imitate the insurgents within Syria itself?
The answer to that question, in theory, is that Sunni Muslim Islamists inside Syria might copy their co-communalists by rising up against a regime dominated by someone else, in this case Alawites, a purportedly Shi'a but actually non-Muslim minority of only 12 percent ruling over a 60 percent Sunni majority. Yet Syria's support for the insurgency has consolidated its reputation--among its own Sunni majority as well as abroad--as a fighter for Sunni and Islamist causes. By supporting the insurgency, Syria has made itself less liable to face such an insurgency of its own.
Jihadi Terrorism and Blowback
According to the U.S. and Iraqi governments, as well as others, Syria has played a major role in supporting and inspiring not just "communal nationalist" Sunni insurgents--who merely want to return to the historic situation of their own supremacy--but also jihadi ones--who want a radical Islamist state in Iraq.
This help includes housing headquarters, leaders, and large amounts of funds, as well as allowing Islamist volunteers for the insurgency to enter, transit, receive arms, and get training in Syria. These people are mainly radical Islamists who would like to overthrow all existing Arab governments and install Islamist states.
In theory, Syria could fear similar treatment. In reality, however, Syria has reinvented itself as the main Arab sponsor of radical Islamist movements. True, the Ba'thist regime there was long a secular one in orientation, but this has not been true for a number of years, certainly not since Bashar al-Asad became president in 2000. Within Syria, mosques have been built and restrictions loosened (for example, on women wearing veils and on soldiers praying on bases), and government propaganda often sounds like variations or clones of radical Islamist arguments. Syria is in no way an Islamist regime, but it often talks and acts as if it is one.
Syria's Relationship with Iran and Saudi Arabia
A very intriguing and ironic outcome of Syria's support for Sunni insurgents and jihadists in Iraq is the apparent--but not substantive--contradiction with another key aspect of Syria's foreign policy: its alliance with Iran, which is not only the major Shi'a power in the world today but also actively supports Shi'a government officials and sectarian militias inside Iraq.
On the surface, Iran backs the current Iraqi government, which Syria is so energetically subverting. In fact, though, Iran's main priorities are to push out the U.S. forces and establish a pro-Iranian regime in Iraq that would be part of the existing Hamas-Iran-Syria-Hizballah alliance. Both Iran and Syria also support Sadr, who represents one of the main forces that might produce such an outcome. Of course, Iran's influence with Shi'a factions within the government coalition is far more extensive than anything Syria possesses, yet that in itself is not a problem for Syria.
Thus, the seemingly amazing point that the two allies, Syria and Iran, are backing opposite sides in a war--two groups that are murdering each other--is reconciled in strategic terms.
Another factor here is that Syria continues to maintain it is the best of all Arab nationalists while abandoning the camp of Arab states for an alliance with Iran. Asad's insulting talk toward Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia has not been defused by talks with leaders of those countries. These regimes oppose Syria's posture but--it is important to note--they, too, are sympathetic toward the insurgency and want to maintain Sunni rule in Iraq. At any rate, they are not taking substantive anti-Syrian action, so the cost to Damascus is minimal.
Sectarian Conflict
Aside from foreign policy and the profitable alliance with Iran, there are ample domestic reasons for Syria's behavior. By supporting Sunni Islam with the Iraqi insurgency and Hamas--and even by its backing for Shi'a (but Islamist) Hizballah in Lebanon--the regime has increased its support among Syria's Sunni Muslim majority as the champion and defender of their community, Sunnis abroad, and Islamism. At a time when the Syrian economy is in terrible shape, freedoms are limited, and the minority (and non-Muslim or at least pseudo-Shi'a) nature of the regime might be otherwise controversial, Bashar is at the peak of his popularity. Anti-American and anti-Israeli policies and rhetoric intensify this populist, demagogic success.
What is particularly notable is that the main and potentially most effective opposition group, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, has been undercut. For instance, at a meeting of Muslim Brotherhood cadre in Amman, Jordan, Jordanian Muslim Brothers criticized their Syrian counterparts, saying it was forbidden to fight the Syrian regime since it was doing such a good job of promoting Islamism.
Yet at precisely the same time, the regime effectively uses the Islamist--which in Syria also means Sunni sectarian--threat at home to solidify support among those who fear such a danger. Those who might otherwise become liberal critics of the regime are afraid to speak, or even back Asad, because they fear that the alternative is a Sunni Islamist regime. This is true not only among Alawites and intellectuals and educated urban women (who might themselves be Sunni), but also among the sizeable Christian population. It might also be a factor among the Druze minority too.
Thus, rather than threaten to spill over, sectarian strife in Iraq contributes to Syrian regime maintenance. Those Syrians who support the insurgency count it to Syria's credit; those who are horrified at the bloodshed support the regime to ensure that it does not spill over and that Syria does not face the perils of democracy.
Exception Number One: Kurdish Ethnic Spillover
In March 2004, during a soccer game in Qamishili, Syria, Kurds in the crowd shouted slogans about Iraq's new constitution, which gave their counterparts there autonomy. Syrian Arabs, including police, responded with chants backing Shi'a hardliners in the neighboring country. The security forces fired at the Kurds, killing several people. Police again opened fire during the funeral, setting off two days of riots. Many Kurds were arrested, beaten, and tortured. Kurdish groups have aligned themselves with the pro-democratic opposition.
Clearly, the Kurdish autonomy in Iraq does inspire Syrian Kurds to demand more. Still, however, the situation largely seems under control by the Syrian authorities. Moreover, some Iraqi Kurdish leaders, including President Talabani, are sympathetic to Syria for hosting them in exile, while foreign Kurdish militants in Iraq are focused on Turkey or Iran rather than Syria. Finally, Syrian Kurds are only one-quarter proportionately as many as their counterparts in Iraq or Turkey.
Exception Number Two: Refugees
The only actual cost Syria is facing due to the instability in Iraq is the flow of many refugees into Syria. This has a real financial cost to the regime. At the same time, though, even this has advantages by giving Syria an opportunity to show humanitarian credentials and serving as a first-hand warning to its own citizens as to the cost of putting faith in America, trying out democracy, and overthrowing a dictatorial regime.
As of early 2007, according to one Syrian official, Syria was hosting well over one million Iraqi "visitors," at a high financial cost:
No economy can simply absorb so many. In Damascus alone 25,000 children are attending our elementary schools--free of charge, it goes without saying. For us that means that we have to build dozens of new schools. One must emphasize that the U.S. in particular has a moral obligation in this matter.
In March 2007, in the highest-level direct contact since the February 2005 Hariri assassination, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Migration, and Refugees Ellen Sauerbrey journeyed to Damascus for a "useful exchange" focused "exclusively on Iraq refugee issues" with Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Faysal Maqdad. The United States apparently agreed to keep funding UNHCR aid to Iraqi refugees, while the Syrians expressed their willingness to continue hosting displaced Iraqis, although noting the burden that this does place on them and on their system.
Syrian Options
For Syria, instability in Iraq--or rather its own ability to promote or curtail it--is not a threatening crisis but a major asset for achieving leverage on other issues. The very deniability built into sponsoring terrorism allows Syria to continue backing the insurgency while claiming innocence and even that it deserves credit for countering it.
There are many media outlets, experts, and politicians in the West quite ready to credit Syrian statements about its alleged efforts for peace in Iraq or the high value of its efforts in ending the violence there, and to urge rewarding Damascus for what it claims to have already done or might do. There is a long list of benefits Syria hopes to get by promising or pretending to implement help on Iraq.
Engagement
Syria hopes that its ability to help resolve the Iraq issue will lead the West in general and the United States in particular to engage in a diplomatic process with itself. The purpose of this is not so much to reach an agreement, but to gain three other objectives.
First, if Western states are in negotiations with Syria, they are more likely not to attack it or to inflict other costs on it. Thus, a long-term process in effect gives Syria a license to do what it wants on such questions as supporting terrorist operations; backing its political clients such as Hamas, Hizballah, and Islamic Jihad; subverting Lebanon; sabotaging any Arab-Israeli peace efforts, and so on.
Second, Western states are more likely to make concessions to Syria in order to get it to engage, keep it engaged, and try to persuade it to reach some kind of agreement. This kind of argument is constantly being voiced.
Third, it sends a message to Syria's own people that their
government is strong and successful, giving them the impression that it will make big gains in future so they will ignore the current lack of rights and low living standards.
The model for this strategy is its experience with the United States in the 1990s. At that time, Syria supported the coalition against Iraq during the Kuwait crisis and then engaged in talks with Israel. As a result, Syria received huge amounts of aid from Saudi Arabia and a free pass on Lebanon and other issues. In the end, Syria gave nothing and reaped great benefits.
Lebanon
The number-one goal of Syrian policy is to revive its long domination over Lebanon. This occupation not only brought strategic advantages but also tremendous material ones. For wealthier Syrians and regime supporters--including army officers--there were the profitable areas of looting, smuggling, investing and real estate, counterfeiting, and drug production. For poorer Syrians, there were hundreds of thousands of jobs in Lebanon that paid far better than their counterparts in Syria (and certainly much better than the unemployment they would have suffered at home) and low-level participation in smuggling and other such enterprises.
Syria has tried to get back into control of Lebanon through terrorism (including assassinations) aimed to convince the Lebanese that without the Syrian presence they can know no security. Its assets include traditional pro-Syrian politicians, the Christian faction of Michel Aoun, some small Sunni Islamist groups, and first and foremost Hizballah. It has a wide variety of schemes to regain a pro-Syrian government.
If, the regime argues, the West were to give Lebanon back to Damascus, it would kill two insurgencies with one stone, so to speak. Syria would rein in both the Iraqi insurgency and Hizballah in attacking Israel. Not only is this the crudest form of terrorism as blackmail, but Syria would probably not deliver on its promises even as it swallowed its prizes.
The Hariri Investigation
If Lebanon is the regime's greatest desire, the Hariri investigation is its biggest fear. It is increasingly clear that the highest levels of the Syrian regime ordered the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2005. The UN investigation has been moving toward this conclusion. It is quite conceivable that if it continues as an honest and independent investigation, the process will end with the indictment of the Syrian regime. In this case, a joint international tribunal of Lebanese and foreign judges would be set up to try Syrian officials. If some start testifying about what they know in order to save themselves, higher-ups will be implicated.
The Syrian regime has been desperate to kill this tribunal. One way has been to take over Lebanon or to intimidate the Lebanese government into watering down or dispensing with the investigation. The other way is to get the West to drop it. The Iraq issue is seen as a way of saving the regime by doing a trade-off.
The Golan Heights
This issue is far more ambiguous than it might appear from the standpoint of Syrian interests. First, Syria does not want to pay anything for getting back the Golan Heights in terms of peace with Israel or other concessions because such a deal--as the following points show--has far more negatives than positives for the Syrian regime.
While these factors apply both to Hafiz--who, after all, turned down such a deal in 2000--and his successor, Bashar is simultaneously more insecure and more committed to a consistently radical strategy. In contrast to actually reaching a deal, however, being engaged in a protracted negotiating process is advantageous, as the analysis below will show.
Second, the Golan Heights are a poisoned prize for Syria. If the regime loses the excuse of the conflict with Israel, it has precious little otherwise to use to rationalize its continued rule.
A rational analysis of regime interest shows many more reasons for Syria to avoid rather than to make peace with Israel. Syria has a great deal to lose if diplomacy succeeds. It does not want to see an increase in regional stability, a greater U.S. role, or the normalization of Israel's position in the area. Extremely dissatisfied with the status quo, Syria's rulers have seen the Arab world's return to past militancy as a way to escape isolation and seize leadership. Otherwise, their hope of gaining, or keeping, influence over neighbors and becoming the area's dominant power would be lost forever. The existence of a Western-oriented Palestinian state that did not side with Syria's ambitions but whose existence might even reduce tensions or end the Arab-Israeli conflict would do nothing for them either.
An Israel-Syria peace treaty would be equally bad for the regime. Such a diplomatic achievement would open the door for most other Arab states to have relations with Israel and to work with it on matters of common interest. Yet Israel would remain determined--and be far more able--to oppose Syria's ambitions for sway over Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinians. The United States would also use its stronger influence to block Syrian goals. An Israel-Lebanon agreement would follow any Israel-Syria accord, reducing Damascus's leverage in that country and bringing international pressure for a Syrian withdrawal.
These strategic costs would not be matched by many economic or political gains for Syria, certainly not on the all-important domestic front. A Syrian agreement with Israel would not bring much Western aid or investment. More open access for foreigners to invest or do business directly in Syria and more open commercial opportunities for Syrian businesspeople would actually weaken the dictatorship's hold over its own subjects. Freer communications would give Syria more access to news and information, including ideas and facts the regime does not want them to know.
As a result of such changes, Syria would lose prestige, aid, and deferral to its interests, all the advantages that being a militant confrontation state had long given it. Today, these same factors make Syria a superpower in terms of the demagogic appeal used to keep its people in line, marching behind the regime.
In short, the existence of the Arab-Israeli conflict was and continues to be good for Syria. If it were to disappear, this would be worse than being defeated in a dozen battles against Israel. Syria would be relegated into permanent status as a secondary power in the Middle East. At home, the result could be the regime's overthrow and a devastating civil war or revolution. This was the meaning of the warning given by one pro-regime Syrian writer that Israel's proposal to give Syria the Golan Heights in exchange for real peace "is like a minefield; it conceals things that are not apparent on the surface."
A peace agreement would also advance U.S. influence in the region and against Syrian interests. It would promote moderation, undercut radicalism, introduce Israel as a normal political (and economic) factor, and promote a regional stability that would strengthen the status quo. On every aspect of its impact, a successful peace process runs counter to Syrian interests.
Consequently, the Syrians are not interested in "trading" Iraq for the Golan Heights. However, they are more interested in trading the pretense of being helpful for a long-term process, Lebanon, and an end to the Hariri investigation.
Material Benefits
Given the bad shape of its economy and the regime's refusal to make meaningful economic reforms, Syria is also interested in using Iraq to gain material benefits. In 2005, officially reported Syrian exports to Iraq totaled approximately $800 million, not far behind Iran's roughly $1 billion figure. Since diplomatic relations were restored in late 2006, Syrian officials have voiced greater interest in expanding formal economic ties with Iraq. In March 2007, to cite one example, their ministers of electricity signed an agreement to plan links between the two national grids so that Syria could sell electricity to Iraq.
If, however, obtaining such advantages would require concessions or compromises on Syria's part, the regime would rather give up the gains than pay for them. This is clear from the government's meager record in this regard.
At the same time, Syria might well offer cosmetic overtures to Iraq and pay lip service to good neighborly relations. For instance, in March 2007, Syrian Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Abdallah al-Dardari made the following declaration: "Stability, development, prosperity and unity in Iraq will be beneficial for Syria more than any other country. Our economic outlook depends on economic growth and development in Iraq."
After all, if Syria can have normal relations with the Iraqi government while still subverting it--a goal that is quite obtainable--it would be the best of all possible situations for the Damascus regime. Furthermore, in this context, the economic benefits are also an attraction for Iraq to ignore some of Syria's unfriendly, but covert, activities.
There is one more extremely important aspect of Syria's posture. In February 2007, President Asad asserted in Newsweek magazine that Syria is "the main player" in Iraq; his deputy prime minister echoed that line, telling Der Spiegel that "everyone who wants to bring peace to Iraq has to work closely with Syria."
This concept is an important element in the Syrian policy conception. Asad seeks to portray himself as the key player in the region who can pose far-reaching demands in exchange for his cooperation. Yet if Syria is so valuable an interlocutor, it can expect to receive unilateral concessions. Certainly, Asad seems to believe genuinely that he is operating from a position of strength. Every hint of the West's uncertainty or weakness--such as the visit of Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and others in April 2007--is portrayed in Syria as a major victory and proof that its strategy is working.
Always in the regime's thinking are its objectives beyond Iraq. Its aims include eliminating or rendering impotent the Hariri investigation, its removal from the U.S. terrorist list, reopening the Iraq oil pipeline through Syria (which the same regime used to violate the sanctions before Saddam Hussein was overthrown), completing a trade agreement with the European Union, and getting security equipment (in some cases, items it has previously given Hizballah and the Iraqi insurgency, such as night-vision goggles) to "patrol" the Syria-Iraq border.
Conclusions
The problem in analyzing Syria is misunderstanding the government's interests. At the top of the list is regime maintenance. In this vein, for example, peace with Israel in exchange for the Golan Heights would weaken the regime, and the same is true for democratization or economic reform, changes that are superficially thought to benefit the country.
Next on the regime's list is killing the Hariri investigation and reestablishing its domination of Lebanon. In this connection, continued backing for Hizballah and strengthening it are absolutely necessary, since it is Syria's main asset in Lebanon. Similarly, there is nothing the West can offer Syria in any realistic context that would make it worthwhile for Damascus to split from Tehran, which gives it so much geopolitical leverage, Islamist legitimacy, and material benefits.
The bottom line is that Syria likes the instability and insurgency in neighboring Iraq, preferring instability in its neighbor unless it can dominate that country itself--or in tandem with its ally Iran. The fact is that Syria's interests are diametrically opposed to the United States on this issue.
The Syrians would welcome a U.S. withdrawal, though they might worry it would free up U.S. assets to be used against itself. While they would not like to see Iran have a monopoly on influence in Iraq, the idea of an Iraq in Iran's orbit does not scare them. After all, it is a member of what would be the Iran-
Syria-Iraq alignment.
The regime in Damascus would like to use its ability to disrupt Iraq as a bargaining chip to make gains elsewhere. Yet even if in receipt of these gains, Syria would not be inclined to favor a moderate, pro-Western, stable, democratic Iraq.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary Center, and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs. His latest book is The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2007). He is editor of the recently published Political Islam (three volumes) and also of Iraq After Saddam and The Global Survey of Islamism.
Tuesday, December 11, 2007
NEW SUPERCOPS
by Brad Reagan
Protecting America's cities, ports, borders and airports requires new technology and new tactics. Here's a look at who's doing it right.
A heavily armed Hercules team makes a show of force outside a midtown Manhattan office building.
No one sees them coming. There are no flashing lights, no sirens. The black Suburban simply glides out of Fifth Avenue traffic and pulls into a no-parking zone in front of the Empire State Building.
Moments later, four men spill out in combat helmets and heavy body armor: Two carry submachine guns; the others, snub-nosed shotguns.
Camera-toting tourists stop jabbering and stare at this intimidating new presence, their faces a mixture of curiosity and fear. Even jaded New Yorkers, many of whom work inside the midtown Manhattan landmark, look impressed.
A stone's throw down the sidewalk, Abad Nieves watches the scene unfold. Nieves is a detective with the Intelligence Division of the New York Police Department (NYPD).
Casually clad in slacks and a black leather jacket, he monitors the response of people loitering in the area. Is anyone making notes or videotaping? Does anyone seem especially startled by the out-of-the-blue appearance of a heavily armed NYPD squad?
On this day, Nieves doesn't see anything overly suspicious, but he is pleased that the deployment created a strong impression.
Known as a Hercules team, it makes multiple appearances around the city each day. The locations are chosen either in response to specific intelligence or simply to provide a show of force at high-profile sites.
'The response we usually get is, 'Holy s---!'' Nieves says. 'That's the reaction we want. We are in the business of scaring people--we just want to scare the right people.'
The people the NYPD hopes to scare are the ideological brothers of the Islamic extremists who have successfully attacked New York City twice in the past 13 years. To stop these terrorists, the department fundamentally changed the way it protects the city after 9/11.
At 51,000 strong, the NYPD employs more than 1.5 times as many people as the FBI, and its anti-terrorism initiative is a synchronized effort between the department's Intelligence Division and the Counter Terrorism Bureau.
The Intelligence Division coordinates the Hercules teams, which are composed of specialist cops rotated in from throughout the force.
The Counter Terrorism Bureau takes on a more focused role, functioning as the department's think tank on terrorism prevention and overseeing various subdepartments such as the NYPD/FBI Joint Terrorist Task Force.
The effort even stretches far from New York, with nine liaisons assigned to such overseas hot spots as Tel Aviv, Israel; Amman, Jordan; and London.
New York has become a testing ground for urban terrorism prevention in a major city, integrating new thinking and sophisticated technology into every level of the force.
And, the lessons learned are beginning to influence police forces in other cities. In 2004, Los Angeles launched Operation Archangel to identify possible targets and to develop protection plans for them, and the Chicago Police Department earlier this year began providing five days of terrorism training to all of its 13,500 officers.
Several big cities, including Washington, D.C., Las Vegas, Los Angeles and Chicago, even formed a network to gather and share intelligence--an interagency version of what New York built in-house.
The NYPD provides valuable consultation to many other local police departments and even state and federal agencies, from the Department of Defense to the Illinois State Police. In fact, international police forces from the Netherlands, Singapore and other countries have sent representatives to the NYPD to learn its tactics.
'Clearly, New York is way in front on this,' says Brian Michael Jenkins, a terrorism expert with the Rand Corp. 'As the threat gets more diffused, we are going to have less of the kind of intelligence that can be picked up by the feds.
We are dealing now with threats that are deliberately operating under the radar. Therefore, we have to aim the radar lower, to the local level.'
Although there have been no attacks in New York since 9/11, police officials work under the assumption that Al Qaeda and its sympathizers are constantly plotting against the city. As an example, they point to a 2002 plan by an Ohio truck driver named Iyman Faris to bring down the Brooklyn Bridge by cutting its cables.
Hercules teams are frequently stationed on the bridge, and the department keeps a boat in the waters beneath it at all times.
Faris, who later pleaded guilty to aiding Al Qaeda, ultimately called off the operation with a coded message reading: 'The weather is too hot.'
Protecting America's cities, ports, borders and airports requires new technology and new tactics. Here's a look at who's doing it right.
A heavily armed Hercules team makes a show of force outside a midtown Manhattan office building.
No one sees them coming. There are no flashing lights, no sirens. The black Suburban simply glides out of Fifth Avenue traffic and pulls into a no-parking zone in front of the Empire State Building.
Moments later, four men spill out in combat helmets and heavy body armor: Two carry submachine guns; the others, snub-nosed shotguns.
Camera-toting tourists stop jabbering and stare at this intimidating new presence, their faces a mixture of curiosity and fear. Even jaded New Yorkers, many of whom work inside the midtown Manhattan landmark, look impressed.
A stone's throw down the sidewalk, Abad Nieves watches the scene unfold. Nieves is a detective with the Intelligence Division of the New York Police Department (NYPD).
Casually clad in slacks and a black leather jacket, he monitors the response of people loitering in the area. Is anyone making notes or videotaping? Does anyone seem especially startled by the out-of-the-blue appearance of a heavily armed NYPD squad?
On this day, Nieves doesn't see anything overly suspicious, but he is pleased that the deployment created a strong impression.
Known as a Hercules team, it makes multiple appearances around the city each day. The locations are chosen either in response to specific intelligence or simply to provide a show of force at high-profile sites.
'The response we usually get is, 'Holy s---!'' Nieves says. 'That's the reaction we want. We are in the business of scaring people--we just want to scare the right people.'
The people the NYPD hopes to scare are the ideological brothers of the Islamic extremists who have successfully attacked New York City twice in the past 13 years. To stop these terrorists, the department fundamentally changed the way it protects the city after 9/11.
At 51,000 strong, the NYPD employs more than 1.5 times as many people as the FBI, and its anti-terrorism initiative is a synchronized effort between the department's Intelligence Division and the Counter Terrorism Bureau.
The Intelligence Division coordinates the Hercules teams, which are composed of specialist cops rotated in from throughout the force.
The Counter Terrorism Bureau takes on a more focused role, functioning as the department's think tank on terrorism prevention and overseeing various subdepartments such as the NYPD/FBI Joint Terrorist Task Force.
The effort even stretches far from New York, with nine liaisons assigned to such overseas hot spots as Tel Aviv, Israel; Amman, Jordan; and London.
New York has become a testing ground for urban terrorism prevention in a major city, integrating new thinking and sophisticated technology into every level of the force.
And, the lessons learned are beginning to influence police forces in other cities. In 2004, Los Angeles launched Operation Archangel to identify possible targets and to develop protection plans for them, and the Chicago Police Department earlier this year began providing five days of terrorism training to all of its 13,500 officers.
Several big cities, including Washington, D.C., Las Vegas, Los Angeles and Chicago, even formed a network to gather and share intelligence--an interagency version of what New York built in-house.
The NYPD provides valuable consultation to many other local police departments and even state and federal agencies, from the Department of Defense to the Illinois State Police. In fact, international police forces from the Netherlands, Singapore and other countries have sent representatives to the NYPD to learn its tactics.
'Clearly, New York is way in front on this,' says Brian Michael Jenkins, a terrorism expert with the Rand Corp. 'As the threat gets more diffused, we are going to have less of the kind of intelligence that can be picked up by the feds.
We are dealing now with threats that are deliberately operating under the radar. Therefore, we have to aim the radar lower, to the local level.'
Although there have been no attacks in New York since 9/11, police officials work under the assumption that Al Qaeda and its sympathizers are constantly plotting against the city. As an example, they point to a 2002 plan by an Ohio truck driver named Iyman Faris to bring down the Brooklyn Bridge by cutting its cables.
Hercules teams are frequently stationed on the bridge, and the department keeps a boat in the waters beneath it at all times.
Faris, who later pleaded guilty to aiding Al Qaeda, ultimately called off the operation with a coded message reading: 'The weather is too hot.'
Monday, December 03, 2007
ODDS & ENDS
Fred Thompson bought Christmas gifts for his kids in New Hampshire Friday. He's sixty-five years old. How can people criticize Barry Bonds for using performance-enhancing drugs when Fred Thompson has a three-year-old child and a one-year-old baby?
Hillary Clinton sang old hymns at Grace United Methodist Church in Des Moines on Christ the King Sunday. They took up two collections to get her to stop singing. Whenever Hillary sings she sounds like a cat on its way to the tennis racket factory.
Saudi Arabia agreed to attend today's peace conference in Maryland as a favor to the Republicans. The Democrats make the Saudis feel like they're replaceable. Barack Obama is slick and John Edwards is oily and Bill Clinton is nothing if not crude.
GOP candidate Ron Paul was endorsed for president Saturday by a Nevada brothel owner. They aren't far apart in their views. Ron Paul believes in an immediate pullout and the brothel owner is in favor of the customer having the full fifteen minutes.
The Republican Party was reported Sunday to be recruiting very wealthy people to run for Congress using their own money. It's an awful idea. People with that much money get used to saying whatever they think, and that will end anyone's career in politics.
John Edwards marched with striking screenwriters in Beverly Hills Monday. He's right at home here. We're the only people who know that his four-hundred-dollar haircut is what you pay at SuperCuts in Beverly Hills, but only if you have a coupon.
President Bush met Al Gore in the Oval Office Monday before a ceremony saluting this year's Nobel Prize winners. The president was a gracious host. He pushed the thermostat up to ninety degrees to make Al Gore feel that he's right about everything.
Israel's Ehud Olmert and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas agreed to begin talks for an independent Palestine. They'll meet every two weeks. The leaders say they are worried because they can hear the clock ticking, at least they think it's a clock.
Bill Clinton answered his wife's call to head for Iowa on Monday where he went from town to town on behalf of her candidacy. The former president just loves to get out among the people and press the flesh. It hardly left any time for campaigning.
Teddy Kennedy signed a huge deal Tuesday to write his memoirs in two years. He must have some priceless memories. The Kennedys harken back to a more innocent time in our history when a Democrat could go to confession and that would be the end of it.
President Bush promised Tuesday to help the Palestinians and the Israelis find common ground. Was this wise? If President Bush knew just a little more about the Middle East, he'd know that common ground only leads to gun battles over water rights.
Bill Clinton spoke about himself in Iowa for two hours on Tuesday when he was supposed to be talking about Hillary. This is a tough year for him. Everywhere Bill Clinton goes, he puts seven chairs next to him so he'll feel like he's in the debates.
Senator Teddy Kennedy signed the richest political book deal in history Monday to write his memoirs. He's been keeping detailed notes throughout his career. His co-author now faces the daunting task of collating a hundred thousand cocktail napkins.
Hat tip Pookie 18
Hillary Clinton sang old hymns at Grace United Methodist Church in Des Moines on Christ the King Sunday. They took up two collections to get her to stop singing. Whenever Hillary sings she sounds like a cat on its way to the tennis racket factory.
Saudi Arabia agreed to attend today's peace conference in Maryland as a favor to the Republicans. The Democrats make the Saudis feel like they're replaceable. Barack Obama is slick and John Edwards is oily and Bill Clinton is nothing if not crude.
GOP candidate Ron Paul was endorsed for president Saturday by a Nevada brothel owner. They aren't far apart in their views. Ron Paul believes in an immediate pullout and the brothel owner is in favor of the customer having the full fifteen minutes.
The Republican Party was reported Sunday to be recruiting very wealthy people to run for Congress using their own money. It's an awful idea. People with that much money get used to saying whatever they think, and that will end anyone's career in politics.
John Edwards marched with striking screenwriters in Beverly Hills Monday. He's right at home here. We're the only people who know that his four-hundred-dollar haircut is what you pay at SuperCuts in Beverly Hills, but only if you have a coupon.
President Bush met Al Gore in the Oval Office Monday before a ceremony saluting this year's Nobel Prize winners. The president was a gracious host. He pushed the thermostat up to ninety degrees to make Al Gore feel that he's right about everything.
Israel's Ehud Olmert and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas agreed to begin talks for an independent Palestine. They'll meet every two weeks. The leaders say they are worried because they can hear the clock ticking, at least they think it's a clock.
Bill Clinton answered his wife's call to head for Iowa on Monday where he went from town to town on behalf of her candidacy. The former president just loves to get out among the people and press the flesh. It hardly left any time for campaigning.
Teddy Kennedy signed a huge deal Tuesday to write his memoirs in two years. He must have some priceless memories. The Kennedys harken back to a more innocent time in our history when a Democrat could go to confession and that would be the end of it.
President Bush promised Tuesday to help the Palestinians and the Israelis find common ground. Was this wise? If President Bush knew just a little more about the Middle East, he'd know that common ground only leads to gun battles over water rights.
Bill Clinton spoke about himself in Iowa for two hours on Tuesday when he was supposed to be talking about Hillary. This is a tough year for him. Everywhere Bill Clinton goes, he puts seven chairs next to him so he'll feel like he's in the debates.
Senator Teddy Kennedy signed the richest political book deal in history Monday to write his memoirs. He's been keeping detailed notes throughout his career. His co-author now faces the daunting task of collating a hundred thousand cocktail napkins.
Hat tip Pookie 18
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